by Chidi Odinkalu
Nigeria
is in the throes of an epidemic of violence and impunity much unlike
anything the country has witnessed before. Violence in its multi-faceted
forms is by most understandings the biggest single law and order and
public health problem in the country today. For the first time in our
collective consciousness, such acts of violence now routinely include
indiscriminate mass killings of civilians caused by Improvised Explosive
Devices.
As disparate as these forms of violence seem to be,
one thing unites them: our mechanisms of legal accountability seem
inadequate to address them or to apprehend the perpetrators. Clothed
with effective impunity, therefore, those who unleash this violence feel
able not just to repeat it as often as they wish, but also to recruit
many followers into the enterprise of seeming to make violence
worthwhile. For many Nigerians, another Independence anniversary could
feel very much like cutting a birthday cake for impunity.
Fifty two years after Independence, this crisis of
violence is the principal metric of the state of evolution and disrepair
of our institutions of legal and judicial accountability. The verdict
they encapsulate is an unhappy one. So, what then is the relationship of
violence to the evolution of Nigeria’s judicial and legal institutions?
Simply put, an epidemic of violence is the opposite of a state of rule
of law. It is evidence of failure of institutions of the rule of law and
of a widespread lack of trust in them.
At Independence in 1960, Nigeria inherited colonial
institutions that had not been tested by a free people. The Police Force
bequeathed to the country in 1960, for instance, was an expeditionary
institution with a century of the wrong kind of traditions and history.
The judiciary, for all the admirable men (they were all men then) that
administered it, was institutionally younger than the Police at
Independence, but essentially also not much different in its essential
philosophies. The governing organs of the legal profession were wholly
owned by government. With over 28 of our 52 years of post-colonial
government lived under military rule, the institutions of the rule of
law were fated to suffer considerable diminution in both their efficacy
and authority.
The defining landmarks in the unraveling of the
post-colonial legal system have been captured in symbolic moments and
snapshots. From 1961 until 1963, there were three such moments in the
civilian interregnum that preceded military rule.
First, Shortly after Independence, the Nigerian legal
system faced its first major test in the Treason Trial of J.S. Tarka in
1961. Tarka, firebrand leader of an opposition party, the United Middle
Belt Congress, was charged with the serious crime of levying war
against Her Majesty, the Queen of Nigeria – treason. This was two years
before Nigeria would become a Republic in 1963. The trial somehow
conveniently coincided with the elections into the dissolved Northern
Nigeria House of Assembly, controlled by the then ruling Northern
Peoples’ Congress. The effort to crush the UMBC failed in the short term
as forces loyal to Tarka prevailed in his beloved Tivland during the
elections and he was acquitted in the trial. However, the ruling party
had learnt not to be outmanoeuvred on strategy.
Next, in 1962, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the
Opposition in the Federal Parliament would subsequently be tried and
convicted of treasonable felony in proceedings in which the then Federal
Minister for Internal Affairs, Usman Sarki, denied his counsel of
choice, Mr. Gratien QC, entry clearance into Nigeria. This was to
precede a takeover of Chief Awolowo’s Western region.
Thus, in 1963, dis-regarding a pending Privy Council
appeal (which it subsequently lost) in a dispute over who was the lawful
Prime Minister of the Western Region, the government restored Chief
Awolowo’s ambitious former deputy, Samuel Akintola, as the Prime
Minister of the Western Region. Following the Privy Council decision in
this case [Adegbenro vs. Akintola, (1963) A.C. 164], the then Federal
Government established the Supreme Court, abolished appeals to the Privy
Council and proclaimed Nigeria a Republic. The civilians had laid the
foundations of what would define post-colonial institutional politics –
that the decisions of courts which prove not to be malleable can be
dispensed with at the whim of the rulers of the day.
The military would take this lesson to heart when
they took over the reins of power following the coups of 1966. When the
then Supreme Court ruled in 1969 in Lakanmi’s case that the events of
January 1966 were not revolutionary in a constitutional sense, obliging
the then military regime, therefore, to subject itself to the niceties
of the written 1963 Constitution, the soldiers simply promulgated the
Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree
of 1970, eviscerating the decision and lobotomising the courts. Despite
episodic stirrings to judicial imagination since then, our judicial
institutions have never quite recovered from these grave errors by men
who were inevitably limited by their youth.
The tendency of the post-colonial regimes to respect
only legal advice that they liked and obey judicial decisions that
favoured them would catch up with both its authors and the country.
Taslim Elias, who, as Federal Attorney-General, presided over the
developments narrated above, would himself become a victim of his own
precedents when, as Chief Justice, he was summarily relieved of his
position in 1975 with no need for justification.
A major victim of this arbitrariness was Nigeria’s
criminal justice and penal system. Bola Ige, the story of whose life is
well known as counsel to J.S. Tarka in the treason trials, and later as
governor, political detainee, Justice Minister and himself victim of an
assassination, notes in his work, People, Politics, and Politicians of
Nigeria, 1940-1979, that “Nigerian authorities have become more
inhumane, more intolerant and more callous in their treatment not only
of those standing trial but also of those detained for months without
trial….”
By the outset of the third decade of Nigeria’s
independence, the consequences of this history had percolated into
judicial decision-making in the first evidence of what would become a
gangrene of allegations of judicial corruption. In 1986, the report of
the Babalakin Commission of Inquiry into the then Federal Electoral
Commission, found, in relation to judicial decision making in the 1983
elections that “allegations of corruption in high places were freely
made.”
•Odinkalu chairs the Board of the National Human Rights Commission.Punch
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