Wednesday 1 August 2012

Nigeria-THE FIRST REPUBLIC


Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960. The period between this date and January 15, 1966, when the first military coup d'�tat took place, is generally referred to as the First Republic, although the country only became a republic on October 1, 1963. After a plebiscite in February 1961, the Northern Cameroons, which before then was administered separately within Nigeria, voted to join Nigeria.
At independence Nigeria had all the trappings of a democratic state and was indeed regarded as a beacon of hope for democracy. It had a federal constitution that guaranteed a large measure of autonomy to three (later four) regions; it operated a parliamentary democracy modeled along British lines that emphasized majority rule; the constitution included an elaborate bill of rights; and, unlike other African states that adopted one-party systems immediately after independence, the country had a functional, albeit regionally based, multiparty system.
These democratic trappings were not enough to guarantee the survival of the republic because of certain fundamental and structural weaknesses. Perhaps the most significant weakness was the disproportionate power of the north in the federation. The departing colonial authority had hoped that the development of national politics would forestall any sectional domination of power, but it underestimated the effects of a regionalized party system in a country where political power depended on population. The major political parties in the republic had emerged in the late 1940s and early 1950s as regional parties whose main aim was to control power in their regions. The Northern People's Congress (NPC) and the Action Group (AG), which controlled the Northern Region and the Western Region, respectively, clearly emerged in this way. The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), which controlled the Eastern Region and the Midwestern Region (created in 1963), began as a nationalist party but was forced by the pressures of regionalism to become primarily an eastern party, albeit with strong pockets of support elsewhere in the federation. These regional parties were based upon, and derived their main support from, the major groups in their regions: NPC (Hausa/Fulani), AG (Yoruba), and NCNC (Igbo). A notable and more ideologically-based political party that never achieved significant power was Aminu Kano's radical Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), which opposed the NPC in the north from its Kano base.
There were also several political movements formed by minority groups to press their demands for separate states. These minority parties also doubled as opposition parties in the regions and usually aligned themselves with the party in power in another region that supported their demands for a separate state. Ethnic minorities therefore enabled the regional parties to extend their influence beyond their regions.
In the general election of 1959 to determine which parties would rule in the immediate postcolonial period, the major ones won a majority of seats in their regions, but none emerged powerful enough to constitute a national government. A coalition government was formed by the NPC and NCNC, the former having been greatly favored by the departing colonial authority. The coalition provided a measure of north-south consensus that would not have been the case if the NCNC and AG had formed a coalition. Nnamdi Azikiwe (NCNC) became the governor general (and president after the country became a republic in 1963), Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (NPC) was named prime minister, and Obafemi Awolowo (AG) had to settle for leader of the opposition. The regional premiers were Ahmadu Bello (Northern Region, NPC), Samuel Akintola (Western Region, AG), Michael Okpara (Eastern Region, NCNC), and Dennis Osadebey (Midwestern Region, NCNC).
Among the difficulties of the republic were efforts of the NPC, the senior partner in the coalition government, to use the federal government's increasing power in favor of the Northern Region. The balance rested on the premise that the Northern Region had the political advantage deriving from its preponderant size and population, and the two southern regions (initially the Eastern Region and the Western Region) had the economic advantage as sources of most of the exported agricultural products, in addition to their control of the federal bureaucracy. The NPC sought to redress northern economic and bureaucratic disadvantages. Under the First National Development Plan, many of the federal government's projects and military establishments were allocated to the north. There was an "affirmative action" program by the government to recruit and train northerners, resulting in the appointment of less qualified northerners to federal public service positions, many replacing more qualified southerners. Actions such as these served to estrange the NCNC from its coalition partner. The reactions to the fear of northern dominance, and especially the steps taken by the NCNC to counter the political dominance of the north, accelerated the collapse of the young republic.
The southern parties, especially the embittered NCNC, had hoped that the regional power balance could be shifted if the 1962 census favored the south. Population determined the allocation of parliamentary seats on which the power of every region was based. Because population figures were also used in allocating revenue to the regions and in determining the viability of any proposed new region, the 1962 census was approached by all regions as a key contest for control of the federation. This contest led to various illegalities: inflated figures, electoral violence, falsification of results, manipulation of population figures, and the like. Although the chief census officer found evidence of more inflated figures in the southern regions, the northern region retained its numerical superiority. As could be expected, southern leaders rejected the results, leading to a cancellation of the census and to the holding of a fresh census in 1963. This population count was finally accepted after a protracted legal battle by the NCNC and gave the Northern Region a population of 29,758,975 out of the total of 55,620,268. These figures eliminated whatever hope the southerners had of ruling the federation.
Since the 1962-63 exercise, the size and distribution of the population have remained volatile political issues (see Population , ch. 2). In fact, the importance and sensitivity of a census count have increased because of the expanded use of population figures for revenue allocations, constituency delineation, allocations under the quota system of admissions into schools and employment, and the siting of industries and social amenities such as schools, hospitals, and post offices. Another census in 1973 failed, even though it was conducted by a military government that was less politicized than its civilian predecessor. What made the 1973 census particularly volatile was the fact that it was part of a transition plan by the military to hand over power to civilians. The provisional figures showed an increase for the states that were carved out of the former Northern Region with a combined 51.4 million people out of a total 79.8 million people. Old fears of domination were resurrected, and the stability of the federation was again seriously threatened. The provisional results were finally canceled in 1975. As of late 1990, no other census had been undertaken, although one was scheduled for 1991 as part of the transition to civilian rule. In the interim, Nigeria has relied on population projections based on 1963 census figures.
Other events also contributed to the collapse of the First Republic. In 1962, after a split in the leadership of the AG that led to a crisis in the Western Region, a state of emergency was declared in the region, and the federal government invoked its emergency powers to administer the region directly. These actions resulted in removing the AG from regional power. Awolowo, its leader, along with other AG leaders, was convicted of treasonable felony. Awolowo's former deputy and premier of the Western Region formed a new party--the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP)--that took over the government. The federal coalition government also supported agitation of minority groups for a separate state to be excised from the Western Region. In 1963 the Midwestern Region was created.
By the time of the 1964 general elections, the first to be conducted solely by Nigerians, the country's politics had become polarized into a competition between two opposing alliances. One was the Nigerian National Alliance made up of the NPC and NNDC; the other was the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) composed of the NCNC, the AG, and their allies. Each of the regional parties openly intimidated its opponents in the campaigns. When it became clear that the neutrality of the Federal Electoral Commission could not be guaranteed, calls were made for the army to supervise the elections. The UPGA resolved to boycott the elections. When elections were finally held under conditions that were not free and were unfair to opponents of the regional parties, the NCNC was returned to power in the east and midwest, while the NPC kept control of the north and was also in a position to form a federal government on its own. The Western Region became the "theater of war" between the NNDP (and the NPC) and the AG-UPGA. The rescheduled regional elections late in 1965 were violent. The federal government refused to declare a state of emergency, and the military seized power on January 15, 1966. The First Republic had collapsed.
Scholars have made several attempts to explain the collapse. Some attribute it to the inappropriateness of the political institutions and processes and to their not being adequately entrenched under colonial rule, whereas others hold the elite responsible. Lacking a political culture to sustain democracy, politicians failed to play the political game according to established rules. The failure of the elite appears to have been a symptom rather than the cause of the problem. Because members of the elite lacked a material base for their aspirations, they resorted to control of state offices and resources. At the same time, the uneven rates of development among the various groups and regions invested the struggle for state power with a group character. These factors gave importance to group, ethnic, and regional conflicts that eventually contributed to the collapse of the republic.
The final explanation is closely related to all the foregoing. It holds that the regionalization of politics and, in particular, of party politics made the stability of the republic dependent on each party retaining control of its regional base. As long as this was so, there was a rough balance between the parties, as well as their respective regions. Once the federal government invoked its emergency powers in 1962 and removed the AG from power in the Western Region, the fragile balance on which the federation rested was disturbed. Attempts by the AG and NCNC to create a new equilibrium, or at least to return the status quo ante, only generated stronger opposition and hastened the collapse of the republic.
Data as of June 1991




Background
British influence and control over what would become Nigeria and Africa's most populous country grew through the 19th century. A series of constitutions after World War II granted Nigeria greater autonomy; independence came in 1960. Following nearly 16 years of military rule, a new constitution was adopted in 1999, and a peaceful transition to civilian government was completed. The government continues to face the daunting task of reforming a petroleum-based economy, whose revenues have been squandered through corruption and mismanagement, and institutionalizing democracy. In addition, Nigeria continues to experience longstanding ethnic and religious tensions. Although both the 2003 and 2007 presidential elections were marred by significant irregularities and violence, Nigeria is currently experiencing its longest period of civilian rule since independence. The general elections of April 2007 marked the first civilian-to-civilian transfer of power in the country's history.
Location
Western Africa, bordering the Gulf of Guinea, between Benin and Cameroon
Area(sq km)
total: 923,768 sq km
land: 910,768 sq km
water: 13,000 sq km
Geographic coordinates
10 00 N, 8 00 E
Land boundaries(km)
total: 4,047 km
border countries: Benin 773 km, Cameroon 1,690 km, Chad 87 km, Niger 1,497 km
Coastline(km)
853 km
Climate
varies; equatorial in south, tropical in center, arid in north
Elevation extremes(m)
lowest point: Atlantic Ocean 0 m
highest point: Chappal Waddi 2,419 m
Natural resources
natural gas, petroleum, tin, iron ore, coal, limestone, niobium, lead, zinc, arable land
Land use(%)
arable land: 33.02%
permanent crops: 3.14%
other: 63.84% (2005)
Irrigated land(sq km)
2,820 sq km (2003)
Total renewable water resources(cu km)
286.2 cu km (2003)
Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural)
total: 8.01 cu km/yr (21%/10%/69%)
per capita: 61 cu m/yr (2000)
Natural hazards
periodic droughts; flooding
Environment - current issues
soil degradation; rapid deforestation; urban air and water pollution; desertification; oil pollution - water, air, and soil; has suffered serious damage from oil spills; loss of arable land; rapid urbanization
Environment - international agreements
party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Marine Life Conservation, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands
signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements
Geography - note
the Niger enters the country in the northwest and flows southward through tropical rain forests and swamps to its delta in the Gulf of Guinea
Population
149,229,090
note: estimates for this country explicitly take into account the effects of excess mortality due to AIDS; this can result in lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality, higher death rates, lower population growth rates, and changes in the distribution of population by age and sex than would otherwise be expected (July 2009 est.)
Age structure(%)
0-14 years: 41.5% (male 31,624,050/female 30,242,637)
15-64 years: 55.5% (male 42,240,641/female 40,566,672)
65 years and over: 3.1% (male 2,211,840/female 2,343,250) (2009 est.)
Median age(years)
total: 19 years
male: 18.9 years
female: 19.1 years (2009 est.)
Population growth rate(%)
1.999% (2009 est.)
Birth rate(births/1,000 population)
36.65 births/1,000 population (2009 est.)
Death rate(deaths/1,000 population)
16.56 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.)
Net migration rate(migrant(s)/1,000 population)
-0.1 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2009 est.)
Urbanization(%)
urban population: 48% of total population (2008)
rate of urbanization: 3.8% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
Sex ratio(male(s)/female)
at birth: 1.06 male(s)/female
under 15 years: 1.05 male(s)/female
15-64 years: 1.04 male(s)/female
65 years and over: 0.94 male(s)/female
total population: 1.04 male(s)/female (2009 est.)
Infant mortality rate(deaths/1,000 live births)
total: 94.35 deaths/1,000 live births
male: 100.38 deaths/1,000 live births
female: 87.97 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 est.)
Life expectancy at birth(years)
total population: 46.94 years
male: 46.16 years
female: 47.76 years (2009 est.)
Total fertility rate(children born/woman)
4.91 children born/woman (2009 est.)
Nationality
noun: Nigerian(s)
adjective: Nigerian
Ethnic groups(%)
Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, is composed of more than 250 ethnic groups; the following are the most populous and politically influential: Hausa and Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo (Ibo) 18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3.5%, Tiv 2.5%
Religions(%)
Muslim 50%, Christian 40%, indigenous beliefs 10%
Languages(%)
English (official), Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo (Ibo), Fulani
Country name
conventional long form: Federal Republic of Nigeria
conventional short form: Nigeria
Government type
federal republic
Capital
name: Abuja
geographic coordinates: 9 05 N, 7 32 E
time difference: UTC+1 (6 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)
Administrative divisions
36 states and 1 territory*; Abia, Adamawa, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Enugu, Federal Capital Territory*, Gombe, Imo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Lagos, Nassarawa, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe, Zamfara
Constitution
adopted 5 May 1999; effective 29 May 1999
Legal system
based on English common law, Islamic law (in 12 northern states), and traditional law; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction with reservations
Suffrage
18 years of age; universal
Executive branch
chief of state: President Umaru Musa YAR'ADUA (since 29 May 2007); note - the president is both the chief of state and head of government
head of government: President Umaru Musa YAR'ADUA (since 29 May 2007)
cabinet: Federal Executive Council
elections: president is elected by popular vote for a four-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held 21 April 2007 (next to be held in April 2011)
election results: Umaru Musa YAR'ADUA elected president; percent of vote - Umaru Musa YAR'ADUA 69.8%, Muhammadu BUHARI 18.7%, Atiku ABUBAKAR 7.5%, Orji Uzor KALU 1.7%, other 2.3%
Legislative branch
bicameral National Assembly consists of the Senate (109 seats, 3 from each state plus 1 from Abuja; members elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms) and House of Representatives (360 seats; members elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms)
elections: Senate - last held 21 April 2007 (next to be held in April 2011); House of Representatives - last held 21 April 2007 (next to be held in April 2011)
election results: Senate - percent of vote by party - PDP 53.7%, ANPP 27.9%, AD 9.7%, other 8.7%; seats by party - PDP 76, ANPP 27, AD 6; House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - PDP 54.5%, ANPP 27.4%, AD 8.8%, UNPP 2.8%, NPD 1.9%, APGA 1.6%, PRP 0.8%; seats by party - PDP 76, ANPP 27, AD 6, UNPP 2, APGA 2, NPD 1, PRP 1, vacant 1
Judicial branch
Supreme Court (judges recommended by the National Judicial Council and appointed by the president); Federal Court of Appeal (judges are appointed by the federal government from a pool of judges recommended by the National Judicial Council)
Political pressure groups and leaders
Academic Staff Union for Universities or ASUU; Campaign for Democracy or CD; Civil Liberties Organization or CLO; Committee for the Defense of Human Rights or CDHR; Constitutional Right Project or CRP; Human Right Africa; National Association of Democratic Lawyers or NADL; National Association of Nigerian Students or NANS; Nigerian Bar Association or NBA; Nigerian Labor Congress or NLC; Nigerian Medical Association or NMA; the Press; Universal Defenders of Democracy or UDD
International organization participation
ACP, AfDB, AU, C, ECOWAS, FAO, G-15, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC, MIGA, MINURCAT, MINURSO, MONUC, NAM, OAS (observer), OIC, OPCW, OPEC, PCA, UN, UN Security Council (temporary), UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO
Flag description
three equal vertical bands of green (hoist side), white, and green
Economy - overview
Oil-rich Nigeria, long hobbled by political instability, corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and poor macroeconomic management, has undertaken several reforms over the past decade. Nigeria's former military rulers failed to diversify the economy away from its overdependence on the capital-intensive oil sector, which provides 95% of foreign exchange earnings and about 80% of budgetary revenues. Following the signing of an IMF stand-by agreement in August 2000, Nigeria received a debt-restructuring deal from the Paris Club and a $1 billion credit from the IMF, both contingent on economic reforms. Nigeria pulled out of its IMF program in April 2002, after failing to meet spending and exchange rate targets, making it ineligible for additional debt forgiveness from the Paris Club. Since 2008 the government has begun showing the political will to implement the market-oriented reforms urged by the IMF, such as to modernize the banking system, to curb inflation by blocking excessive wage demands, and to resolve regional disputes over the distribution of earnings from the oil industry. In 2003, the government began deregulating fuel prices, announced the privatization of the country's four oil refineries, and instituted the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy, a domestically designed and run program modeled on the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility for fiscal and monetary management. In November 2005, Abuja won Paris Club approval for a debt-relief deal that eliminated $18 billion of debt in exchange for $12 billion in payments - a total package worth $30 billion of Nigeria's total $37 billion external debt. The deal requires Nigeria to be subject to stringent IMF reviews. Based largely on increased oil exports and high global crude prices, GDP rose strongly in 2007 and 2008. President YAR'ADUA has pledged to continue the economic reforms of his predecessor with emphasis on infrastructure improvements. Infrastructure is the main impediment to growth. The government is working toward developing stronger public-private partnerships for electricity and roads.
GDP (purchasing power parity)
$336.2 billion (2008 est.)
$319.3 billion (2007 est.)
$300.1 billion (2006 est.)
note: data are in 2008 US dollars
GDP (official exchange rate)
$207.1 billion (2008 est.)
GDP - real growth rate(%)
5.3% (2008 est.)
6.4% (2007 est.)
6.2% (2006 est.)
GDP - per capita (PPP)
$2,300 (2008 est.)
$2,200 (2007 est.)
$2,100 (2006 est.)
note: data are in 2008 US dollars
GDP - composition by sector(%)
agriculture: 18.1%
industry: 50.8%
services: 31.1% (2008 est.)
Labor force
51.04 million (2008 est.)
Labor force - by occupation(%)
agriculture: 70%
industry: 10%
services: 20% (1999 est.)
Unemployment rate(%)
4.9% (2007 est.)
Population below poverty line(%)
70% (2007 est.)
Household income or consumption by percentage share(%)
lowest 10%: 2%
highest 10%: 32.4% (2004)
Distribution of family income - Gini index
43.7 (2003)
50.6 (1997)
Investment (gross fixed)(% of GDP)
21.7% of GDP (2008 est.)
Budget
revenues: $19.76 billion
expenditures: $24.72 billion (2008 est.)
Inflation rate (consumer prices)(%)
11.6% (2008 est.)
5.4% (2007 est.)
Stock of money
$35.29 billion (31 December 2008)
$26.82 billion (31 December 2007)
Stock of quasi money
$32.04 billion (31 December 2008)
$22.78 billion (31 December 2007)
Stock of domestic credit
$49.51 billion (31 December 2008)
$35.68 billion (31 December 2007)
Market value of publicly traded shares
$49.8 billion (31 December 2008)
$86.35 billion (31 December 2007)
$32.82 billion (31 December 2006)
Economic aid - recipient
$6.437 billion (2005)
Public debt(% of GDP)
13.4% of GDP (2008 est.)
20% of GDP (2004 est.)
Agriculture - products
cocoa, peanuts, palm oil, corn, rice, sorghum, millet, cassava (tapioca), yams, rubber; cattle, sheep, goats, pigs; timber; fish
Industries
crude oil, coal, tin, columbite; palm oil, peanuts, cotton, rubber, wood; hides and skins, textiles, cement and other construction materials, food products, footwear, chemicals, fertilizer, printing, ceramics, steel, small commercial ship construction and repair
Industrial production growth rate(%)
2.8% (2008 est.)
Current account balance
$3.877 billion (2008 est.)
$2.203 billion (2007 est.)
Exports
$76.03 billion (2008 est.)
$61.82 billion (2007 est.)
Exports - commodities(%)
petroleum and petroleum products 95%, cocoa, rubber
Exports - partners(%)
US 41.4%, India 10.4%, Brazil 9.4%, Spain 7.2%, France 4.6% (2008)
Imports
$46.3 billion (2008 est.)
$38.8 billion (2007 est.)
Imports - commodities(%)
machinery, chemicals, transport equipment, manufactured goods, food and live animals
Imports - partners(%)
China 13.8%, Netherlands 9.6%, US 8.4%, UK 5.3%, South Korea 5.2%, France 4.3% (2008)
Reserves of foreign exchange and gold
$53 billion (31 December 2008 est.)
$51.33 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Debt - external
$9.996 billion (31 December 2008 est.)
$8.007 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Stock of direct foreign investment - at home
$68.84 billion (31 December 2008 est.)
$58.84 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Stock of direct foreign investment - abroad
$13.02 billion (31 December 2008 est.)
$12.72 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Exchange rates
nairas (NGN) per US dollar - 117.8 (2008 est.), 127.46 (2007), 127.38 (2006), 132.59 (2005), 132.89 (2004)
Currency (code)
naira (NGN)
Telephones - main lines in use
1.308 million (2008)
Telephones - mobile cellular
62.988 million (2008)
Telephone system
general assessment: further expansion and modernization of the fixed-line telephone network is needed
domestic: the addition of a second fixed-line provider in 2002 resulted in faster growth but subscribership remains only about 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular services growing rapidly, in part responding to the shortcomings of the fixed-line network; multiple cellular service providers operate nationally with subscribership reaching 45 per 100 persons in 2008
international: country code - 234; landing point for the SAT-3/WASC fiber-optic submarine cable that provides connectivity to Europe and Asia; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (2 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean) (2008)
Internet country code
.ng
Internet users
11 million (2008)
Airports
56 (2009)
Pipelines(km)
condensate 21 km; gas 2,560 km; liquid petroleum gas 97 km; oil 3,396 km; refined products 4,090 km (2008)
Roadways(km)
total: 193,200 km
paved: 28,980 km
unpaved: 164,220 km (2004)
Ports and terminals
Bonny Inshore Terminal, Calabar, Lagos
Military branches
Nigerian Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force (2008)
Military service age and obligation(years of age)
18 years of age for voluntary military service (2007)
Manpower available for military service
males age 16-49: 31,929,204
females age 16-49: 30,638,979 (2008 est.)
Manpower fit for military service
males age 16-49: 19,763,535
females age 16-49: 18,850,650 (2009 est.)
Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually
male: 1,697,030
female: 1,618,561 (2009 est.)
Military expenditures(% of GDP)
1.5% of GDP (2006)
Disputes - international
Joint Border Commission with Cameroon reviewed 2002 ICJ ruling on the entire boundary and bilaterally resolved differences, including June 2006 Greentree Agreement that immediately cedes sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon with a phase-out of Nigerian control within two years while resolving patriation issues; the ICJ ruled on an equidistance settlement of Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea, but imprecisely defined coordinates in the ICJ decision and a sovereignty dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River all contribute to the delay in implementation; only Nigeria and Cameroon have heeded the Lake Chad Commission's admonition to ratify the delimitation treaty which also includes the Chad-Niger and Niger-Nigeria boundaries
Refugees and internally displaced persons
refugees (country of origin): 5,778 (Liberia)
IDPs: undetermined (communal violence between Christians and Muslims since President OBASANJO's election in 1999; displacement is mostly short-term) (2007)
Electricity - production(kWh)
21.92 billion kWh (2007 est.)
Electricity - production by source(%)
fossil fuel: 61.9%
hydro: 38.1%
nuclear: 0%
other: 0% (2001)
Electricity - consumption(kWh)
19.21 billion kWh (2007 est.)
Electricity - exports(kWh)
0 kWh (2008 est.)
Electricity - imports(kWh)
0 kWh (2008 est.)
Oil - production(bbl/day)
2.169 million bbl/day (2008 est.)
Oil - consumption(bbl/day)
286,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)
Oil - exports(bbl/day)
2.327 million bbl/day (2007 est.)
Oil - imports(bbl/day)
170,000 bbl/day (2007 est.)
Oil - proved reserves(bbl)
36.22 billion bbl (1 January 2009 est.)
Natural gas - production(cu m)
32.82 billion cu m (2008 est.)
Natural gas - consumption(cu m)
12.28 billion cu m (2008 est.)
Natural gas - exports(cu m)
20.55 billion cu m (2008)
Natural gas - proved reserves(cu m)
5.215 trillion cu m (1 January 2009 est.)
HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate(%)
3.1% (2007 est.)
HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS
2.6 million (2007 est.)
HIV/AIDS - deaths
170,000 (2007 est.)
Major infectious diseases
degree of risk: very high
food or waterborne diseases: bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A and E, and typhoid fever
vectorborne disease: malaria and yellow fever
respiratory disease: meningococcal meningitis
aerosolized dust or soil contact disease: one of the most highly endemic areas for Lassa fever
water contact disease: leptospirosis and shistosomiasis
animal contact disease: rabies
Literacy(%)
definition: age 15 and over can read and write
total population: 68%
male: 75.7%
female: 60.6% (2003 est.)
School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education)(years)
total: 8 years
male: 9 years
female: 7 years (2004)
Education expenditures(% of GDP)
0.9% of GDP (1991)
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JUNE 12: An albatross in Nigeria’s democracy

By Charles   Adingupu
IN less than three days, pro-democracy activists and apostles of June 12 will again march to the streets of Lagos and Nigeria at large. For them, this show of solidarity for June 12 annulled election has become a ritual. Almost nineteen years after, the ghost of June 12 still haunts Nigerians.
This institutionalised festival has become  an option for the activists and their allies to ventilate their ideals on what democracy should be.
However, the immediate cause of June 12 centred on the then military government of General Ibrahim Babangida, who braved the consequence of his  action to stop and annul an election widely believed to have been won by Chief Moshood Abiola of the defunct Social Democratic Party (SDP) without satisfactory explanations.
However, subsequent interim national government (ING) of Chief Earnest Shonekan who played the messianic role of delivering Nigeria from the catastrophic effects of the annulment failed as the late General Sani Abacha took over the reign of government. Admittedly, the constitutional conference by Abacha’s government equally failed in its quest for solution to the political imbroglio  that Nigeria was enmeshed in.
Shonekan; Abiola and Babangida
Against this backdrop, it became apparent at this point that no degree of primordial hatred against the Yoruba race or Abiola as a person would erase the glaring fact that MKO Abiola contested and apparently won an election carried out by over 14 million eligible Nigerians in that dark year of 1993.
However, there were incidentally some shortcomings in the way and manner Abiola’s camp fought doggedly  to right the wrong of that illogical decision. It began by  Bashorun deserting his teeming supporters immediately the annulment was announced.
In his bid to reclaim his mandate, the late Chief Abiola traversed the globe, drumming support from world policemen to invade and possibly annihilate the “diabolic” military administration. Unknown to the Bashorun, his supporters were no better than a leopard who changes its skin at will. His hitherto allies became jittery and in the process changed tune without any formal notice.
However,the military junta eventually agreed to “step aside” after much painstaken persuasions as a ‘personal sacrifice’. Chief Ernest Shonekan  was then saddled with the inglorious task of managing a doomed transitional government.
In a manner typical with Nigerians, Abiola had allegedly settled with General Abacha to take over from Shonekan with the hope of de-annulling June 12 election. That agreement was never realised. Abacha in his various speeches shortly afterwards maintained the military was determined to enthrone a long lasting democratic government in Nigeria. That promise, implied absence of a hidden agenda.
Abiola left in the cold.
In a bid to actualise his ‘hidden agenda,’ General Abacha immediately appointed Chief Ebenezer Babatope and Alhaji Lateef Jakande as ministers in his junta’s cabinet. That unwholesome gesture, threw members of the Abiola’s camp into disarray. Perceived soldiers of June 12 went through the back door of the Abacha’s government to seek for contracts and overtly identified with the government. Even some of the Yoruba elders began to speak with both sides of their mouths.
Not a word of their mouth could be trusted anymore. Their heart was full of mischief. Their tongue flattered with deceit.
The pan Yoruba group was torn asunder. It became difficult to determine the role played by most elder statesmen of the Yoruba extraction. It was like the arrow of God fell on them and things fell apart and the orchestrated struggle was no longer at ease. Till date, the legion of June 12 apostles has depleted either due to the affront of old age or they have compromised with the government that be.
Professor Akin Oyebode of the University of Lagos, in his recent lecture titled Future of democracy  and rule of Law pointed out the attitude of these soldiers of democracy better when he observed that “We’re living at a period of false pretences, false promises  and false achievements when our so-called leaders are soaked in hypocrisy, primitive  accumulation and reckless disregard for the national interest and popular hopes and aspirations.”
As things stand, the  self acclaimed apostles of June 12 today believed that the concept surrounding the struggle has been overtaken by events. Their focus, they said should be centred around the enthronement of genuine democracy which will allow for the convocation of a sovereign national conference  where all ethnic nationalities will deliberate their future. But how far have they gone in this journey has become another ball game for the military who only “stepped aside.”
Again, the varsity don, Professor Oyebode captured the essence of the above scenario as he stated that “aside from the fact that ballot box democracy was an anathema to the military dictators, the self proclaimed saviours of the masses felt perfectly free to suspend the cherished values of free choices, federalism and respect for the sanctity of due process which had served as the lubricants of democracy and the rule of law.”
He further enthused that Nigeria’s leaders envisaged no genuine desire for restoration of democratic rule until revolutionary pressures compelled them to foist what an observer described as an endless transition in the country.
As Nigerians continue to ruminate upon June 12, true apostles of that struggle can never be forgotten. These included people like Chief Frank Kokori, erstwhile chairman of NUPENG who refused to quit prison until Chief MKO Abiola’s mandate was restored. Other heroes of that struggle included the late Chief  Anthony Enahoro, General Cornelius Adebayo and others who we hoped that their struggle for the restoration of true democracy in Nigeria would not be in vain .
It must remain relevant — Akin
Relevance of June 12
June 12 will always be relevant and remains important because it is an expression of an elected president we never had. The election took place but the results were annuled. There’s nothing like annulment. You can only agree or disagree with the results. Hence, it will continue to remain relevant. People will always record it as a historical event.
Apostles of June 12?
They were together always in ideology. Though as at today, they may not be together physically. Some of them might have died, some might have changed attitudes but what brought them together was basically to do away with military government. And they truly succeeded. That will always bring them together. Well, now that democracy has been achieved, the apostles of June 12 should now engage in the consolidation of democracy. It is very much consistent with the  democratic nationalism we are talking about.
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THE JUNE 12 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WAS NEITHER FREE NOR FAIR


By
Abubakar Siddique Mohammed,
Director,
Centre for Democratic Development Research and Training,
P.M.B 1077, Hanwa, Zaria,
Nigeria.
Was the June 12th, 1993 presidential election free and fair? Was it the “freest and fairest election” in Nigerian history? If it was free and fair and it was actually won by Chief M.K.0 Abiola, the candidate of the Social Democratic Party, what electoral mandate did it give him? Did it give him the mandate to become the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Commander - in - Chief of its Armed Forces, for a period of four years, from 27th August, 1993, to 26th August, 1997, under the relevant provisions of the Nigerian Constitution of 1989? Or, did that election and its results, give him a special mandate, higher than the mandate given by any previous or, subsequent, Nigerian election, to become the President of Nigeria for four years, from any day he is installed, during his life time? That is, did Chief Abiola, on June 12th 1993, obtain a mandate from the electorate of Nigeria, which is not defined, or limited, by any time framework, any constitution, any laws, and even the existence of the other essential political institutions of civilian democratic government in a federal Nigeria, like the federal legislatures and the state executives and legislatures?
These are some of many questions millions of Nigerians are asking as their response to the deafening media campaign, since the death of General Sani Abacha, to have Chief M. K. O Abiola installed by the present military regime as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Commander - in - Chief of its Armed Forces, heading a "Government of National Unity", outside the provision of any constitution, for the next four years. These questions are, not only not receiving any answers, but are even being shut out of the media coverage of the current political debate about what to do with the current transition programme to return Nigeria to civilian democracy on Thursday, 1st October, 1998, with the swearing - in of a democratically elected President on that day.
These questions cannot be avoided, because they address some very important political issues, which go far beyond the fate of Chief M. K. O. Abiola and what is called "his mandate". These issues are central to the building of democratic civilian rule in Nigeria on solid foundations. Nigeria cannot start rebuilding democracy without a clear public understanding of, what actually is a free and fair election and the meaning and the basis of the electoral mandate derived from such an election.
The campaign for what is called “the actualisation of June 12th” is promoting the false impression that the freedom and fairness of an election is determined solely by what happens on the day of the election; and has nothing to do with the whole political process of party formation, party control, the nomination of candidates, the election campaign and the extent of the democratic space within which these are conducted.
There are six aspects of an election which determine whether, or not, it is democratic, free and fair. The first aspect has to do with the composition of the electorate. The second aspect has to do with the formation and control of the political parties putting up candidates for the election. The third aspect has to do with the nomination of the candidates. The fourth aspect has to do with the election campaign. The fifth aspect has to do with the polling, the counting and recording of votes and the announcement of results. The sixth aspect has to do with the operations of the judicial system in its handling of the election petitions.
The Parties and the Electorate
The extent to which an election is free and fair, is determined by the freedom with which the adult citizens of a country can participate in it as voters. In an electoral system in which primaries are conducted by political parties for members of each party to elect their candidates, this freedom of participation has to include the freedom to form political parties which can contest elections and to vote for, or against, candidates in the party primaries. This freedom was denied to the citizens of Nigeria in the presidential election primaries of 1993 which produced Chief M. K. O Abiola as one of the two presidential candidates. The convention of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) which was held in Jos on Saturday, 27th March, 1993, in which 5,215 delegates voted and Chief Abiola won with a majority of 272 votes, cannot by any democratic standards be regarded as free and fair. This is because the S.D.P itself was decreed into existence in 1989 by the Armed Forces Ruling Council. In fact, the formation of the SDP and the National Republican Convention (NRC), violated all universally acceptable democratic principles of party formation.
Before the SDP and the NRC were imposed on the people of Nigeria, by the then ruling military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida, 38 political parties and associations had been freely formed to contest for the elections which were to return the country to civilian rule. These parties and associations were, for the avoidance of doubt:
1. People’s Liberation Party (PLP)
2. People’s Front of Nigeria (PFN)
3. Nigerian Peoples Welfare Party (NPWP)
4. Nigerian National Congress (NNC)
5. Peoples Solidarity Party (PSP)
6. Nigerian Labour Party (NLP)
7. The Republican Party of Nigeria (RPN)
8. National Union Party (NUP)
9. Liberal Convention (LC)
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10. Patriotic Nigerian Party (PNP)
11. Ideals Peoples Party (IPP)
12. All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)
13. Peoples Patriotic Party (PPP)
14. United Nigerian Democratic Party(UNDP)
15. Democratic People’s Congress (DPC)
16. People’s Party of Nigeria (PPN)
17. Black But Beautiful Party of Nigeria (BBBPN)
18. Welfare Party of Nigeria (WPN)
19. Liberal New Movement Party (LNMP)
20. Movement of Nationalists And Dynamos (MONAD)
21. Brotherhood Club of Nigeria (BCN)
22. United Front Party of Nigeria (UFP)
23. Abuja United Front (AUF)
24. New Democratic Alliance (NDA)
25. People’s Alliance Party (PAP)
26. The All People’s Party (TAPP)
27. People’s Progressive Party (PPP)
28. National Development Party (NDP)
29. People’s Convention Party (PCP)
30. Oriental Progressive (OP)
31. Nigerian Emancipation Party (NEP)
32. The Voice Group (Bendel) (THVP)
33. Commoners People’s Party (CPP)
34. Nigerian Democratic Congress (NDC)
35. Nigerian Farmers Revolutionary Council (NFRC)
36. Northern Youth Council (NYC)
37. Socialist Party of Workers, Farmers And Youth (SPWFY)
38. Nigerian Republican People’s Party (NRPP)
Of the 38 political parties formed, 13 had applied for registration by 6 p.m of July 19th, 1989, the deadline fixed for the submission of application. These were:
1. Peoples Front Party of Nigeria
PFN
2. Nigerian People’s Welfare Party
NPWP
3. Nigerian National Congress
NNC
4. People’s Solidarity Party
PSP
5. The Republican Party of Nigeria
RPN
6. National Union Party
NUP
7. Liberal Convention
LC
8. National Labour Party
NLP
9. Patriotic Nigerian Party
PNP
10. Ideal People’s Party
IPP
11. All Nigeria People’s Party
ANPP
12. People’s Patriotic Party
PPP
13. United Nigeria Democratic Party
UNDP
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Among these parties, were several which in the words of General Ibrahim Babangida himself, had “deep roots” in Nigeria politics. Indeed, veterans of the National Council for Nigeria and Camerouns (NCNC), Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), Action Group(A.G), and United Middle-Belt Congress (UMBC) of the First Republic, many of whom had played active roles in the struggle for Nigerian independence were found in these parties. Also found, were activists of the People’s Redemption Party (PRP), the Great Nigeria People’s Party (GNPP), the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Nigerian People’s party (NPP), and the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) of the Second Republic.
Impossible conditions were set by the military for the registration of political parties. Satisfying the conditions for registration did not only require the parties to spend hundreds of millions of naira, it also required them to put in place elaborate organisation, logistics, equipment and personnel, which even the military government could not fulfil, even when they later banned these parties and decreed the SDP and the NRC into existence. It was clear that the regime had imposed these impossible conditions because it had no intention of handing over to a democratically elected civilian government. This was known to Chief M. K. O Abiola as he himself said in a lecture he gave in a public meeting in London, on 14th August, 1993, to justify his anger at what Babangida later did to him. He said, “Yes, Babangida is my friend. We have been friends for quite a long time. The first time he started this democratic race of his, I asked him whether indeed there was a vacancy, since I do not like applying for a job which is not vacant”. When he satisfied himself that the office was not vacant, that means General Babangida had no intention of handing over, Chief Abiola issued a statement to the effect that “over the last few weeks, thousands of people have urged me to stand for the presidency of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, whilst some have counselled otherwise. Having carefully considered both sides of the argument, I have decided that I will not offer myself for this great office at this time”
In a broadcast to the nation, on the 8th of October, 1989, General Ibrahim Babangida announced that “the thirteen political associations are dissolved with immediate effect.” Not only were these parties banned, they were also forced to close their offices and stop all activities, or risk having their members being arrested and detained by the military regime. The military regime then created two political parties, the SDP and the NRC, and directed all those who were interested in politics to join either of the two.
Thus, the SDP, the primaries of which Chief Abiola won to become the candidate in the June 12th presidential elections, and the NRC, had their constitutions and manifestos produced by the military and formally launched by General Babangida at the Nnamdi Azikiwe Press Centre in Dodan Barracks on Monday, December 4, 1989. In his broadcast to the nation, on October 9th, 1989, General Babangida said that “The draft constitution of these parties as approved by the Armed Forces Ruling Council shall be identical. The National Electoral Commission shall submit (these) draft manifestoes to the Armed Forces Ruling Council for preliminary approval within two weeks from today…The draft manifestoes may be amended at the national conventions of each party subject to NEC guidelines. They shall then be sent to the Armed Forces Ruling Council, which
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shall approve the amendments, after which the draft becomes a party manifesto”. Thus, not only had the parties no independence whatsoever, their members and even the ordinary Nigerian voter were denied even the choice of programmes, as the parties had “identical manifestoes” which they cannot in reality amend.
This undemocratic situation was captured by the editorial in The Guardian newspaper of Friday, 22nd December, 1989, which states that : “Whether it is in the area of the economy, education, health, etc. that one takes, we find that there is little fundamental difference between the manifestoes of the parties. Even their preambles, which should reveal the basic philosophy and the nature of social order they want to construct, fail to provide any meaningful differences between the two parties. And if parties do not differ in their basic philosophy of society, then, differences over strategies become cosmetics. Their language, uniformly bland, is bereft of the commitment and dedication to goals and ideals that should inform manifestoes,.”
The SDP and the NRC were not only creations of the military regime, but they were also funded by that regime. Their state, local government and national offices were built by the military government. The Federal Military Government alone voted N676.5 million for the construction of 21 party offices in the state capitals, while the state military governors were ordered to construct two offices each for the parties, in each of the local government areas of the country. They budgeted a total sum of N546.6 million for this, making the total expenditure on the offices of these two parties, to come to the huge sum of N1.22 billion, equivalent, at that time to US$111.2 million.
Even the membership cards of the two parties and their symbols and colours were dictated by the military regime of General Babangida. What is very significant with regards to the status of the June 12th election is that the adoption of the two-party system was what Chief M. K. O Abiola had canvassed for since 1985. In an interview in the New Nigerian of 31st May, 1985, Chief Abiola, “commended a two-party system and described the five party system as a ‘ridiculous rubbish’ because it was expensive to run and did not guarantee a better government.”
Clearing the Field for Abiola
Clearing the field for the emergence of Chief Abiola as the SDP presidential candidate by the military government of General Babangida started since 1991. First, General Babangida announced a ban on most people who had held public offices and who wanted to become presidential candidates. When some of these politicians refused to accept such a ban and continued with their political activities, they were arrested and detained on 2nd December, 1991, and later arraigned before the Transition to Civil Rule Tribunal, in order to frighten and intimidate them. These politicians were:
1. Major General Shehu Musa Yar ‘Adua (rtd)
2. Alhaji Lateef Jakande
3. Chief Bola Ige
4. Chief Solomon Lar
5. Alhaji Muhamadu Abubakar Rimi
6. Chief Christian Onoh
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7. Dr. Olusola Saraki
8. Chief Francis Arthur Nzeribe
9. Alhaji Bello Maitama Yusuf
10. Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu
11. Mr. Paul Unongo
12. Alhaji Lawal Kaita
After this, the effort of clearing the field for General Babangida’s best friend moved to the organisation of the party presidential primaries. One of the conditions for free and fair election is the conduct of free and fair election of candidates by members of the political parties in the primaries. These primaries must be organised by the elected officials of the parties concerned. This was the case with the presidential primaries in the two political parties conducted in October, 1992. However, these primaries which were won by the late Major General Shehu Yar Adua, in the SDP, and Alhaji Adamu Ciroma, in the NRC, were annulled on 16th October, 1992, on the spurious ground that they were not properly done. The candidates, together with all other contestants, were banned again from contesting for the office of the president. Many others were cowered into silence.
It was no other person but Chief M.K.O Abiola who rose to defend this brazenly unfair decision by General Babangida saying in The African Guardian of 10th March , 1993 that “ I do not agree with those who believe that it was the government that sabotaged the presidential primaries.”
When Chief Abiola joined the SDP to contest for the presidency, the ground had been further cleared for him. First, all the elected officials of the parties, from the federal down to the state and local government levels were dismissed by General Babangida. In their place, the military regime appointed administrators at the national and state levels, on the 26th of January, 1993 to administer the parties. In all, 88 sole administrators and executive secretaries were appointed to run the parties in all the states of the federation, including Abuja. All the officials were answerable not to the members of the parties they were administering but to the Armed Forces Ruling Council headed by General Babangida through the National Electoral Commission.
The undemocratic, and regimented, nature of the parties is even more glaring in the case of the SDP. For, in the period 26th January to 27th March, 1993, when the party’s primaries which produced Chief Abiola as presidential candidate took place, the party was administered by a retired air force general, and former military governor of Kano State, Air Vice Marshal Stephen Shekari. This airforce general presided over the Jos convention of 27th March, 1993, which produced Chief Abiola as the SDP’s flag-bearer.
As far as the composition of the party electorate which voted for Chief Abiola to become the SDP’s flag-bearer is concerned, there was nothing free or fair about it. There was also nothing democratic, or free and fair, about the formation and control of the party which nominated him. Therefore, Chief Abiola’s candidature had its roots in the military regimentation of the electoral process, in violation of all the norms of freedom and fairness in democratic elections.
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The Election Campaign
Any attempt at honestly, and rigorously, understanding the June 12th, issue, cannot ignore the role of Chief M. K.O Abiola in the campaign for the perpetuation of military rule in Nigeria. Far from being a democrat, as we are now made to understand by those shouting for “the actualisation of June 12”, Abiola is one of the leading Nigerian civilian public figures who had always supported, and financed, military coups, as a means of changing governments. Thus, when he fell out with the National Party of Nigeria, in 1982, over his failure to get elected as the chairman of the party in order to be in a position to contest as its presidential candidate in 1983, he resigned from the NPN, claiming that he had left active politics, while in reality he was busy conspiring with the military to overthrow the democratically elected government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari. This, they finally did, with his financial and media support on the 31st December, 1983, with his bosom friend, General Ibrahim Babangida, emerging as the Chief of Army Staff.
When the sterility and repression of the General Buhari’s military regime became obvious and its draconian decrees widely hated, Chief M. K. O. Abiola came to the defence of the regime, adding that “Any body who is a threat to the government can be restricted”. As his newspaper, National Concord of 12th January, 1985 reported, he was “putting his full weight behind the curtailment of dangerous elements within the system” These “dangerous elements” were the 1979 and 1983 democratically elected civilian political leaders at the state and federal levels, who had been locked up in jail for over one year without proper legal trial. Those who were tried, were tried before secret military tribunals.
When the Buhari regime came under intense public pressure to allow people to discuss the political future of the country, Chief Abiola was one of the very few leading, civilian, Nigerians who gave yet another spirited defence of the military regime, by saying in the New Nigeria of 31st May, 1985 that, “we have a government headed by Major General Buhari, Head of State and Commander-in-Chief. What is of concern to me is that he rules Nigeria well to the betterment of every Nigerian That is all. It doesn’t bother me how long he stay there. The longer he stays from my point of view the more stability we will have.”
When General Babangida seized power on 27th August, 1985, Chief Abiola became even closer to the military regime, because Babangida was his close friend and he also financed this coup. He defended almost every action of that regime , stating blandly that “there was nothing they have not done that I don’t particularly like”, as reported in the National Concord of 28th January, 1986.
In spite of some hiccups in his relationship with the regime, connected with the actions of some his journalists and his children, Chief Abiola was seen by the generality of Nigerians as General Babangida’s man. The main pillar of his election campaign was that he was so close to General Babangida and the military, that Nigerians thought, he should be voted for to get rid of the military, who would be willing to hand over to him, as he has been very close to them, at every level.
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This view was reinforced by the fact that the security apparatus of the regime had imposed a light-weight businessman, Alhaji Bashir Tofa, as the candidate of the other party, the NRC. For, while Chief Abiola is giant among Nigerian businessmen, Alhaji Bashir Tofa remained, up to his nomination, essentially an errand boy of Brigadier General Halilu Akilu, head of Babangida’s security services; as he has earlier been an errand boy of Kano NPN tycoons, who made him the National Financial Secretary of that party.
The election campaign was therefore heavily loaded in favour of M. K. O. Abiola, by this very fact of his personal and warm friendship with General Babangida and the light weight rival candidate produced for him by the military regime.
Not only was the campaign made easier by the puny status of Alhaji Bashir Tofa, as against Chief Abiola, even in Kano, but the security apparatus of the regime promoted a campaign against Alhaji Bashir Tofa publicising accusations of dishonesty in the oil business against him.
Chief Abiola, meanwhile, continued to bask in his aura of belonging to the magic circle of the closest personal friends of General Babangida, A few months before he joined the SDP to contest for the presidency, General Babangida sent him a warm message of congratulations on the occasion of his 55th birthday, on 25th August, 1992. The National Concord of 26th August, 1992, the former editor of which was a close aide to Chief Abiola, Mr. Duro Onabule, who became General Babangida’s Chief Press Secretary, reported that the message was unique. In it, General Babangida said, : “…you have not stalled in your philanthropic activities for which I assure you history will duly reward you most appropriately. It is also noteworthy that your business continue to widen, all aimed at providing job opportunities and enhanced standard of living for our fellow countrymen. May Allah grant you more years of useful service to the nation and humanity.”
The Conduct of the Election
The conduct of the election of June 12th did not make it the freest and fairest in Nigeria. In the first place, it is well known that Chief Abiola used massive amounts of money to bribe election officials and security personnel to ensure his victory. For, in spite of the way the campaign had greatly favoured him, he was not the one to take any chances with his wily friend, General Babangida. Everybody knows that with regards to the bribing and corrupting of election officials and security personnel, the 1993 presidential election was worse than the 1979 presidential election. As far as the turn out of voters was concerned, the number of people who came out to vote in 1979 was 16.8 million, while in 1993, with a larger population, only 13.6 million voted in the presidential election.
There was no time for election petitions, since the results were annulled before they were formally announced. Therefore, it is very difficult to assess the freedom and fairness with which it was conducted and with which the judicial machinery for it operated.
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The Conspiracy
The fact that the results of 12th of June Presidential election were annulled by the military regime of General Babangida cannot by itself make the election free and fair. The evidence available clearly establishes that, right from the way the two parties were imposed by military diktat, funded, housed and controlled by the regime, and had their primaries and campaigns largely determined by the regime, there was very little that was democratic in the whole process culminating in the June 12th, 1993, election.
The only inference one can draw from the facts available, is that a conspiracy to install Chief M.K.O Abiola was, at the last minute, aborted by General Babangida and others, perhaps including General Abacha. This conspiracy may actually go back to the early 1980s, when these two generals began plotting with Chief Abiola, and others, against the democratically elected government of Nigeria; a conspiracy which successfully bore fruit on 31st December, 1983, when, the then Brigadier General Sani Abacha, announced the overthrow of the democratically elected governments of Nigeria and M. K. O. Abiola led in the campaign to support this act of treason, and General Babangida took up the strategic position of Chief of Army Staff, which in August, 1985 he relinquished to General Abacha on becoming Head of State.
Indications of such a conspiracy can be seen in the way Chief M. K. O. Abiola consulted very closely with General Babangida over who was to be his running mate, even after, according to him, he had felt that his friend was no longer with him. He, on the 14th August, 1993, said: “ We got to Jos, the first shocker for Babangida was that I won in Jos very narrowly but I won…the problem is that I need a Christian as a running-mate…The President (Babangida) was suggesting that I should pick Bafyau…So I went back to see Babangida the next day Friday. He was still insisting on Bafyau. It became very clear that we were on a collision course…I phoned the President at midnight before the announcement and told him that out of courtesy I must let him know that there is no way I can pick Bafyua. I was going to announce Babagana Kingibe in the morning.”
Other indications of Chief Abiola’s deep conspiratorial involvement with the military, particularly with the two generals most influential in the overthrow of our last democratic governments, also come out in the way he went to express such public confidence in General Abacha’s commitment to hand over power to him as soon as the latter had executed the November 17, 1993 military coup. Speaking at SDP Kaduna State office, at Kawo, Kaduna, on 28th September, 1993, he said: “I really commend General Sani Abacha because out of love of the country, he puts his common sense, experience, tact and intellect to ease out (the former President, General Ibrahim Babangida). I have no doubt that it is that common sense, that patriotism, that intellect that will enable him to ease out his Babangida surrogates..but for people like Sani Abacha this country would have plunged into bloodshed”.
If, what Mrs Titilayo Abiola told The Post Express in an interview on Sunday, 28th June, 1998, that Chief M. K. O. Abiola was so much looking forward to coming out and meeting General Abacha, that he cried when he heard of his death is
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true, it further indicates that his connections with General Abacha, at least as far as he was concerned, remained a very important part of his life, even after the latter has locked him up for over four years.
It is difficult at this stage to fathom the depth and ramifications of the layers, upon layers, of conspiracy involved. But there can be no doubt that an election cannot, suddenly, become free and fair, just because a military President falls out with one of the candidates in a presidential election, with whom he had a long standing conspiratorial relations against democracy in Nigeria, and goes ahead to annul the victory of his co-conspirator.
The Facts and the Figures
The fact that those campaigning for the “actualisation of the June 12th election” refused to face is that out of 36.7 million Nigerians who registered to vote in that election, only 7.7 million voted for Chief Abiola while 5.9 million voted for Alhaji Bashir Tofa and 23.1 million abstained. In other words, 29.0 million Nigerian voters, equal to 79% of the registered voters refused to vote for Chief Abiola, either by abstaining, or by voting for the NRC candidate. How can a candidate, who fails to obtain the support of 8 out every 10 voters in a country, be made to appear to have obtained a special mandate to rule that country, irrespective of time, of laws and of the constitution? Certainly, in democratic elections of the type we have, a candidate can be validly elected, even with a smaller proportion of the registered voters voting for him, or her. But to claim that a candidate has a mandate to rule a country even five years after the election, there surely should be better evidence of solid electoral support, in fact, repeated over a number of elections.
It is not only when looking at the figures for the whole country, that we find that the overwhelming majority of Nigerians refused to vote for him but even in the South-western States of Nigeria, 61.1% of the voters either abstained, or voted, for Alhaji Bashir Tofa, thus effectively refusing to vote for M. K. O Abiola. In Lagos State, where it is claimed he has his main support base, 63% of the registered voters refused to vote for him by either abstaining or by voting for Alhaji Bashir Tofa. The table below brings out these facts clearly.
THE JUNE 12 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
WAS NEITHER FREE NOR FAIR
By
Abubakar Siddique Mohammed,
Director,
Centre for Democratic Development Research and Training,
P.M.B 1077, Hanwa, Zaria,
Nigeria.
Was the June 12th, 1993 presidential election free and fair? Was it the “freest and fairest election” in Nigerian history? If it was free and fair and it was actually won by Chief M.K.0 Abiola, the candidate of the Social Democratic Party, what electoral mandate did it give him? Did it give him the mandate to become the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Commander - in - Chief of its Armed Forces, for a period of four years, from 27th August, 1993, to 26th August, 1997, under the relevant provisions of the Nigerian Constitution of 1989? Or, did that election and its results, give him a special mandate, higher than the mandate given by any previous or, subsequent, Nigerian election, to become the President of Nigeria for four years, from any day he is installed, during his life time? That is, did Chief Abiola, on June 12th 1993, obtain a mandate from the electorate of Nigeria, which is not defined, or limited, by any time framework, any constitution, any laws, and even the existence of the other essential political institutions of civilian democratic government in a federal Nigeria, like the federal legislatures and the state executives and legislatures?
These are some of many questions millions of Nigerians are asking as their response to the deafening media campaign, since the death of General Sani Abacha, to have Chief M. K. O Abiola installed by the present military regime as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Commander - in - Chief of its Armed Forces, heading a "Government of National Unity", outside the provision of any constitution, for the next four years. These questions are, not only not receiving any answers, but are even being shut out of the media coverage of the current political debate about what to do with the current transition programme to return Nigeria to civilian democracy on Thursday, 1st October, 1998, with the swearing - in of a democratically elected President on that day.
These questions cannot be avoided, because they address some very important political issues, which go far beyond the fate of Chief M. K. O. Abiola and what is called "his mandate". These issues are central to the building of democratic civilian rule in Nigeria on solid foundations. Nigeria cannot start rebuilding democracy without a clear public understanding of, what actually is a free and fair election and the meaning and the basis of the electoral mandate derived from such an election.
The campaign for what is called “the actualisation of June 12th” is promoting the false impression that the freedom and fairness of an election is determined solely by what happens on the day of the election; and has nothing to do with the whole political process of party formation, party control, the nomination of candidates, the election campaign and the extent of the democratic space within which these are conducted.
There are six aspects of an election which determine whether, or not, it is democratic, free and fair. The first aspect has to do with the composition of the electorate. The second aspect has to do with the formation and control of the political parties putting up candidates for the election. The third aspect has to do with the nomination of the candidates. The fourth aspect has to do with the election campaign. The fifth aspect has to do with the polling, the counting and recording of votes and the announcement of results. The sixth aspect has to do with the operations of the judicial system in its handling of the election petitions.
The Parties and the Electorate
The extent to which an election is free and fair, is determined by the freedom with which the adult citizens of a country can participate in it as voters. In an electoral system in which primaries are conducted by political parties for members of each party to elect their candidates, this freedom of participation has to include the freedom to form political parties which can contest elections and to vote for, or against, candidates in the party primaries. This freedom was denied to the citizens of Nigeria in the presidential election primaries of 1993 which produced Chief M. K. O Abiola as one of the two presidential candidates. The convention of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) which was held in Jos on Saturday, 27th March, 1993, in which 5,215 delegates voted and Chief Abiola won with a majority of 272 votes, cannot by any democratic standards be regarded as free and fair. This is because the S.D.P itself was decreed into existence in 1989 by the Armed Forces Ruling Council. In fact, the formation of the SDP and the National Republican Convention (NRC), violated all universally acceptable democratic principles of party formation.
Before the SDP and the NRC were imposed on the people of Nigeria, by the then ruling military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida, 38 political parties and associations had been freely formed to contest for the elections which were to return the country to civilian rule. These parties and associations were, for the avoidance of doubt:
1. People’s Liberation Party (PLP)
2. People’s Front of Nigeria (PFN)
3. Nigerian Peoples Welfare Party (NPWP)
4. Nigerian National Congress (NNC)
5. Peoples Solidarity Party (PSP)
6. Nigerian Labour Party (NLP)
7. The Republican Party of Nigeria (RPN)
8. National Union Party (NUP)
9. Liberal Convention (LC)
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10. Patriotic Nigerian Party (PNP)
11. Ideals Peoples Party (IPP)
12. All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)
13. Peoples Patriotic Party (PPP)
14. United Nigerian Democratic Party(UNDP)
15. Democratic People’s Congress (DPC)
16. People’s Party of Nigeria (PPN)
17. Black But Beautiful Party of Nigeria (BBBPN)
18. Welfare Party of Nigeria (WPN)
19. Liberal New Movement Party (LNMP)
20. Movement of Nationalists And Dynamos (MONAD)
21. Brotherhood Club of Nigeria (BCN)
22. United Front Party of Nigeria (UFP)
23. Abuja United Front (AUF)
24. New Democratic Alliance (NDA)
25. People’s Alliance Party (PAP)
26. The All People’s Party (TAPP)
27. People’s Progressive Party (PPP)
28. National Development Party (NDP)
29. People’s Convention Party (PCP)
30. Oriental Progressive (OP)
31. Nigerian Emancipation Party (NEP)
32. The Voice Group (Bendel) (THVP)
33. Commoners People’s Party (CPP)
34. Nigerian Democratic Congress (NDC)
35. Nigerian Farmers Revolutionary Council (NFRC)
36. Northern Youth Council (NYC)
37. Socialist Party of Workers, Farmers And Youth (SPWFY)
38. Nigerian Republican People’s Party (NRPP)
Of the 38 political parties formed, 13 had applied for registration by 6 p.m of July 19th, 1989, the deadline fixed for the submission of application. These were:
1. Peoples Front Party of Nigeria
PFN
2. Nigerian People’s Welfare Party
NPWP
3. Nigerian National Congress
NNC
4. People’s Solidarity Party
PSP
5. The Republican Party of Nigeria
RPN
6. National Union Party
NUP
7. Liberal Convention
LC
8. National Labour Party
NLP
9. Patriotic Nigerian Party
PNP
10. Ideal People’s Party
IPP
11. All Nigeria People’s Party
ANPP
12. People’s Patriotic Party
PPP
13. United Nigeria Democratic Party
UNDP
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Among these parties, were several which in the words of General Ibrahim Babangida himself, had “deep roots” in Nigeria politics. Indeed, veterans of the National Council for Nigeria and Camerouns (NCNC), Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), Action Group(A.G), and United Middle-Belt Congress (UMBC) of the First Republic, many of whom had played active roles in the struggle for Nigerian independence were found in these parties. Also found, were activists of the People’s Redemption Party (PRP), the Great Nigeria People’s Party (GNPP), the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Nigerian People’s party (NPP), and the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) of the Second Republic.
Impossible conditions were set by the military for the registration of political parties. Satisfying the conditions for registration did not only require the parties to spend hundreds of millions of naira, it also required them to put in place elaborate organisation, logistics, equipment and personnel, which even the military government could not fulfil, even when they later banned these parties and decreed the SDP and the NRC into existence. It was clear that the regime had imposed these impossible conditions because it had no intention of handing over to a democratically elected civilian government. This was known to Chief M. K. O Abiola as he himself said in a lecture he gave in a public meeting in London, on 14th August, 1993, to justify his anger at what Babangida later did to him. He said, “Yes, Babangida is my friend. We have been friends for quite a long time. The first time he started this democratic race of his, I asked him whether indeed there was a vacancy, since I do not like applying for a job which is not vacant”. When he satisfied himself that the office was not vacant, that means General Babangida had no intention of handing over, Chief Abiola issued a statement to the effect that “over the last few weeks, thousands of people have urged me to stand for the presidency of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, whilst some have counselled otherwise. Having carefully considered both sides of the argument, I have decided that I will not offer myself for this great office at this time”
In a broadcast to the nation, on the 8th of October, 1989, General Ibrahim Babangida announced that “the thirteen political associations are dissolved with immediate effect.” Not only were these parties banned, they were also forced to close their offices and stop all activities, or risk having their members being arrested and detained by the military regime. The military regime then created two political parties, the SDP and the NRC, and directed all those who were interested in politics to join either of the two.
Thus, the SDP, the primaries of which Chief Abiola won to become the candidate in the June 12th presidential elections, and the NRC, had their constitutions and manifestos produced by the military and formally launched by General Babangida at the Nnamdi Azikiwe Press Centre in Dodan Barracks on Monday, December 4, 1989. In his broadcast to the nation, on October 9th, 1989, General Babangida said that “The draft constitution of these parties as approved by the Armed Forces Ruling Council shall be identical. The National Electoral Commission shall submit (these) draft manifestoes to the Armed Forces Ruling Council for preliminary approval within two weeks from today…The draft manifestoes may be amended at the national conventions of each party subject to NEC guidelines. They shall then be sent to the Armed Forces Ruling Council, which
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shall approve the amendments, after which the draft becomes a party manifesto”. Thus, not only had the parties no independence whatsoever, their members and even the ordinary Nigerian voter were denied even the choice of programmes, as the parties had “identical manifestoes” which they cannot in reality amend.
This undemocratic situation was captured by the editorial in The Guardian newspaper of Friday, 22nd December, 1989, which states that : “Whether it is in the area of the economy, education, health, etc. that one takes, we find that there is little fundamental difference between the manifestoes of the parties. Even their preambles, which should reveal the basic philosophy and the nature of social order they want to construct, fail to provide any meaningful differences between the two parties. And if parties do not differ in their basic philosophy of society, then, differences over strategies become cosmetics. Their language, uniformly bland, is bereft of the commitment and dedication to goals and ideals that should inform manifestoes,.”
The SDP and the NRC were not only creations of the military regime, but they were also funded by that regime. Their state, local government and national offices were built by the military government. The Federal Military Government alone voted N676.5 million for the construction of 21 party offices in the state capitals, while the state military governors were ordered to construct two offices each for the parties, in each of the local government areas of the country. They budgeted a total sum of N546.6 million for this, making the total expenditure on the offices of these two parties, to come to the huge sum of N1.22 billion, equivalent, at that time to US$111.2 million.
Even the membership cards of the two parties and their symbols and colours were dictated by the military regime of General Babangida. What is very significant with regards to the status of the June 12th election is that the adoption of the two-party system was what Chief M. K. O Abiola had canvassed for since 1985. In an interview in the New Nigerian of 31st May, 1985, Chief Abiola, “commended a two-party system and described the five party system as a ‘ridiculous rubbish’ because it was expensive to run and did not guarantee a better government.”
Clearing the Field for Abiola
Clearing the field for the emergence of Chief Abiola as the SDP presidential candidate by the military government of General Babangida started since 1991. First, General Babangida announced a ban on most people who had held public offices and who wanted to become presidential candidates. When some of these politicians refused to accept such a ban and continued with their political activities, they were arrested and detained on 2nd December, 1991, and later arraigned before the Transition to Civil Rule Tribunal, in order to frighten and intimidate them. These politicians were:
1. Major General Shehu Musa Yar ‘Adua (rtd)
2. Alhaji Lateef Jakande
3. Chief Bola Ige
4. Chief Solomon Lar
5. Alhaji Muhamadu Abubakar Rimi
6. Chief Christian Onoh
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7. Dr. Olusola Saraki
8. Chief Francis Arthur Nzeribe
9. Alhaji Bello Maitama Yusuf
10. Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu
11. Mr. Paul Unongo
12. Alhaji Lawal Kaita
After this, the effort of clearing the field for General Babangida’s best friend moved to the organisation of the party presidential primaries. One of the conditions for free and fair election is the conduct of free and fair election of candidates by members of the political parties in the primaries. These primaries must be organised by the elected officials of the parties concerned. This was the case with the presidential primaries in the two political parties conducted in October, 1992. However, these primaries which were won by the late Major General Shehu Yar Adua, in the SDP, and Alhaji Adamu Ciroma, in the NRC, were annulled on 16th October, 1992, on the spurious ground that they were not properly done. The candidates, together with all other contestants, were banned again from contesting for the office of the president. Many others were cowered into silence.
It was no other person but Chief M.K.O Abiola who rose to defend this brazenly unfair decision by General Babangida saying in The African Guardian of 10th March , 1993 that “ I do not agree with those who believe that it was the government that sabotaged the presidential primaries.”
When Chief Abiola joined the SDP to contest for the presidency, the ground had been further cleared for him. First, all the elected officials of the parties, from the federal down to the state and local government levels were dismissed by General Babangida. In their place, the military regime appointed administrators at the national and state levels, on the 26th of January, 1993 to administer the parties. In all, 88 sole administrators and executive secretaries were appointed to run the parties in all the states of the federation, including Abuja. All the officials were answerable not to the members of the parties they were administering but to the Armed Forces Ruling Council headed by General Babangida through the National Electoral Commission.
The undemocratic, and regimented, nature of the parties is even more glaring in the case of the SDP. For, in the period 26th January to 27th March, 1993, when the party’s primaries which produced Chief Abiola as presidential candidate took place, the party was administered by a retired air force general, and former military governor of Kano State, Air Vice Marshal Stephen Shekari. This airforce general presided over the Jos convention of 27th March, 1993, which produced Chief Abiola as the SDP’s flag-bearer.
As far as the composition of the party electorate which voted for Chief Abiola to become the SDP’s flag-bearer is concerned, there was nothing free or fair about it. There was also nothing democratic, or free and fair, about the formation and control of the party which nominated him. Therefore, Chief Abiola’s candidature had its roots in the military regimentation of the electoral process, in violation of all the norms of freedom and fairness in democratic elections.
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The Election Campaign
Any attempt at honestly, and rigorously, understanding the June 12th, issue, cannot ignore the role of Chief M. K.O Abiola in the campaign for the perpetuation of military rule in Nigeria. Far from being a democrat, as we are now made to understand by those shouting for “the actualisation of June 12”, Abiola is one of the leading Nigerian civilian public figures who had always supported, and financed, military coups, as a means of changing governments. Thus, when he fell out with the National Party of Nigeria, in 1982, over his failure to get elected as the chairman of the party in order to be in a position to contest as its presidential candidate in 1983, he resigned from the NPN, claiming that he had left active politics, while in reality he was busy conspiring with the military to overthrow the democratically elected government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari. This, they finally did, with his financial and media support on the 31st December, 1983, with his bosom friend, General Ibrahim Babangida, emerging as the Chief of Army Staff.
When the sterility and repression of the General Buhari’s military regime became obvious and its draconian decrees widely hated, Chief M. K. O. Abiola came to the defence of the regime, adding that “Any body who is a threat to the government can be restricted”. As his newspaper, National Concord of 12th January, 1985 reported, he was “putting his full weight behind the curtailment of dangerous elements within the system” These “dangerous elements” were the 1979 and 1983 democratically elected civilian political leaders at the state and federal levels, who had been locked up in jail for over one year without proper legal trial. Those who were tried, were tried before secret military tribunals.
When the Buhari regime came under intense public pressure to allow people to discuss the political future of the country, Chief Abiola was one of the very few leading, civilian, Nigerians who gave yet another spirited defence of the military regime, by saying in the New Nigeria of 31st May, 1985 that, “we have a government headed by Major General Buhari, Head of State and Commander-in-Chief. What is of concern to me is that he rules Nigeria well to the betterment of every Nigerian That is all. It doesn’t bother me how long he stay there. The longer he stays from my point of view the more stability we will have.”
When General Babangida seized power on 27th August, 1985, Chief Abiola became even closer to the military regime, because Babangida was his close friend and he also financed this coup. He defended almost every action of that regime , stating blandly that “there was nothing they have not done that I don’t particularly like”, as reported in the National Concord of 28th January, 1986.
In spite of some hiccups in his relationship with the regime, connected with the actions of some his journalists and his children, Chief Abiola was seen by the generality of Nigerians as General Babangida’s man. The main pillar of his election campaign was that he was so close to General Babangida and the military, that Nigerians thought, he should be voted for to get rid of the military, who would be willing to hand over to him, as he has been very close to them, at every level.
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This view was reinforced by the fact that the security apparatus of the regime had imposed a light-weight businessman, Alhaji Bashir Tofa, as the candidate of the other party, the NRC. For, while Chief Abiola is giant among Nigerian businessmen, Alhaji Bashir Tofa remained, up to his nomination, essentially an errand boy of Brigadier General Halilu Akilu, head of Babangida’s security services; as he has earlier been an errand boy of Kano NPN tycoons, who made him the National Financial Secretary of that party.
The election campaign was therefore heavily loaded in favour of M. K. O. Abiola, by this very fact of his personal and warm friendship with General Babangida and the light weight rival candidate produced for him by the military regime.
Not only was the campaign made easier by the puny status of Alhaji Bashir Tofa, as against Chief Abiola, even in Kano, but the security apparatus of the regime promoted a campaign against Alhaji Bashir Tofa publicising accusations of dishonesty in the oil business against him.
Chief Abiola, meanwhile, continued to bask in his aura of belonging to the magic circle of the closest personal friends of General Babangida, A few months before he joined the SDP to contest for the presidency, General Babangida sent him a warm message of congratulations on the occasion of his 55th birthday, on 25th August, 1992. The National Concord of 26th August, 1992, the former editor of which was a close aide to Chief Abiola, Mr. Duro Onabule, who became General Babangida’s Chief Press Secretary, reported that the message was unique. In it, General Babangida said, : “…you have not stalled in your philanthropic activities for which I assure you history will duly reward you most appropriately. It is also noteworthy that your business continue to widen, all aimed at providing job opportunities and enhanced standard of living for our fellow countrymen. May Allah grant you more years of useful service to the nation and humanity.”
The Conduct of the Election
The conduct of the election of June 12th did not make it the freest and fairest in Nigeria. In the first place, it is well known that Chief Abiola used massive amounts of money to bribe election officials and security personnel to ensure his victory. For, in spite of the way the campaign had greatly favoured him, he was not the one to take any chances with his wily friend, General Babangida. Everybody knows that with regards to the bribing and corrupting of election officials and security personnel, the 1993 presidential election was worse than the 1979 presidential election. As far as the turn out of voters was concerned, the number of people who came out to vote in 1979 was 16.8 million, while in 1993, with a larger population, only 13.6 million voted in the presidential election.
There was no time for election petitions, since the results were annulled before they were formally announced. Therefore, it is very difficult to assess the freedom and fairness with which it was conducted and with which the judicial machinery for it operated.
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The Conspiracy
The fact that the results of 12th of June Presidential election were annulled by the military regime of General Babangida cannot by itself make the election free and fair. The evidence available clearly establishes that, right from the way the two parties were imposed by military diktat, funded, housed and controlled by the regime, and had their primaries and campaigns largely determined by the regime, there was very little that was democratic in the whole process culminating in the June 12th, 1993, election.
The only inference one can draw from the facts available, is that a conspiracy to install Chief M.K.O Abiola was, at the last minute, aborted by General Babangida and others, perhaps including General Abacha. This conspiracy may actually go back to the early 1980s, when these two generals began plotting with Chief Abiola, and others, against the democratically elected government of Nigeria; a conspiracy which successfully bore fruit on 31st December, 1983, when, the then Brigadier General Sani Abacha, announced the overthrow of the democratically elected governments of Nigeria and M. K. O. Abiola led in the campaign to support this act of treason, and General Babangida took up the strategic position of Chief of Army Staff, which in August, 1985 he relinquished to General Abacha on becoming Head of State.
Indications of such a conspiracy can be seen in the way Chief M. K. O. Abiola consulted very closely with General Babangida over who was to be his running mate, even after, according to him, he had felt that his friend was no longer with him. He, on the 14th August, 1993, said: “ We got to Jos, the first shocker for Babangida was that I won in Jos very narrowly but I won…the problem is that I need a Christian as a running-mate…The President (Babangida) was suggesting that I should pick Bafyau…So I went back to see Babangida the next day Friday. He was still insisting on Bafyau. It became very clear that we were on a collision course…I phoned the President at midnight before the announcement and told him that out of courtesy I must let him know that there is no way I can pick Bafyua. I was going to announce Babagana Kingibe in the morning.”
Other indications of Chief Abiola’s deep conspiratorial involvement with the military, particularly with the two generals most influential in the overthrow of our last democratic governments, also come out in the way he went to express such public confidence in General Abacha’s commitment to hand over power to him as soon as the latter had executed the November 17, 1993 military coup. Speaking at SDP Kaduna State office, at Kawo, Kaduna, on 28th September, 1993, he said: “I really commend General Sani Abacha because out of love of the country, he puts his common sense, experience, tact and intellect to ease out (the former President, General Ibrahim Babangida). I have no doubt that it is that common sense, that patriotism, that intellect that will enable him to ease out his Babangida surrogates..but for people like Sani Abacha this country would have plunged into bloodshed”.
If, what Mrs Titilayo Abiola told The Post Express in an interview on Sunday, 28th June, 1998, that Chief M. K. O. Abiola was so much looking forward to coming out and meeting General Abacha, that he cried when he heard of his death is
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true, it further indicates that his connections with General Abacha, at least as far as he was concerned, remained a very important part of his life, even after the latter has locked him up for over four years.
It is difficult at this stage to fathom the depth and ramifications of the layers, upon layers, of conspiracy involved. But there can be no doubt that an election cannot, suddenly, become free and fair, just because a military President falls out with one of the candidates in a presidential election, with whom he had a long standing conspiratorial relations against democracy in Nigeria, and goes ahead to annul the victory of his co-conspirator.
The Facts and the Figures
The fact that those campaigning for the “actualisation of the June 12th election” refused to face is that out of 36.7 million Nigerians who registered to vote in that election, only 7.7 million voted for Chief Abiola while 5.9 million voted for Alhaji Bashir Tofa and 23.1 million abstained. In other words, 29.0 million Nigerian voters, equal to 79% of the registered voters refused to vote for Chief Abiola, either by abstaining, or by voting for the NRC candidate. How can a candidate, who fails to obtain the support of 8 out every 10 voters in a country, be made to appear to have obtained a special mandate to rule that country, irrespective of time, of laws and of the constitution? Certainly, in democratic elections of the type we have, a candidate can be validly elected, even with a smaller proportion of the registered voters voting for him, or her. But to claim that a candidate has a mandate to rule a country even five years after the election, there surely should be better evidence of solid electoral support, in fact, repeated over a number of elections.
It is not only when looking at the figures for the whole country, that we find that the overwhelming majority of Nigerians refused to vote for him but even in the South-western States of Nigeria, 61.1% of the voters either abstained, or voted, for Alhaji Bashir Tofa, thus effectively refusing to vote for M. K. O Abiola. In Lagos State, where it is claimed he has his main support base, 63% of the registered voters refused to vote for him by either abstaining or by voting for Alhaji Bashir Tofa. The table below brings out these facts clearly.
Chief M. K. O. Abiola’s Performance in the June 12
Presidential Election in the South Western States of Nigeria.
State
Total number of registered voters
Total number of votes for Abiola
% of registered voters who voted for Abiola
% of registered voters who did not vote for Abiola.
Lagos
2, 397, 421
883, 965
36.9
63
Ogun
941, 889
425, 725
45.4
54.6
Ondo
1,767, 896
803, 024
45.4
54.6
Osun
1, 056, 690
365,024
21.0
79
Oyo
1,597, 280
538,001
33.6
66.4
Total
7, 761, 176
3,015,739
38.9
61.1
Source: Newswatch, June 28th 1993, p.10 10
Those leaders of NADECO, and the pro-democracy groups who threaten that if Chief M. K. O Abiola is not installed as President of Nigeria, because he won the 12th of June election, the Yorubas will break away, have to explain how the political fate of Abiola who 61.1% of the registered Yoruba voters refused to vote for can be used to legitimise the secession of the Yorubas from Nigeria. Is it because this majority does not have any rights because they choose to refuse to vote for Chief M. K. O. Abiola ? Clearly, this secessionist threat has nothing to do with justice, equity, and the democratic rights of the great majority of Yoruba voters, who refused to vote for Abiola on June 12th, 1993, and, therefore, cannot be expected to fight for “the actualisation of the mandate” which they never gave him.
Conclusion
Clearly, Chief Abiola did not obtain any democratic mandate through a free and fair election, for, no such election took place June 12th, 1993. But, even, granted that in spite of all its severe limitation, that election reflected the will of the Nigerian electorate, at that point in time, and in those special circumstances, it does not provide a basis for Chief Abiola to be installed as a civilian dictator, outside any democratic political party, without any elected federal legislatures, without any, elected, state executive and legislatures, or, elected, local government councils; leaving him effectively propped up by the military, in this so-called “Government of National Unity”. For, those who advocated that he should head this government are asking for this; including his taking the powers to appoint sole administrators over the states and the local governments, for the next two years.
If, as has been clearly established above, he received no genuine, democratic, mandate to rule Nigeria, in the years 1993-1997, how can he now have this mandate, after 1997? Is it because Chief Abiola is placed on a special pedestal of representing the Yorubas, even though 61.1% of voters in the Yoruba states refused to vote for him? Those advocating this, whether explicitly or implicitly, have to explain what it has to do with democracy or national unity. In fact, they have to explain what it has to do with any form of constitutional government under the rule of law. For, to install Chief Abiola to head a “Government of National Unity” simply because of his tribe, or race, is to actually establish a Government of National Disunity and National Confusion.
For, such an imposition by the present military regime, even for one month, as NADECO has been pleading in Abuja, has no basis in democracy, but amounts to an unprincipled and dangerous compromise with the military and civilian conspirators who, since 31st December, 1983, have taken our country backwards from where it had reached on the weak, but sound, democratic, system we were gradually building in the Second Republic, on the basis of the 1979 Constitution.
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Those leaders of NADECO, and the pro-democracy groups who threaten that if Chief M. K. O Abiola is not installed as President of Nigeria, because he won the 12th of June election, the Yorubas will break away, have to explain how the political fate of Abiola who 61.1% of the registered Yoruba voters refused to vote for can be used to legitimise the secession of the Yorubas from Nigeria. Is it because this majority does not have any rights because they choose to refuse to vote for Chief M. K. O. Abiola ? Clearly, this secessionist threat has nothing to do with justice, equity, and the democratic rights of the great majority of Yoruba voters, who refused to vote for Abiola on June 12th, 1993, and, therefore, cannot be expected to fight for “the actualisation of the mandate” which they never gave him.
Conclusion
Clearly, Chief Abiola did not obtain any democratic mandate through a free and fair election, for, no such election took place June 12th, 1993. But, even, granted that in spite of all its severe limitation, that election reflected the will of the Nigerian electorate, at that point in time, and in those special circumstances, it does not provide a basis for Chief Abiola to be installed as a civilian dictator, outside any democratic political party, without any elected federal legislatures, without any, elected, state executive and legislatures, or, elected, local government councils; leaving him effectively propped up by the military, in this so-called “Government of National Unity”. For, those who advocated that he should head this government are asking for this; including his taking the powers to appoint sole administrators over the states and the local governments, for the next two years.
If, as has been clearly established above, he received no genuine, democratic, mandate to rule Nigeria, in the years 1993-1997, how can he now have this mandate, after 1997? Is it because Chief Abiola is placed on a special pedestal of representing the Yorubas, even though 61.1% of voters in the Yoruba states refused to vote for him? Those advocating this, whether explicitly or implicitly, have to explain what it has to do with democracy or national unity. In fact, they have to explain what it has to do with any form of constitutional government under the rule of law. For, to install Chief Abiola to head a “Government of National Unity” simply because of his tribe, or race, is to actually establish a Government of National Disunity and National Confusion.
For, such an imposition by the present military regime, even for one month, as NADECO has been pleading in Abuja, has no basis in democracy, but amounts to an unprincipled and dangerous compromise with the military and civilian conspirators who, since 31st December, 1983, have taken our country backwards from where it had reached on the weak, but sound, democratic, system we were gradually building in the Second Republic, on the basis of the 1979 Constitution.
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