Was Babangida a Drug Baron?

Nobody knows more about the international drug trade better than Alain Labrousse. The author of the best selling book 'Geopolitics of Drugs' and former Director of the Geopolitical Watchdog on Drugs (OGD), clearly identified Nigeria's former military rulers and diplomats as drug barons. In an authoritative report still posted on the web site of the Canadian Parliament on the drug trade in Africa, Labrouse marks out Ibrahim Babangida, Nigeria's former self-appointed president, as one of the drug-dealing dictators in Africa.

The report says: "The international community has long considered Nigeria a narco-state: the United States put it on the list of 'decertified' countries between 1994 and 1999, and the Dublin Group, consisting mainly of the European countries, unfearingly called it a 'narco-regime'. Its President, General Babangida, and his wife have been suspected of engaging in cocaine trafficking, along with numerous other military officers."

Apart from Babangida and his wife, Maryam, top military brass and members of the diplomatic corps are some others identified in the international investigation of the drug ring that prospered from the early 1980s through the mid-1990s.

Major Orkar, whose unsuccessful coup plot was the most successful attempt to dispose Babangida of power, also alleged that there was drug dealing going on during the regime of the dictator. Said Orkar: " I, Major Gideon Orkar, wish to happily inform you of the successful ousting of the dictatorial, corrupt, drug baronish, evil man, deceitful, homo-sexually-centered, prodigalistic, un-patriotic administration of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida." Since Orkar called IBB a drug baron, many Nigerians have quietly accepted it as a fact.

In Labrousse's report, he claimed: "The United States in particular raised questions about the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tom Ikimi, who made use of the services of the director of a Lagos newspaper who frequently traveled abroad to distribute cocaine and heroin imported from Latin America and Asia among the members of his network of resellers around the world.

"Another soldier long involved in drug trafficking was Major Hamza Al-Mustapha, head of the feared Abacha Security Service (SSS), who carried on his dealings by diplomatic pouch. His wife, of Arab origin, coordinated a ring in the Gulf countries.

"A former head of Nigeria's permanent delegation to the United Nations was also apparently involved.

Nigerian top officials' dealing in drugs under the cover of diplomacy is characteristic of dictatorships around the world, especially in Africa, where Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Charles Taylor of Liberia are known to have treaded the same path.

In the case of Equatorial Guinea, diplomats belonging to the president's family or clan used the diplomatic pouch and their immunity to engage in cocaine and heroin traffic around the world. Tens of them have been arrested over the past two decades, particularly in Spain. The family of Mozambican President Chissano has also been involved a number of times in cocaine cases. But in the case of Babangida, he has been lucky never to have been caught.

The military connection in the drug trafficking business is particularly noteworthy. Military officers have for long been suspected of coordinating the drug trade. The burning of the Ministry of Defence Building in Lagos during Babangida's regime, during which The Sunday Guardian showed IBB smiling right in front of the burning edifice, was believed to have been official arson executed to hide some sensitive information about the trade.

The only case that has been widely linked to Babangida, which many thought could have exposed him is that of Gloria Okon, a Nigerian lady alleged to have been his courier and said to have died in detention but believed to have been resettled in anonymity. It is widely accepted that the murdered journalist, Dele Giwa, was about to unravel the mysterious disappearance of Gloria Okon when he was killed in circumstances tied around Babangida's neck.

Babangida has refused to answer charges of his involvement in the bombing of Dele Giwa, and has used every available legal means to refuse to testify. The Oputa panel set up by the Obasanjo administration to uncover the misdeeds of the past regimes submitted that Babangida has a case to answer regarding Dele Giwa's death.

Starting in the early 1980s, Nigerian traffickers began to gain prominence as they swallowed condoms full of heroin and transported them to European countries and the United States. They sourced the drug from Thailand, Pakistan and India, transited through Ethiopia and Kenya and Central Africa and headed for the Western countries. . At the same time, Nigerians traveled to South America to pick up cocaine destined for European markets and, starting in 1994, for South African markets. According to the World Customs Organization (WCO), Nigerian drug traffickers were involved in 1,200 cases in the world between 1991 and 1995.

According to Alain Labrousse, "It was first thought that the Nigerian organizations were mainly family or clan-based. According to various sources, however, particularly American, there is what could be called a genuine Mafia in Nigeria: "drug barons", supported by "under-barons", who in turn have their own groups of couriers. In this organization, three leaders head up 85 cells of approximately 40 members. In those cells, a "lieutenant" apparently commands six to 20 "soldiers". The structure is found in the organization of the Nigerian rings in the United States. Operation Tonga , carried out by European police in 1995 and 1996, also showed that there were links between the Colombian Mafia, the Neapolitan Camorra and the Nigerian rings.

Similarly, Nigerians are well established in most Eastern countries. Their "bridgeheads" are most often scholarship students from communist regimes who have remained penniless since the political upheavals resulting from the fall of the Berlin Wall. Nigerian traffickers are thus the only native African groups on the most wanted lists of the law enforcement agencies of the rich countries, together with international criminal organizations and the Colombian, Chinese, Turkish, Pakistani and, more recently, Kosovar drug rings.

An estimated 35-40% of all the heroin coming into the United States is brought by Nigerian couriers. In 1989, the United States and Nigeria established a joint Counter-Narcotics Task Force. Lack of cooperation by Nigerian authorities in combating the drug trafficking problem led to a decision by the Clinton Administration in March 1998, as in 1994 and 1996, to put Nigeria on the State Department's list of non-cooperative drug trafficking nations.

The administration of Buhari and Idiagbon saw the grave danger posed by the drug trade, and it waged a very serious war against it. It killed by firing squad two Nigerians caught with drugs while attempting to take them overseas. It had been rumored that if Babangida had not staged his coup at the time he did, he was under the radar for his drug business and would have been arrested.

When IBB took power, Nigeria began to feign combating drug trading. While he put a stop to death sentence for drug trafficking, Babangida set up the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, which recruited its first set of graduates in 1990. Since then, even the agency has been involved in the drug business.

In 1992, drugs seized by the agency continued to disappear even under the oversight of the court in its own premises. The NDLEA ridiculed IBB's drug fight. And no arrested trafficker has given away the name of the boss so far.

According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Nigeria's anti narcotic efforts remain "unfocused and lacking in material support."

While it has never been official confirmed, reports by some Nigerian newspapers in 1993, at the time when Babangida was disgraced out of power, claimed that the Evil Genius was wanted by the US government for drug trafficking. It was said that was why Babangida has not stepped on American soil since he left power.

So, was Babangida a drug baron? There is sufficient suspicion and information, especially outside of the country to link him with drug trafficking in the 1980s and the early 1990s. However, because he has always avoided circumstances that could make him give answers to those allegations, he has never been pinned down. His failure to travel to a country like the United States, where he is believed to be wanted, adds fuel to speculations about his past. Perhaps, if he were to stop raising legal obstacles to the murder of Dele Giwa, a chance to question him about Gloria Okon may bring up the most closely guided open secret of his regime.

CANADIAN PARLIAMENT LINK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA FACING THE CHALLENGE OF DRUGS.

‘Babangida committed treason with June 12 poll annulment’

Former President of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), Chief Rotimi Akeredolu (SAN) yesterday said former military President Ibrahim Babangida committed treason by annulling the 1993 presidential election. Moshood Abiola won that election. Akeredolu was speaking as the guest lecturer in Ado-Ekiti, the Ekiti State capital, at the 18th anniversary of the election organised by the Ekiti State Government.
He said: "What the military did, as regards the annulment of the June 12 presidential elections, was treasonable, and the devastating effects are still on. Lives and property were lost and many still bear the scars, both physical and mental, of the devastating aftermath of the decision to disregard the wishes of the people as freely expressed on that day."
In the lecture entitled: June 12 and Electoral Integrity in Nigeria, Akeredolu noted that June 12, 1993 election remained the most credible in the political history of Nigeria.
He said: "We never had credible elections in the colonial era; 1963 elections were massively rigged in favour of the Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP). There was transparent rigging in the past. You cannot conduct an election to serve a predetermined purpose."
Akeredolu condemned those who might have conspired in the annulment of the election.
He criticised former President Olusegun Obasanjo for distancing himself from the legitimate revolts to reclaim the election and for shunning appeals to immortalise the late Abiola.
Akeredolu said: "Obasanjo betrayed June 12 and was a beneficiary. He betrayed the struggle and worked assiduously against it. He spat on the river that cleanses him. Now, MKO (Abiola) has towered above Obasanjo and his cohorts."
He stressed the need for voter education ahead of future elections, praising the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the National Youth Corps Members (NYSC) for their roles in the April polls.
Ekiti State Governor Kayode Fayemi said the June 12 election was incontrovertible, saying it was a day Nigeria was inextricably woven

Nigeria-THE FIRST REPUBLIC

Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960. The period between this date and January 15, 1966, when the first military coup d'�tat took place, is generally referred to as the First Republic, although the country only became a republic on October 1, 1963. After a plebiscite in February 1961, the Northern Cameroons, which before then was administered separately within Nigeria, voted to join Nigeria.
At independence Nigeria had all the trappings of a democratic state and was indeed regarded as a beacon of hope for democracy. It had a federal constitution that guaranteed a large measure of autonomy to three (later four) regions; it operated a parliamentary democracy modeled along British lines that emphasized majority rule; the constitution included an elaborate bill of rights; and, unlike other African states that adopted one-party systems immediately after independence, the country had a functional, albeit regionally based, multiparty system.
These democratic trappings were not enough to guarantee the survival of the republic because of certain fundamental and structural weaknesses. Perhaps the most significant weakness was the disproportionate power of the north in the federation. The departing colonial authority had hoped that the development of national politics would forestall any sectional domination of power, but it underestimated the effects of a regionalized party system in a country where political power depended on population. The major political parties in the republic had emerged in the late 1940s and early 1950s as regional parties whose main aim was to control power in their regions. The Northern People's Congress (NPC) and the Action Group (AG), which controlled the Northern Region and the Western Region, respectively, clearly emerged in this way. The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), which controlled the Eastern Region and the Midwestern Region (created in 1963), began as a nationalist party but was forced by the pressures of regionalism to become primarily an eastern party, albeit with strong pockets of support elsewhere in the federation. These regional parties were based upon, and derived their main support from, the major groups in their regions: NPC (Hausa/Fulani), AG (Yoruba), and NCNC (Igbo). A notable and more ideologically-based political party that never achieved significant power was Aminu Kano's radical Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), which opposed the NPC in the north from its Kano base.
There were also several political movements formed by minority groups to press their demands for separate states. These minority parties also doubled as opposition parties in the regions and usually aligned themselves with the party in power in another region that supported their demands for a separate state. Ethnic minorities therefore enabled the regional parties to extend their influence beyond their regions.
In the general election of 1959 to determine which parties would rule in the immediate postcolonial period, the major ones won a majority of seats in their regions, but none emerged powerful enough to constitute a national government. A coalition government was formed by the NPC and NCNC, the former having been greatly favored by the departing colonial authority. The coalition provided a measure of north-south consensus that would not have been the case if the NCNC and AG had formed a coalition. Nnamdi Azikiwe (NCNC) became the governor general (and president after the country became a republic in 1963), Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (NPC) was named prime minister, and Obafemi Awolowo (AG) had to settle for leader of the opposition. The regional premiers were Ahmadu Bello (Northern Region, NPC), Samuel Akintola (Western Region, AG), Michael Okpara (Eastern Region, NCNC), and Dennis Osadebey (Midwestern Region, NCNC).
Among the difficulties of the republic were efforts of the NPC, the senior partner in the coalition government, to use the federal government's increasing power in favor of the Northern Region. The balance rested on the premise that the Northern Region had the political advantage deriving from its preponderant size and population, and the two southern regions (initially the Eastern Region and the Western Region) had the economic advantage as sources of most of the exported agricultural products, in addition to their control of the federal bureaucracy. The NPC sought to redress northern economic and bureaucratic disadvantages. Under the First National Development Plan, many of the federal government's projects and military establishments were allocated to the north. There was an "affirmative action" program by the government to recruit and train northerners, resulting in the appointment of less qualified northerners to federal public service positions, many replacing more qualified southerners. Actions such as these served to estrange the NCNC from its coalition partner. The reactions to the fear of northern dominance, and especially the steps taken by the NCNC to counter the political dominance of the north, accelerated the collapse of the young republic.
The southern parties, especially the embittered NCNC, had hoped that the regional power balance could be shifted if the 1962 census favored the south. Population determined the allocation of parliamentary seats on which the power of every region was based. Because population figures were also used in allocating revenue to the regions and in determining the viability of any proposed new region, the 1962 census was approached by all regions as a key contest for control of the federation. This contest led to various illegalities: inflated figures, electoral violence, falsification of results, manipulation of population figures, and the like. Although the chief census officer found evidence of more inflated figures in the southern regions, the northern region retained its numerical superiority. As could be expected, southern leaders rejected the results, leading to a cancellation of the census and to the holding of a fresh census in 1963. This population count was finally accepted after a protracted legal battle by the NCNC and gave the Northern Region a population of 29,758,975 out of the total of 55,620,268. These figures eliminated whatever hope the southerners had of ruling the federation.
Since the 1962-63 exercise, the size and distribution of the population have remained volatile political issues (see Population , ch. 2). In fact, the importance and sensitivity of a census count have increased because of the expanded use of population figures for revenue allocations, constituency delineation, allocations under the quota system of admissions into schools and employment, and the siting of industries and social amenities such as schools, hospitals, and post offices. Another census in 1973 failed, even though it was conducted by a military government that was less politicized than its civilian predecessor. What made the 1973 census particularly volatile was the fact that it was part of a transition plan by the military to hand over power to civilians. The provisional figures showed an increase for the states that were carved out of the former Northern Region with a combined 51.4 million people out of a total 79.8 million people. Old fears of domination were resurrected, and the stability of the federation was again seriously threatened. The provisional results were finally canceled in 1975. As of late 1990, no other census had been undertaken, although one was scheduled for 1991 as part of the transition to civilian rule. In the interim, Nigeria has relied on population projections based on 1963 census figures.
Other events also contributed to the collapse of the First Republic. In 1962, after a split in the leadership of the AG that led to a crisis in the Western Region, a state of emergency was declared in the region, and the federal government invoked its emergency powers to administer the region directly. These actions resulted in removing the AG from regional power. Awolowo, its leader, along with other AG leaders, was convicted of treasonable felony. Awolowo's former deputy and premier of the Western Region formed a new party--the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP)--that took over the government. The federal coalition government also supported agitation of minority groups for a separate state to be excised from the Western Region. In 1963 the Midwestern Region was created.
By the time of the 1964 general elections, the first to be conducted solely by Nigerians, the country's politics had become polarized into a competition between two opposing alliances. One was the Nigerian National Alliance made up of the NPC and NNDC; the other was the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) composed of the NCNC, the AG, and their allies. Each of the regional parties openly intimidated its opponents in the campaigns. When it became clear that the neutrality of the Federal Electoral Commission could not be guaranteed, calls were made for the army to supervise the elections. The UPGA resolved to boycott the elections. When elections were finally held under conditions that were not free and were unfair to opponents of the regional parties, the NCNC was returned to power in the east and midwest, while the NPC kept control of the north and was also in a position to form a federal government on its own. The Western Region became the "theater of war" between the NNDP (and the NPC) and the AG-UPGA. The rescheduled regional elections late in 1965 were violent. The federal government refused to declare a state of emergency, and the military seized power on January 15, 1966. The First Republic had collapsed.
Scholars have made several attempts to explain the collapse. Some attribute it to the inappropriateness of the political institutions and processes and to their not being adequately entrenched under colonial rule, whereas others hold the elite responsible. Lacking a political culture to sustain democracy, politicians failed to play the political game according to established rules. The failure of the elite appears to have been a symptom rather than the cause of the problem. Because members of the elite lacked a material base for their aspirations, they resorted to control of state offices and resources. At the same time, the uneven rates of development among the various groups and regions invested the struggle for state power with a group character. These factors gave importance to group, ethnic, and regional conflicts that eventually contributed to the collapse of the republic.
The final explanation is closely related to all the foregoing. It holds that the regionalization of politics and, in particular, of party politics made the stability of the republic dependent on each party retaining control of its regional base. As long as this was so, there was a rough balance between the parties, as well as their respective regions. Once the federal government invoked its emergency powers in 1962 and removed the AG from power in the Western Region, the fragile balance on which the federation rested was disturbed. Attempts by the AG and NCNC to create a new equilibrium, or at least to return the status quo ante, only generated stronger opposition and hastened the collapse of the republic.
Data as of June 1991

• Nigeria-Women's Roles
  
• Nigeria-WELFARE
  
• Nigeria-THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE POSTWAR ERA
  
• Nigeria-EDUCATION
  
• Nigeria-Lugard and Indirect Rule
  
• Nigeria-Arms Procurement and Defense Industries
  
• Nigeria-Communications
  
• Nigeria-Irrigation
  
• Nigeria-COLONIAL NIGERIA
  
• Nigeria-Roads
  
• Nigeria-African and Regional Issues
  
• Nigeria-The Northern Area
  
• Nigeria-Fisheries
  
• Nigeria-The 1964-65 Elections
  
• Nigeria-Relations with Major Powers
  
• Nigeria-Electric Power
  
• Nigeria-Trade Unions
  
• Nigeria-Organization, Mission, and Order of Battle
  
• Nigeria-Climate
  
• Nigeria-POPULATION
  
• Nigeria-AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, AND FISHING
  
• Nigeria-Early States Before 1500
  
• Nigeria-The Yoruba Wars
  
• Nigeria-BANKING, FINANCE, AND OTHER SERVICES
  
• Nigeria-The Second Republic
  
• Nigeria-Population Estimates and the Demographic Transition
  
• Nigeria-The Gowon Regime
  
• Nigeria-Crime and Punishment
  
• Nigeria-Oil and Gas
  
• Nigeria-Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia
  
• Nigeria-Abolition of the Slave Trade
  
• Nigeria-The Savanna States, 1500-1800
  
• Nigeria-Recruitment and Conditions of Service
  
• Nigeria-The Igbo: A Stateless Society?
  
• Nigeria-Extension of British Control
  
• Nigeria-NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES AND PERCEPTIONS
  
• Nigeria-The Regime of Murtala Muhammad, 1975-76
  
• Nigeria-Unemployment
  
• Nigeria-THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
  
• Nigeria-Constitutional and Political Framework
  
• Nigeria-Regional Groupings
  
• Nigeria-MANUFACTURING
  
• Nigeria-Training
  
• Nigeria-Indigenous Beliefs
  
• Nigeria-The Southern Area
  
• Nigeria -Country Profile
  
• Nigeria-Early Development
  
• Nigeria-Chapter 3 - The Economy
  
• Nigeria-RELIGION
  
• Nigeria-The Third Republic
  
• Nigeria-Civic Action and Veterans' Groups
  
• Nigeria-Chapter 5 - National Security
  
• Nigeria-Army
  
• Nigeria-RETURN TO MILITARY RULE
  
• Nigeria-NATIONAL SECURITY
  
• Nigeria-Human Rights
  
• Nigeria-Rural-Urban Linkages
  
• Nigeria-EARLY HISTORY
  
• Nigeria-Ethnic Relations
  
• Nigeria-Introduction
  
• Nigeria-Royal Niger Company
  
• Nigeria-Attitudes Toward the Military
  
• Nigeria-Usman dan Fodio and the Sokoto Caliphate
  
• Nigeria-Census History
  
• Nigeria-Labor Organizations
  
• Nigeria-The Colonial Period
  
• Nigeria-Relations with Neighboring States
  
• Nigeria-Railroads
  
• Nigeria-New State Movements
  
• Nigeria-Economic Development
  
• Nigeria-Military Capabilities
  
• Nigeria-Foreword
  
• Nigeria-GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
  
• Nigeria-ECONOMY
  
• Nigeria-The Obasanjo Regime, 1976-79
  
• Nigeria-Professional Associations INTEREST GROUPS AND NATIONAL POLITICS
  
• Nigeria-Other Interest Groups
  
• Nigeria-URBANIZATION
  
• Nigeria-Chapter 4 - Government and Politics
  
• Nigeria-The Debt Overhang
  
• Nigeria-Influence of the Christian Missions
  
• Nigeria-Christianity
  
• Nigeria-FEDERALISM AND INTRAGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
  
• Nigeria-Unification of Nigeria
  
• Nigeria-Government Finance
  
• Nigeria-Forestry
  
• Nigeria-Chapter 2 - The Society and Its Environment
  
• Nigeria-MILITARY INTERVENTION AND MILITARY RULE
  
• Nigeria-Ports
  
• Nigeria-Planning
  
• Nigeria-FOREIGN RELATIONS
  
• Nigeria-Labor Unions
  
• Nigeria-Balance of Payments
  
• Nigeria-Primary Health Care Policies
  
• Nigeria-Relations with the Rest of Africa
  
• Nigeria-Commodity Trade
  
• Nigeria-Political Role of the Military
  
• Nigeria-The Census Controversy
  
• Nigeria-Acknowledgements
  
• Nigeria-Early British Imperialism THE COLONIAL ECONOMIC LEGACY
  
• Nigeria-National Economic Interests in the Postwar Period
  
• Nigeria-TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
  
• Nigeria-ETHNICITY
  
• Nigeria-Social Structure
  
• Nigeria-Nigeria
  
• Nigeria-Internal Security Forces and Organizations
  
• Nigeria-Crime, Corruption, and Political Turbulence
  
• Nigeria-Transportation TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
  
• Nigeria-Crops
  
• Nigeria-EMERGENCE OF NIGERIAN NATIONALISM
  
• Nigeria-Security and Anticrime Measures
  
• Nigeria-MINING, PETROLEUM, AND ENERGY RESOURCES
  
• Nigeria-ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY
  
• Nigeria-Civil War
  
• Nigeria-Ministry of Internal Affairs
  
• Nigeria
  
• Nigeria-Student Associations
  
• Nigeria
  
• Nigeria-Nigeria Police Force
  
• Nigeria-The Northern Kingdoms of the Savanna
  
• Nigeria-Navy
  
• Nigeria-THE FIRST REPUBLIC
  
• Nigeria-INDEPENDENT NIGERIA
  
• Nigeria-The 1966 Coups, Civil War, and Gowon's Government
  
• Nigeria-The Media
  
• Nigeria-Urbanization Since Independence
  
• Nigeria-Preparations for the Return to Civilian Rule
  
• Nigeria-Relations with International Organizations
  
• Nigeria
  
• Nigeria-THE CIVIL SERVICE
  
• Nigeria-The Muhammad/Obasanjo Government
  
• Nigeria-LABOR
  
• Nigeria-The Babangida Government
  
• Nigeria-Islam
  
• Nigeria-Chapter 1 - Historical Setting
  
• Nigeria-Livestock
  
• Nigeria-ARMED FORCES
  
• Nigeria-Foreign Policy
  
• Nigeria-POLITICAL TRANSITIONS AND TRANSITION PLANNING
  
• Nigeria-Yoruba Kingdoms and Benin
  
• Nigeria-Structural Adjustment
  
• Nigeria-Development of National Economic Interests to World War II
  
• Nigeria-History of Modern Medical Services
  
• Nigeria-Income Distribution
  
• Nigeria-Politics in the Crisis Years
  
• Nigeria-Further Development of Colonial Policy
  
• Nigeria-Air Force
  
• Nigeria-CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
  
• Nigeria
  
• Nigeria-Local and Bilateral Issues
  
• Nigeria-INTERNAL SECURITY
  
• Nigeria-Religious Sectarianism
  
• Nigeria-Incidence and Trends in Crime
  
• Nigeria
  
• Nigeria-Preface
  
• Nigeria-Demographic Factors and the Defense Budget
  
• Nigeria-Land Use, Soils, and Land Tenure
  
• Nigeria-Foreign Trade FOREIGN TRADE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
  
• Nigeria
  
• Nigeria-Historical Development of Urban Centers
  
• Nigeria-THE SECOND REPUBLIC, 1979-83
  
• Nigeria-GEOGRAPHY
  
• Nigeria-HEALTH
  
• Nigeria-Domestic Security
  
• Nigeria-Women's Organizations
  
• Nigeria-EUROPEAN SLAVE TRADE IN WEST AFRICA
  
• Nigeria
  
• Nigeria-The Buhari Regime
  

Background		British influence and control over what would become Nigeria and Africa's most populous country grew through the 19th century. A series of constitutions after World War II granted Nigeria greater autonomy; independence came in 1960. Following nearly 16 years of military rule, a new constitution was adopted in 1999, and a peaceful transition to civilian government was completed. The government continues to face the daunting task of reforming a petroleum-based economy, whose revenues have been squandered through corruption and mismanagement, and institutionalizing democracy. In addition, Nigeria continues to experience longstanding ethnic and religious tensions. Although both the 2003 and 2007 presidential elections were marred by significant irregularities and violence, Nigeria is currently experiencing its longest period of civilian rule since independence. The general elections of April 2007 marked the first civilian-to-civilian transfer of power in the country's history.
Location		Western Africa, bordering the Gulf of Guinea, between Benin and Cameroon
Area(sq km)		total: 923,768 sq km land: 910,768 sq km water: 13,000 sq km
Geographic coordinates		10 00 N, 8 00 E
Land boundaries(km)		total: 4,047 km border countries: Benin 773 km, Cameroon 1,690 km, Chad 87 km, Niger 1,497 km
Coastline(km)		853 km
Climate		varies; equatorial in south, tropical in center, arid in north
Elevation extremes(m)		lowest point: Atlantic Ocean 0 m highest point: Chappal Waddi 2,419 m
Natural resources		natural gas, petroleum, tin, iron ore, coal, limestone, niobium, lead, zinc, arable land
Land use(%)		arable land: 33.02% permanent crops: 3.14% other: 63.84% (2005)
Irrigated land(sq km)		2,820 sq km (2003)
Total renewable water resources(cu km)		286.2 cu km (2003)
Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural)		total: 8.01 cu km/yr (21%/10%/69%) per capita: 61 cu m/yr (2000)
Natural hazards		periodic droughts; flooding
Environment - current issues		soil degradation; rapid deforestation; urban air and water pollution; desertification; oil pollution - water, air, and soil; has suffered serious damage from oil spills; loss of arable land; rapid urbanization
Environment - international agreements		party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Marine Life Conservation, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements
Geography - note		the Niger enters the country in the northwest and flows southward through tropical rain forests and swamps to its delta in the Gulf of Guinea
Population		149,229,090 note: estimates for this country explicitly take into account the effects of excess mortality due to AIDS; this can result in lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality, higher death rates, lower population growth rates, and changes in the distribution of population by age and sex than would otherwise be expected (July 2009 est.)
Age structure(%)		0-14 years: 41.5% (male 31,624,050/female 30,242,637) 15-64 years: 55.5% (male 42,240,641/female 40,566,672) 65 years and over: 3.1% (male 2,211,840/female 2,343,250) (2009 est.)
Median age(years)		total: 19 years male: 18.9 years female: 19.1 years (2009 est.)
Population growth rate(%)		1.999% (2009 est.)
Birth rate(births/1,000 population)		36.65 births/1,000 population (2009 est.)
Death rate(deaths/1,000 population)		16.56 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.)
Net migration rate(migrant(s)/1,000 population)		-0.1 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2009 est.)
Urbanization(%)		urban population: 48% of total population (2008) rate of urbanization: 3.8% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
Sex ratio(male(s)/female)		at birth: 1.06 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.05 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 1.04 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.94 male(s)/female total population: 1.04 male(s)/female (2009 est.)
Infant mortality rate(deaths/1,000 live births)		total: 94.35 deaths/1,000 live births male: 100.38 deaths/1,000 live births female: 87.97 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 est.)
Life expectancy at birth(years)		total population: 46.94 years male: 46.16 years female: 47.76 years (2009 est.)
Total fertility rate(children born/woman)		4.91 children born/woman (2009 est.)
Nationality		noun: Nigerian(s) adjective: Nigerian
Ethnic groups(%)		Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, is composed of more than 250 ethnic groups; the following are the most populous and politically influential: Hausa and Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo (Ibo) 18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3.5%, Tiv 2.5%
Religions(%)		Muslim 50%, Christian 40%, indigenous beliefs 10%
Languages(%)		English (official), Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo (Ibo), Fulani
Country name		conventional long form: Federal Republic of Nigeria conventional short form: Nigeria
Government type		federal republic
Capital		name: Abuja geographic coordinates: 9 05 N, 7 32 E time difference: UTC+1 (6 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)
Administrative divisions		36 states and 1 territory*; Abia, Adamawa, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Enugu, Federal Capital Territory*, Gombe, Imo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Lagos, Nassarawa, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe, Zamfara
Constitution		adopted 5 May 1999; effective 29 May 1999
Legal system		based on English common law, Islamic law (in 12 northern states), and traditional law; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction with reservations
Suffrage		18 years of age; universal
Executive branch		chief of state: President Umaru Musa YAR'ADUA (since 29 May 2007); note - the president is both the chief of state and head of government head of government: President Umaru Musa YAR'ADUA (since 29 May 2007) cabinet: Federal Executive Council elections: president is elected by popular vote for a four-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held 21 April 2007 (next to be held in April 2011) election results: Umaru Musa YAR'ADUA elected president; percent of vote - Umaru Musa YAR'ADUA 69.8%, Muhammadu BUHARI 18.7%, Atiku ABUBAKAR 7.5%, Orji Uzor KALU 1.7%, other 2.3%
Legislative branch		bicameral National Assembly consists of the Senate (109 seats, 3 from each state plus 1 from Abuja; members elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms) and House of Representatives (360 seats; members elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms) elections: Senate - last held 21 April 2007 (next to be held in April 2011); House of Representatives - last held 21 April 2007 (next to be held in April 2011) election results: Senate - percent of vote by party - PDP 53.7%, ANPP 27.9%, AD 9.7%, other 8.7%; seats by party - PDP 76, ANPP 27, AD 6; House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - PDP 54.5%, ANPP 27.4%, AD 8.8%, UNPP 2.8%, NPD 1.9%, APGA 1.6%, PRP 0.8%; seats by party - PDP 76, ANPP 27, AD 6, UNPP 2, APGA 2, NPD 1, PRP 1, vacant 1
Judicial branch		Supreme Court (judges recommended by the National Judicial Council and appointed by the president); Federal Court of Appeal (judges are appointed by the federal government from a pool of judges recommended by the National Judicial Council)
Political pressure groups and leaders		Academic Staff Union for Universities or ASUU; Campaign for Democracy or CD; Civil Liberties Organization or CLO; Committee for the Defense of Human Rights or CDHR; Constitutional Right Project or CRP; Human Right Africa; National Association of Democratic Lawyers or NADL; National Association of Nigerian Students or NANS; Nigerian Bar Association or NBA; Nigerian Labor Congress or NLC; Nigerian Medical Association or NMA; the Press; Universal Defenders of Democracy or UDD
International organization participation		ACP, AfDB, AU, C, ECOWAS, FAO, G-15, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC, MIGA, MINURCAT, MINURSO, MONUC, NAM, OAS (observer), OIC, OPCW, OPEC, PCA, UN, UN Security Council (temporary), UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO
Flag description		three equal vertical bands of green (hoist side), white, and green
Economy - overview		Oil-rich Nigeria, long hobbled by political instability, corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and poor macroeconomic management, has undertaken several reforms over the past decade. Nigeria's former military rulers failed to diversify the economy away from its overdependence on the capital-intensive oil sector, which provides 95% of foreign exchange earnings and about 80% of budgetary revenues. Following the signing of an IMF stand-by agreement in August 2000, Nigeria received a debt-restructuring deal from the Paris Club and a $1 billion credit from the IMF, both contingent on economic reforms. Nigeria pulled out of its IMF program in April 2002, after failing to meet spending and exchange rate targets, making it ineligible for additional debt forgiveness from the Paris Club. Since 2008 the government has begun showing the political will to implement the market-oriented reforms urged by the IMF, such as to modernize the banking system, to curb inflation by blocking excessive wage demands, and to resolve regional disputes over the distribution of earnings from the oil industry. In 2003, the government began deregulating fuel prices, announced the privatization of the country's four oil refineries, and instituted the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy, a domestically designed and run program modeled on the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility for fiscal and monetary management. In November 2005, Abuja won Paris Club approval for a debt-relief deal that eliminated $18 billion of debt in exchange for $12 billion in payments - a total package worth $30 billion of Nigeria's total $37 billion external debt. The deal requires Nigeria to be subject to stringent IMF reviews. Based largely on increased oil exports and high global crude prices, GDP rose strongly in 2007 and 2008. President YAR'ADUA has pledged to continue the economic reforms of his predecessor with emphasis on infrastructure improvements. Infrastructure is the main impediment to growth. The government is working toward developing stronger public-private partnerships for electricity and roads.
GDP (purchasing power parity)		$336.2 billion (2008 est.) $319.3 billion (2007 est.) $300.1 billion (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
GDP (official exchange rate)		$207.1 billion (2008 est.)
GDP - real growth rate(%)		5.3% (2008 est.) 6.4% (2007 est.) 6.2% (2006 est.)
GDP - per capita (PPP)		$2,300 (2008 est.) $2,200 (2007 est.) $2,100 (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
GDP - composition by sector(%)		agriculture: 18.1% industry: 50.8% services: 31.1% (2008 est.)
Labor force		51.04 million (2008 est.)
Labor force - by occupation(%)		agriculture: 70% industry: 10% services: 20% (1999 est.)
Unemployment rate(%)		4.9% (2007 est.)
Population below poverty line(%)		70% (2007 est.)
Household income or consumption by percentage share(%)		lowest 10%: 2% highest 10%: 32.4% (2004)
Distribution of family income - Gini index		43.7 (2003) 50.6 (1997)
Investment (gross fixed)(% of GDP)		21.7% of GDP (2008 est.)
Budget		revenues: $19.76 billion expenditures: $24.72 billion (2008 est.)
Inflation rate (consumer prices)(%)		11.6% (2008 est.) 5.4% (2007 est.)
Stock of money		$35.29 billion (31 December 2008) $26.82 billion (31 December 2007)
Stock of quasi money		$32.04 billion (31 December 2008) $22.78 billion (31 December 2007)
Stock of domestic credit		$49.51 billion (31 December 2008) $35.68 billion (31 December 2007)
Market value of publicly traded shares		$49.8 billion (31 December 2008) $86.35 billion (31 December 2007) $32.82 billion (31 December 2006)
Economic aid - recipient		$6.437 billion (2005)
Public debt(% of GDP)		13.4% of GDP (2008 est.) 20% of GDP (2004 est.)
Agriculture - products		cocoa, peanuts, palm oil, corn, rice, sorghum, millet, cassava (tapioca), yams, rubber; cattle, sheep, goats, pigs; timber; fish
Industries		crude oil, coal, tin, columbite; palm oil, peanuts, cotton, rubber, wood; hides and skins, textiles, cement and other construction materials, food products, footwear, chemicals, fertilizer, printing, ceramics, steel, small commercial ship construction and repair
Industrial production growth rate(%)		2.8% (2008 est.)
Current account balance		$3.877 billion (2008 est.) $2.203 billion (2007 est.)
Exports		$76.03 billion (2008 est.) $61.82 billion (2007 est.)
Exports - commodities(%)		petroleum and petroleum products 95%, cocoa, rubber
Exports - partners(%)		US 41.4%, India 10.4%, Brazil 9.4%, Spain 7.2%, France 4.6% (2008)
Imports		$46.3 billion (2008 est.) $38.8 billion (2007 est.)
Imports - commodities(%)		machinery, chemicals, transport equipment, manufactured goods, food and live animals
Imports - partners(%)		China 13.8%, Netherlands 9.6%, US 8.4%, UK 5.3%, South Korea 5.2%, France 4.3% (2008)
Reserves of foreign exchange and gold		$53 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $51.33 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Debt - external		$9.996 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $8.007 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Stock of direct foreign investment - at home		$68.84 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $58.84 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Stock of direct foreign investment - abroad		$13.02 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $12.72 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Exchange rates		nairas (NGN) per US dollar - 117.8 (2008 est.), 127.46 (2007), 127.38 (2006), 132.59 (2005), 132.89 (2004)
Currency (code)		naira (NGN)
Telephones - main lines in use		1.308 million (2008)
Telephones - mobile cellular		62.988 million (2008)
Telephone system		general assessment: further expansion and modernization of the fixed-line telephone network is needed domestic: the addition of a second fixed-line provider in 2002 resulted in faster growth but subscribership remains only about 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular services growing rapidly, in part responding to the shortcomings of the fixed-line network; multiple cellular service providers operate nationally with subscribership reaching 45 per 100 persons in 2008 international: country code - 234; landing point for the SAT-3/WASC fiber-optic submarine cable that provides connectivity to Europe and Asia; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (2 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean) (2008)
Internet country code		.ng
Internet users		11 million (2008)
Airports		56 (2009)
Pipelines(km)		condensate 21 km; gas 2,560 km; liquid petroleum gas 97 km; oil 3,396 km; refined products 4,090 km (2008)
Roadways(km)		total: 193,200 km paved: 28,980 km unpaved: 164,220 km (2004)
Ports and terminals		Bonny Inshore Terminal, Calabar, Lagos
Military branches		Nigerian Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force (2008)
Military service age and obligation(years of age)		18 years of age for voluntary military service (2007)
Manpower available for military service		males age 16-49: 31,929,204 females age 16-49: 30,638,979 (2008 est.)
Manpower fit for military service		males age 16-49: 19,763,535 females age 16-49: 18,850,650 (2009 est.)
Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually		male: 1,697,030 female: 1,618,561 (2009 est.)
Military expenditures(% of GDP)		1.5% of GDP (2006)
Disputes - international		Joint Border Commission with Cameroon reviewed 2002 ICJ ruling on the entire boundary and bilaterally resolved differences, including June 2006 Greentree Agreement that immediately cedes sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon with a phase-out of Nigerian control within two years while resolving patriation issues; the ICJ ruled on an equidistance settlement of Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea, but imprecisely defined coordinates in the ICJ decision and a sovereignty dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River all contribute to the delay in implementation; only Nigeria and Cameroon have heeded the Lake Chad Commission's admonition to ratify the delimitation treaty which also includes the Chad-Niger and Niger-Nigeria boundaries
Refugees and internally displaced persons		refugees (country of origin): 5,778 (Liberia) IDPs: undetermined (communal violence between Christians and Muslims since President OBASANJO's election in 1999; displacement is mostly short-term) (2007)
Electricity - production(kWh)		21.92 billion kWh (2007 est.)
Electricity - production by source(%)		fossil fuel: 61.9% hydro: 38.1% nuclear: 0% other: 0% (2001)
Electricity - consumption(kWh)		19.21 billion kWh (2007 est.)
Electricity - exports(kWh)		0 kWh (2008 est.)
Electricity - imports(kWh)		0 kWh (2008 est.)
Oil - production(bbl/day)		2.169 million bbl/day (2008 est.)
Oil - consumption(bbl/day)		286,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)
Oil - exports(bbl/day)		2.327 million bbl/day (2007 est.)
Oil - imports(bbl/day)		170,000 bbl/day (2007 est.)
Oil - proved reserves(bbl)		36.22 billion bbl (1 January 2009 est.)
Natural gas - production(cu m)		32.82 billion cu m (2008 est.)
Natural gas - consumption(cu m)		12.28 billion cu m (2008 est.)
Natural gas - exports(cu m)		20.55 billion cu m (2008)
Natural gas - proved reserves(cu m)		5.215 trillion cu m (1 January 2009 est.)
HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate(%)		3.1% (2007 est.)
HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS		2.6 million (2007 est.)
HIV/AIDS - deaths		170,000 (2007 est.)
Major infectious diseases		degree of risk: very high food or waterborne diseases: bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A and E, and typhoid fever vectorborne disease: malaria and yellow fever respiratory disease: meningococcal meningitis aerosolized dust or soil contact disease: one of the most highly endemic areas for Lassa fever water contact disease: leptospirosis and shistosomiasis animal contact disease: rabies
Literacy(%)		definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 68% male: 75.7% female: 60.6% (2003 est.)
School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education)(years)		total: 8 years male: 9 years female: 7 years (2004)
Education expenditures(% of GDP)		0.9% of GDP (1991)

JUNE 12: An albatross in Nigeria’s democracy

By Charles   Adingupu
IN less than three days, pro-democracy activists and apostles of June 12 will again march to the streets of Lagos and Nigeria at large. For them, this show of solidarity for June 12 annulled election has become a ritual. Almost nineteen years after, the ghost of June 12 still haunts Nigerians.
This institutionalised festival has become  an option for the activists and their allies to ventilate their ideals on what democracy should be.
However, the immediate cause of June 12 centred on the then military government of General Ibrahim Babangida, who braved the consequence of his  action to stop and annul an election widely believed to have been won by Chief Moshood Abiola of the defunct Social Democratic Party (SDP) without satisfactory explanations.
However, subsequent interim national government (ING) of Chief Earnest Shonekan who played the messianic role of delivering Nigeria from the catastrophic effects of the annulment failed as the late General Sani Abacha took over the reign of government. Admittedly, the constitutional conference by Abacha’s government equally failed in its quest for solution to the political imbroglio  that Nigeria was enmeshed in.

Shonekan; Abiola and Babangida

Against this backdrop, it became apparent at this point that no degree of primordial hatred against the Yoruba race or Abiola as a person would erase the glaring fact that MKO Abiola contested and apparently won an election carried out by over 14 million eligible Nigerians in that dark year of 1993.
However, there were incidentally some shortcomings in the way and manner Abiola’s camp fought doggedly  to right the wrong of that illogical decision. It began by  Bashorun deserting his teeming supporters immediately the annulment was announced.
In his bid to reclaim his mandate, the late Chief Abiola traversed the globe, drumming support from world policemen to invade and possibly annihilate the “diabolic” military administration. Unknown to the Bashorun, his supporters were no better than a leopard who changes its skin at will. His hitherto allies became jittery and in the process changed tune without any formal notice.
However,the military junta eventually agreed to “step aside” after much painstaken persuasions as a ‘personal sacrifice’. Chief Ernest Shonekan  was then saddled with the inglorious task of managing a doomed transitional government.
In a manner typical with Nigerians, Abiola had allegedly settled with General Abacha to take over from Shonekan with the hope of de-annulling June 12 election. That agreement was never realised. Abacha in his various speeches shortly afterwards maintained the military was determined to enthrone a long lasting democratic government in Nigeria. That promise, implied absence of a hidden agenda.
Abiola left in the cold.
In a bid to actualise his ‘hidden agenda,’ General Abacha immediately appointed Chief Ebenezer Babatope and Alhaji Lateef Jakande as ministers in his junta’s cabinet. That unwholesome gesture, threw members of the Abiola’s camp into disarray. Perceived soldiers of June 12 went through the back door of the Abacha’s government to seek for contracts and overtly identified with the government. Even some of the Yoruba elders began to speak with both sides of their mouths.
Not a word of their mouth could be trusted anymore. Their heart was full of mischief. Their tongue flattered with deceit.
The pan Yoruba group was torn asunder. It became difficult to determine the role played by most elder statesmen of the Yoruba extraction. It was like the arrow of God fell on them and things fell apart and the orchestrated struggle was no longer at ease. Till date, the legion of June 12 apostles has depleted either due to the affront of old age or they have compromised with the government that be.
Professor Akin Oyebode of the University of Lagos, in his recent lecture titled Future of democracy  and rule of Law pointed out the attitude of these soldiers of democracy better when he observed that “We’re living at a period of false pretences, false promises  and false achievements when our so-called leaders are soaked in hypocrisy, primitive  accumulation and reckless disregard for the national interest and popular hopes and aspirations.”
As things stand, the  self acclaimed apostles of June 12 today believed that the concept surrounding the struggle has been overtaken by events. Their focus, they said should be centred around the enthronement of genuine democracy which will allow for the convocation of a sovereign national conference  where all ethnic nationalities will deliberate their future. But how far have they gone in this journey has become another ball game for the military who only “stepped aside.”
Again, the varsity don, Professor Oyebode captured the essence of the above scenario as he stated that “aside from the fact that ballot box democracy was an anathema to the military dictators, the self proclaimed saviours of the masses felt perfectly free to suspend the cherished values of free choices, federalism and respect for the sanctity of due process which had served as the lubricants of democracy and the rule of law.”
He further enthused that Nigeria’s leaders envisaged no genuine desire for restoration of democratic rule until revolutionary pressures compelled them to foist what an observer described as an endless transition in the country.
As Nigerians continue to ruminate upon June 12, true apostles of that struggle can never be forgotten. These included people like Chief Frank Kokori, erstwhile chairman of NUPENG who refused to quit prison until Chief MKO Abiola’s mandate was restored. Other heroes of that struggle included the late Chief  Anthony Enahoro, General Cornelius Adebayo and others who we hoped that their struggle for the restoration of true democracy in Nigeria would not be in vain .
It must remain relevant — Akin
Relevance of June 12
June 12 will always be relevant and remains important because it is an expression of an elected president we never had. The election took place but the results were annuled. There’s nothing like annulment. You can only agree or disagree with the results. Hence, it will continue to remain relevant. People will always record it as a historical event.
Apostles of June 12?
They were together always in ideology. Though as at today, they may not be together physically. Some of them might have died, some might have changed attitudes but what brought them together was basically to do away with military government. And they truly succeeded. That will always bring them together. Well, now that democracy has been achieved, the apostles of June 12 should now engage in the consolidation of democracy. It is very much consistent with the  democratic nationalism we are talking about.