THE BAKASSI PENINSULA DISPUTE.

By Justice Muluh Mbuh*
We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no White man's
foot ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to
each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew
exactly where the mountains and rivers were.
Lord Salisbury, in "Bakassi? Whose Bakassi?" (West Africa, 18-24 April
1994).
* Culled from Justice M. Mbuh. International Law and Conflicts : Resolving
Border and Sovereignty Disputes in Africa. iUniverse, Inc., 2004. 460 pages,
(ISBN: 0595297072)
Among the many border disputes that Cameroun and Nigeria have had in the years
since independence, the Bakassi peninsula stands out very clearly as the most serious
dispute of all. This portion of the disputed border draws increasing attention, as it
became public knowledge that the peninsula is very rich in petroleum and natural gas.
The show of arms, especially in the past seventeen years, has left many dead and
wounded. Fighting occurred on the lands surrounding the peninsula, (which are equally
disputed), on the peninsula itself, and on the sea. The big question that faces both nations
is that of sovereignty over the mineral rich peninsula—and in answering this question,
both nations resorted to the use of military force to claim the territory.
The military struggle between the two nations has resulted in some form of partition of
the islands. Given the disadvantage that Cameroun's population is about one-tenth that of
Nigeria (roughly 12 million to 120 million), it is no surprise that Cameroun naturally
resorted to accusing Nigeria for using its population advantage to populate the Bakassi
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peninsula—a tactic of claiming ownership.1 From the Nigerian end, it is common to hear
accusations of Cameroun Gendarmes and their tax-drive assaults on Nigerians living in
the area. Thus Cameroun initially claimed it had to exercise its sovereignty and protect
its territorial integrity by taxing those who live on its soil, and Nigeria, while not
relinquishing its claims of sovereignty over the peninsula had to send in troops to protect
its citizens from Cameroun aggression.
Things became heated very on May 16, 1981. A Cameroun national radio news report
informed the world that a Nigerian military patrol army violated Cameroun's territory by
penetrating the Bakassi peninsula as far as the Rio del Rey and opening fire on the
Cameroun Navy. Cameroun troops in returning fire killed five Nigerian soldiers.
Cameroun alleges that this incident has provided the Nigerian authorities the pretext for
exploiting the incident politically and for trying to put the blame on Cameroun.2 Using
diplomatic means, both nations had laid to rest the incident that resulted in the death of
Nigerian soldiers but it seemed to have raised the question of sovereignty over Bakassi to
the forefront of relations between both nations since then. Even with the question over
the sovereignty of Bakassi hovering over the politics of both nations, Nigerians, generally
hold the opinion that both nations still enjoyed, for the most part cordial relations.3 Both
nations exchange delegations on a regular basis, and the Heads of States customarily send
messages of congratulations to each other on festive occasions. A noted example is the
visit of a Cameroun delegation to Nigeria in 1995 "in order to canvass support for
Cameroun's membership in the Commonwealth."4
However, armed assaults continued to plague the Bakassi region over the years, and in
expanded fields. For instance, in 1992-1993, faced with multiparty democratic
challenges, and the growing militantism for Anglophone autonomy, the Cameroun
government resorted to open oppression in which some Nigerian civilians in Cameroun
were killed. Many were forced out of Cameroun during many embarrassing and
harassing tax-drives. As Africa Confidential noted, "Nigeria's…decision to deploy a
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thousand troops on the peninsula was in turn a reaction to the harassment of Nigerian
fishing vessels and traders by Camerounian Gendarmes."5
The Bakassi border dispute escalated with two more serious incidents of incursion that
provoked more shooting, recording many casualties and deaths of soldiers of both
countries. The first incident was the open hostility that broke the stalemate over Bakassi
on February 18-19, 1994.6 It was after this incident that Cameroun decided to take the
border dispute to the ICJ for its adjudication. Cameroun's application was deposited on
March 29, 1994, amidst accusations from Nigeria that Cameroun was not committed to
bilateral negotiations to resolve the matter locally.
A second notable incident that escalated the dispute was recorded on February 3, 1996.
As has already been noted, the strategic importance of the Bakassi peninsula and the
increasing awareness of this same factor have been at the core of escalation. No other
paper gave the situation a more proper picture than Jeune Afrique. In its November 13,
1996 edition, the editor noted that "…tous les ingredients d’un conflict majeur sont
reunis"--emphasizing the point that all the factors that lead to a major conflict are present
in the Bakassi peninsula dispute. The editorial further noted "…les enjeux economiques
et strategiques sont autrement importants…” in stressing the strategic economic
importance of the peninsula as a factor for escalation. The article further expressed the
fact that the region harbors two very important seaports--Douala and Calabar, with a total
of five million inhabitants, and for the developed countries with petroleum companies
operating in the area, the risk of a major war are frightening. Noting the importance of
the region to the French, the editorial did not hesitate to comment on France's "l’
alternative du diable,” which has provoked much criticism from the Nigerian side.7
The devil's alternative indeed! France defends its involvement in the dispute in favor of
Cameroun by citing defense treaties signed at and after independence. But this does not
sink well either in the Cameroons, where an angry opposition sees frustrations of the
democratization process as due to French involvement, nor in Nigeria where France's
investments far exceeds what they have in all French Speaking Africa, put together.
France is seen therefore as fueling the escalation of the conflict for reasons best known
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only to them. The pending question that confronts the French is whether their diplomatic
endeavors in trying to prevent further escalation of the dispute could be taken seriously,
given its position that Bakassi belongs to Cameroun. This is especially troubling to many
Nigerians.
The February 1996 escalation of the border dispute has another interpretation--that of
the Ambazonian (Southern Cameroons) side. Anglophone distrust of governments in
Cameroun, which accordingly failed to implement the Plebiscite Treaty that was
supposed to have united the Cameroons under a Federal form of government (interparliamentary
union), feeling cheated and mistreated now demand from the United
Nations its total independence. Besides, it sees Bakassi as its own. In an interpleader
submitted by the Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement8 to the ICJ was rejected for
lack of Statehood, they laid their own case stressing treachery on the part of Cameroun.
They noted that in the absence of a Cameroon Federation, and given the lack of any
documentation to back the illegal transformations that the Cameroons have undergone
since independence, Cameroun has no case because it has no boundary in the disputed
Bakassi region with Nigeria.9
Following the incident of February 1996, the Southern Cameroons Information Bulletin
of March 8, 1996, stated that the Bakassi war between Cameroun and Nigeria escalated
when Cameroun soldiers who presently occupy Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons), shot
and killed a Nigerian in Victoria, Ambazonia. When the corpse of the fallen Nigerian
was conveyed home, a battalion of Nigerian soldiers disguised as onion merchants took
off in a boat for the Cameroons. When they were stopped at the border by a Cameroon
patrol team, they opened fire killing several soldiers from the Cameroons. The bulletin
noted that the figure of two dead reported by the Cameroun government was an
underestimation. The bulletin article further lamented the fact that the Cameroun
government was sending only Anglophone soldiers, who were less equipped to the border
region, noting that "those killed in the recent escalations are largely Southern
Cameroonians."10
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Still concerning the escalatory nature of the dispute, Global Threat Analysis11 in
an article titled “Showdown Over Bakassi,” Reuters News reported fresh clashes between
Nigerian and Cameroun soldiers over the potentially oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula. Reuters
noted that since mid-April Nigeria has repeatedly accused Camerounian forces of
attacking its positions in the peninsula, in the Gulf of Guinea, which is also rich in fish.
Cameroun denies this and insists that Nigeria is the aggressor. Lagos-based Diplomats
said the recent clashes seem to stem from the mid-March interim ruling by the World
Court at The Hague on the case brought before it by Cameroun to adjudicate on the
dispute, Reuters News reported. According to the report, the Court had ordered the two
sides to cease hostilities pending the final outcome of the case. Military sources said both
sides wanted to maintain a strong foothold in the impoverished islands, hoping this would
help their claim to the territory, the news report further indicated.
The biggest problem the ICJ would face in attempting to settle the dispute over the
Bakassi peninsula, according to arguments advanced in this thesis, (other border portions
between the two belligerents not withstanding), emanates from the fact that the case is
taking a triangular twist--not only are Nigerians claiming ownership, but Ambazonians
are coming in with a much more bigger case that would not only complicate matters for
both Nigeria and Cameroun, but would cause the latter to be dealt a very heavy blow,
because the intrigues of the unification process would be made known to the world. It is
not unlikely that in settling the Bakassi peninsula dispute, the ICJ may end up ruling on
Ambazonian identity as a nation. Such a ruling may become the biggest outcome of the
Bakassi peninsula dispute, especially since the case is solidly planted in historic treaties,
which examination would reveal more treachery on the Cameroun side than that of
Nigeria.
THE ACTUAL DRAWING OF THE BORDER:
At ordinary glance, one can be tempted to conclude like Brownlie (1979), that the
border has been completely demarcated and that there are no disputed portions. In
African Boundaries Ian Brownlie traces the actual demarcation of the Cameroun-Nigeria
border from whence the German Protectorate of Kamerun was established on July 12,
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1884 to the time of the Plebiscite of February 11, 1961, when the territories of Southern
and Northern Cameroons voted separately to join Cameroun and Nigeria (on different
terms) respectively. Relevant treaties and agreements cited by Brownlie include:
i) Notification to the European powers and the United States on October 15, 1884,
concerning the German Protectorate of Kamerun following the July 12, 1884 treaty that
established the Protectorate;
ii) Notification to the Signatory Powers of the General Act of the Berlin Conference on
June 11, 1885 and May 13, 1885, of the British Protectorate of Lagos, renamed Niger
Coast Protectorate;
iii) Exchange of notes dividing the British and German Protectorates from April 1885-
July 1886 and the treaty of July 1, 1890;
iv) Delimitation agreements from April 14, 1893-March 19, 1906 and the exchange of
notes of February 22 and March 5, 1909;
v) The Anglo-German Treaty of April 12, 1913, which presents the boundary sectors
between Gamana and Cross River, and between Cross River and the Bight of Biafra;
vi) The Milner-Simon Declaration of July 10, 1919, which partitioned German
Kamerun between the British and the French;
vii) And with respect to the British and the French Mandates established in 1922;
viii) The trusteeship agreement approved by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on Dec. 13, 1946;
ix) And the 1959 and 1961General Assembly Plebiscites held in the territories of
Northern and Southern Cameroons respectively, and establishing with conformity, the
boundaries between the Cameroons and Nigeria. Further, Brownlie notes that "since
independence, neither of the successor states has challenged the principle of the
boundary."12
The Nigeria-Cameroun border has four sectors. The first is the Lake Chad
Tripoint to the Horere Gesumi Uplands. The second is the sector of the River Gamana
(boundary pillar 64) eastwards to the Kombon Mountains. From pillar 64, the third sector
of the boundary runs eastwards to pillar114 at the Cross River. The forth sector runs from
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the Cross River down to the sea.13 The relevant portion of the border is described in the
Anglo-German Treaty of March 11, 1913, as following the Thalwag of the Akpakorum
(Akwayafe) River, dividing the Mangrove Islands near Ikang and goes as a straight line
to join Bakassi Point and King Point (March 11, 1913 Anglo-German treaty, XVIII).
Further, it was agreed by the two powers (Britain and Germay) that:
XIX. Should the thalweg of the lower Akwayefe, upstream from the line Bakassi Point-
King Point, change its position in such a way as to affect the relative positions of the
thalweg and the Mangrove Islands, a new adjustment of the boundary shall be made, on
the basis of the new positions, as determined by a map to be made for the purpose.
XX. Should the lower course of the Akwayefe so change its mouth as to transfer it to
the Rio del Rey, it is agreed that the area now known as the Bakassi peninsula shall still
remain German Territory. The same condition applies to any portion of territory now
agreed to as being British, which may be cut off in similar way.
XXI. From the center of the navigable channel on a line joining Bakassi point and King
Point, the boundary shall follow the center of the navigable channel of the Akwayefe
River as far as the three-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction. For the purpose of defining
this boundary, the navigable channel of the Akwayefe River shall be considered to lie
wholly to the east of the navigable channel of the Cross- and Calabar Rivers.
XXVI. The fishing rights of the native population of the Bakassi peninsula in the
Estuary of the Cross River shall remain as heretofore.
XXVII. It is agreed that within six months from the date of marking out the boundary
natives living near the boundary-line may, if they so desire, cross over to live on the other
side, and may take with them their portable property and harvesting crops.14
Other provisions of the treaty took care of navigation on the Cross River, which
accordingly, remained open to German ships. Further evidence of the demarcation of the
Cameroun-Nigeria border are contained in the Franco-British Declaration of July 10,
1919, commonly Known as the Milner-Simon Declaration (named after Viscount Milner,
Secretary of State for the Colonies of the British Empire, and M. Henry Simon, Minister
for the Colonies of the French Republic); and the Declaration made by the Governor of
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the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria and the Governor of French Cameroons defining
the boundary between the British and French Cameroons.
Amidst the many adjustments that were made by the British and German boundary
negotiators, regardless of claims that the boundary divided many tribes,15 the Anglo-
German Treaty of April 12, 1913 is the only and most important ground from which
reference concerning any territorial dispute along the border between the two countries
could be made. Equally of importance are the international boundaries between the
Cameroons [Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons) and Cameroun) before independence.
The map of Ambazonia when the British jointly administered it as a UN Trust Territory
with Nigeria is central to understanding the positions of the claimants. This position is
supported by Olayinka Y. Balogunin in his study of "The Process of Cartographic
Definition of Nigerian Boundaries," when he insinuates that "The original boundary
between Nigeria and German Kamerun had been demarcated with pillars by 1913, but
with the post-World War One developments, the only internationally valid sections of the
demarcated boundary are a part of the Yola Arc and the section from the Rio del Rey
Creek to a point where the Gamana River crosses the old boundary.” According to
Olayinka, "this boundary would be valid only if Cameroun respects the protocol signed
by Britain and Germany regarding this mutual boundary…From Gamana River eastward
to Kombon and northward to the tripoint with Chad, the Cameroun-Nigeria boundary is
yet to be demarcated."16
The weakness of Olayinka's argument does not concern the Anglo-German Treaty of
1913, but rather the fact that he regards the boundary between Ambazonia (then Southern
Cameroons), which was jointly administered with Nigeria by Britain as not being an
international boundary. The correct notion is that as long as all the treaties were binding
on the signatories, their international nature will continue regardless of whether or not
Ambazonia is seen only as provinces in present day Cameroun or back then in British
ruled Nigeria. What Treaties has Cameroun with Ambazonia that effectively dissolved
the international boundaries of the latter?
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On the contrary, both Nigeria and Cameroun are not respecting the boundaries and the
agreements that created them. This may be partly because Nigeria wonders what has
become of Ambazonia, which by the terms of the Plebiscite Treaty was not supposed to
cease existing as a State, and in part, because it has instead been absorbed illegally by La
Republic du Cameroun. Nigeria now wrestles with Cameroun in order to get a chunk of
the now entrapped Ambazonia—which probably to them is a "no man's land." There
doesn’t seem to be any other logical explanation why both nations, in violation of
international law, are bent on fighting each other-or as Africa Confidential put it—
"blundering into battle"—over Bakassi.
III CONTEMPORARY CLAIMS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT:
Dispute along the Cameroun-Nigeria border has been a matter of historic
proportions, especially along the Cross River to the Sea section where in lies the Bakassi
peninsula. As we have already noted, the most important document that concerns the
demarcation of the border between the Cameroons (then Southern Cameroons and
Cameroun) and Nigeria is the 1913 Anglo-German Treaty. Confidential documents
made public in London now shed light on how important an instrument the treaty was.
Not only are the pillars of the treaty the only pillars that completely marked the entire
border, but also, the entire confidential documents reveal a high degree of reliability--so
much that not even Her Majesty's government dared to temper with the treaties that fixed
the pillars.
The first noted conflict over the Cameroons and Nigeria coastal area could be
traced to the dispute between the Germans and the British over German success in
signing treaties with the Cameroon Kings of Akwa and Bell Town in Douala on July 14th
1884. The treaties in effect, proclaimed the German Protectorate extending from the Rio
Del Rey area to Gabon. This angered the British Consul, Hewett whose treaties were
signed late17 (we recall here the popular saying in Cameroon history of "Too late
Hewett!" The British, perhaps to save face, or perhaps genuinely, criticized the German
move but went ahead to downplay the loss of the territory terming it "the flat, swampy,
and unhealthy Cameroons-especially as we retain, in the coast of Ambas Bay and the
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neighboring mountains, almost the only part of that region that can be inhabited by
Europeans."18 Moreover, a dispute over the disrespect of German flag, inciting the
natives to rebel against German rule, and the fact that British explorer Hewett would
preside over court cases in Douala as if Germans did not exist equally fueled tensions
between the two European powers. A rebellion of the natives led to the death of one
German. Even though it was crushed, it provoked bitter reaction from Germany, which
led Bismarck, in his traditional way, to demand compensation with land west of Ambas
Bay to the Rio del Rey. After some hesitation Britain complied and a new boundary line
was made along the Right Bank of the Rio del Rey to its source and to extend from there
to the Cross River Rapids. Later the British bargained that Germany surrender claim at
St. Lucia in South Africa in exchange for Victoria in the Cameroons. These agreements
were contained in exchange of letters dated April 29, 1885 and May 7, 1885.19
All along both the British and the Germans had mistakenly believed that the Rio
del Rey was a river. When mapping the Old Calabar (Cross) River in 1889, Captain Graf
Bernstorff discovered with much amazement that:
1) The Akwayaffe River did not end in the Old Calabar River as the English maps
had shown, but rather entered directly into the sea;
2) That the Rio del Rey was not a River, but a seaway, and that the Akwayaffe
was connected to the Rio del Rey by channels to the east;
3) That the Ndian River on the map prepared by the English Consul Johnson is,
according to Weladji, "unknown to the natives of the Rio del Rey who instead call it the
Ofa."20 Commandant Pullen for Her Majesty’s Government confirmed these German
findings. These findings provoked maneuvers from both sides in an effort to secure
Ndian River on the part of the British, and to secure the acceptance of the Akwayaffe as a
substitute for the nonexistent Rio del Rey, on the part of the Germans. Accordingly,
Article 4 of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 firmly secured the findings.21
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The importance of these findings lie in the fact that the Germans insisted that
from 1885, the waterway, whether river or creek, belonged to her and that the 1890
Agreement had changed nothing in this regard. And to this, the British agreed, noting:
There is no doubt that under the agreement of 1885-86 both banks of the river were
given to Germany, and that from that time to 1890 she held this waterway…the resulting
Agreement signed on 14th April, 1893 defined the Rio del Rey boundary with greater
clarity and a pointer to things to come--neutralized the [Bakassi peninsula dispute].22
In 1901, an agreement was reached as to the proposed boundary between the
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the Colony of Kamerun, between the British and the
Germans. This agreement reconfirmed the April 29-June 10, 1885; July 27-August 2,
1886; July 1, 1890; April 14, 1893; and November 15, 1893 Agreements on the boundary
lines between the Rio del Rey and the rapids of the Cross River. This Agreement was
done in a meeting in Buea, Kamerun on April 1901, and is the basis of all subsequent
boundary Agreements—1906, 1909, and 1913—with minor amendments.23
Articles 3 of the Buea Agreement stands out clean and clear on Bakassi. It states:
In lieu of the boundary line commencing in the Rio del Rey at the point given in the
maps 'West Pt.' and 'West Huk' respectively, it should commence at the South West Point
of Bakasi Peninsula marked 'Bakasi Head' and follow the West Coast Line until Bakasi
Point at the mouth of the Akpa Iyefe (Akwafe) River is reached, thence it shall follow the
center of the river as far as the Urifian Creek on the left bank of the said river, in such
manner as to through the Bakasi Peninsula and the area between the Peninsula and the
Creek, formerly in British territory, into the German colony of Kamerun, provided that
the engagements in Article 3 of the Agreement of 14th April 1893 (mentioned in Article
3 herein), shall be observed, and no trade settlements be allowed to exist or be erected
(see Appendix VI & IV for the new position establishing Bakassi Point).
This Agreement has stood the test of time, surviving through the World Wars and the
settlements thereafter, through the period of decolonization of the fifties and sixties.
Recently declassified documents of the British Archives shed more light on the nature
of some other dispute in the Bakassi area of the Cameroun-Nigeria case. Summarily, the
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documents reveal that all through British rule of the Cameroons and Nigeria, the
boundary pillars laid by the Germans were untouched and that any attempt at redressing
the border were resisted. A clear case in point is the dispute over the Obudu Cattle ranch.
The question is whether it was on Nigerian soil, or in the Cameroons, or whether it
overlapped the border. This dispute was dealt with through the exchange of note in
which the British expressed fear of being entangled in a border dispute of the nature of
Kashmir between India and Pakistan.24
The Obudu Cattle Ranch dispute arose from a Shell Company aerial survey map, which
showed that part of the Obudu Cattle Ranch was in fact, on the Cameroonian side of the
border. Because a team of surveyors from Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) was
embarked on tracing the borderline of the State, the British feared that if the surveyors
saw the Shell map, they might use it to confirm the boundaries of Southern Cameroons.
To the British, this would greatly hurt Nigerian feelings, a thing they would like to avoid.
In an inward telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office, the correspondent advised that
the Colonial Office should "instruct Southern Cameroons Government to desist forthwith
from any attempt to demarcate this boundary."25 This telegram provoked a series of
correspondence aimed at resolving the matter.
Sensitivity over the Southern Cameroons-Nigerian border arose from the fact that in
1954 the Nigerian government single-handedly, but also to its disadvantage, inaccurately
redefined the border, leaving out the Obudu cattle ranch, which lies inland, north of
Bakassi.26 In attempting to instruct Southern Cameroons to desist from carrying out the
survey, the British government showed preferential treatment when it failed to question
why and how the Nigerian government could have made such a mistake. As later
correspondence would show, irresponsibility on the part of the Nigerian government was
equally responsible for triggering the squabble over the Obudu Cattle ranch.
In a correspondence to the Commonwealth Office, E. C. Burr27 noted that: "2. Party are
not specifically surveying Southern Cameroons/Nigeria border but will naturally record
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border points to enable boundary to be shown on maps." Three days latter, E.C. Burr28
again communicated Commonwealth Relations Office stating, "…we see nothing sinister
in all this; it is in fact no more than the usual work of the Directorate of Oversea Surveys
and is on a joint Eastern Nigeria/Southern Cameroons scheme. The Nigerian bit is one of
your technical assistance schemes." Burr then cautioned that any attempt to curtail
activities of field party would of course make preparation of maps impossible, and
demanded that the Nigerian government be so informed.
The most intriguing observation from the declassified documents is found in the
document marked WAF 441/110/01, which states, "The actual boundary will not be
shown on the first editions of the new maps if there is any objection from either side in
doing so." In another document29 Greenhill stated that although the British could
undertake not to show the boundary, or for that matter the position of the existing
boundary pillars, on the first edition of the new maps, they "find it very hard to resist
pressure from the Southern Cameroons Government to stop omitting such essential
information from maps of the Southern Cameroons." In addition, he said "the Southern
Cameroons Government have asked for mapping of Southern Cameroons to be continued
by us after the transfer of power of some form of U.K. Technical Assistance." Although
it was latter on determined that the Obudu Cattle ranch lay on the Nigerian side, it is not
clear how this conclusion was arrived at.
Even though Greenhill observed that the foregoing dispute was due to "lack of liaison
between the various departments of the Nigerian Federal Government concerned," one
would not help but have the feeling that the colonial masters were tolerant to Nigeria, and
would let them do as they pleased. Specifically, D. W. S. Hunt had written to the
Colonial Office, asking Geofrey Lamarque, (to whom he equally sent copies of the
correspondence), to
…see that Southern Cameroons direct their attention elsewhere. If this particular area is
to be mapped let it be done from the Nigerian side. Above all, before any boundary line
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is printed on the maps, the Nigerian authorities must be fully consulted and given the
opportunity of working out their own ideas of where the line should run.30
Hunt’s position was however downplayed by J. Chadwick, who on June 6, 1961, wrote
the Commonwealth Office stating,
After all the Nigerians have given tacit approval to the existing boundary between them
and the Ambazonia by failing to protest at the time of the Plebiscite, when the boundary
must have been defined as between those who voted and those who did not…But
obviously we do not wish to offend Nigerians. If they wish to protest …it would be better
if we were in no way involved in the issue. If the matter does come to a head and resolve
itself into a possible boundary adjustment dispute, the protagonists after October 1st
would be the Nigerians and, presumably, the United Federal Cameroon Republic. Must
we make our selves a third party by laying down the boundary at this stage?31
Still in another correspondence dated May 30, 1961, M. L. Woods blamed the Nigerian
government for making unduly heavy weather over the border issue.32 Perhaps this may
be true too of the Bakassi peninsula dispute today, for as one can clearly observe, if the
Obudu Cattle ranch case was settled using the Anglo-German treaty of 1913, why then
can the present border dispute not be resolved in like manner?
Akinjide R. expresses one such opinion that drums up the premise that the 1913 Anglo-
German treaty is not binding on Nigeria. In an article published by West Africa
magazine, in April 1994, Akinjide enumerates many treaties that were signed by the
Chiefs and Kings of the Old and New Calabar area demanding British protection (The Oil
River Protectorate). Akinjide further insinuates that because the Order-in-Council of
November 22, 1913, which came into force on January 1, 1914, bringing together the
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria in to a single Protectorate of
Nigeria, though still separate from the colony of Lagos, and that because the Anglo-
German treaty was signed before this act, that the treaty is not binding on the new
Nigeria. Akinjide further states that the British government within months of it
denounced the treaty birth. Thus the treaty is not a treaty in force. Besides believing that
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the treaty between Britain and Germany was not binding, Akinjide continues to hold yet
another wrong notion of the area.
For instance, he continues to make reference to the Rio del Rey as a river (he does so
seven times and once as a port), even though it was long proven that it is not. All this is
done to uphold the premise that the Bakassi peninsula, which is in the area of the Rio del
Rey belongs to Nigeria. Specifically, he says the Anglo-German Treaty of 1913 is not a
treaty in force because " since something cannot emanate from nothing, the 1913 Treaty
cannot therefore be the judicial basis for a claim to the Bakassi Peninsula by
Cameroon."33
What Akinjide fails to question is why all along, international agreements thereafter
continue to respect the said Treaty, why the Nigerian government and the British
government accepted maps of Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) that showed Bakassi as
its territory and not Nigeria's—even when the said territory was jointly administered by
Britain together with Nigeria, and specifically the stipulations of the Franco-British
Declarations of July 10, 1919, which also, for the most part, honored the 1913 Treaty.
Note should be taken of the fact that the boundaries of Southern Cameroons, have since
the days of the 1913 treaty, remained the same—only to be contested by Nigeria when it
is known that the Southern Cameroons nation has become nothing but a mere colony in
Cameroun—the answer can not be far fetched.
The answer as to why Nigeria and Cameroun suddenly find themselves fighting over
Bakassi seems for the most part to hover over the identity crises surrounding the State of
Southern Cameroons. The position of the Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement
(SCARM) and the Ambazonian Republic leaders has been made clear on numerous
occasions, including their 1995 visit to the UN in demanding adult membership of that
World Body. Concerning Bakassi, the position of the leaders has equally been clear--that
from 1919-1958 when Southern Cameroons was jointly administered with Nigeria, maps
prepared by the Federal Ministry of Lands and Surveys in Lagos recognized the Bakassi
peninsula as being part of Ambazonian territory. They also hold the belief that for the
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short duration of the Federal structure that the Cameroons adopted after the Plebiscite, the
Federal Cameroon Republic had Bakassi as part of it Federal Territory.34
In commenting on declassified documents from the Public Records Office of the UK,
N. N. Susungi notes that in trying to forge a unification process where the Ambazonians
would be integrated in to an independent Republic of Cameroun, President Ahmadou
Ahidjo of Cameroun, committed fatal errors that have placed the unification process in
jeopardy. This has led to a situation where both Cameroun and Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia) would be better off if legally separated by the UN. Notably, Ahidjo failed to
prepare a draft constitutional document to be signed between him and John Ngu Foncha
during and after the Foumban Conference, and so there is no document to show that the
unification process ever took place. Thus UN Resolution 1608 was never implemented in
constitutional terms since there was no constitution signed by the leaders of the two
states. Finally, internationally recognized territorial boundaries are in doubt. Citing the
Bakassi border dispute, Susungi demands to know if under such circumstances the
Cameroun government can lay claim to sovereignty over Bakassi.35
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION OF CLAIMS OF DISPUTING PARTIES:
Another explanation as to why Cameroun and Nigeria were gradually drifting to war is
that both governments are using the border dispute as a means of diverting attention away
from their poor human rights records. In both countries, it is common to easily
enumerate instances of gross human rights violation, resulting from the dire desire of the
masses for genuine democracy and good neighborliness. This position is backed by the
works of Albert Mukong (1985), and as Executive Director of the Human Rights Defense
Group (HRDG) in Cameroun; Joseph Richards (1978) and Africa Confidential—all shade
light on the human records of both nations—Cameroun and Nigeria.
For almost four decades of independence, Cameroun can boast of having only two
presidents. Ahidjo, the first president of Cameroun ruled almost single-handedly, for
twenty-five years. During his terms of office detention for no crimes other than that one
made a negative political comment were very common. Thus Ahidjo operated many
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maximum-security prisons in which political detainees were kept. No other works have
told his story better than Joseph Richard's (1978) Gaulist Africa: Cameroun Under
Ahmadou Ahidjo, and Albert Mukong's (1985) Prisoner Without A Crime. Both authors
believe that as many as 25000 people died as a result of the Union de Populations
Camerounaise (UPC) insurrection, another 5000 by tortures in the Brigade Mixte Mobile
(BMM) while an estimated 20000 shed their blood in passing through the detention
camps.36 But regardless of these crimes Ahidjo managed to stay in power for so long,
that Mungo Beti commented that "Ahidjo appears condemned to commit fratricide…all
Cameroonians of any talent are either in exile or prison; all progressives, or even
oppositional tendencies have been destroyed with ferocity."37
It is however surprising that after Paul Biya took over power from Ahidjo, that things
got worse--both in terms of fundamental human rights and the national economy. If there
was one thing that Cameroonians of all domains did not complain about, it was the
economy. Under Paul Biya the economy has recorded its worst setbacks since
independence, and workers have been reduced to nothingness, having had their salaries
cut by as much as 70%. But this is not the case with the earnings of those in the armed
forces. The salaries of Gendarmes, and the Army have almost doubled since Biya
became President due to almost annual salary increments. Such behavior translates
directly in to that of the repressive nature of the polity in that government has clearly
bought the loyalty of the forces in its bid to rig elections and crush mass resistance just to
maintain power.
Thus the struggle to democratize Cameroun, especially since the "wind of change" of
the 1990s, has been a dismal failure. Democracy, at least of the type once practiced in
Ambazonia became a far-fetched dream. Hundreds of casualties were recorded in trying
to earn it. And as for human rights, thousands are presently in jail for one political
offense or the other, just because freedom of speech was policy only on paper. A case in
point concerns letters written from one of Cameroun's maximum-security prison (BMM)
in Yaounde, to the Director of the Human Rights Defense Group (HRDG), Albert
Mukong.
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The political detainees were all from Ambazonia, and their crime--that they participated
in a signature referendum that demanded the total independence of Ambazonia. In these
letters, the detainees lamented about the conditions under which they were being held and
prayed that Albert Mukong, who was very familiar with these conditions, should not give
up efforts in trying to free them. Some of the victims they noted had already lost their
eyesight, and some had contracted tuberculosis. They were not being given any medical
attention. The detainees begged Mukong to " Sir…use your high office to see about our
problems and if government does not want to judge us, let them transfer us to our areas of
jurisdiction"38
Our area of Jurisdiction?—Even these detainees know that they have been abducted and
are pending trial in an alien land, under laws that do not only contradict those they grew
up in, but are a serious violation of their fundamental human rights. The Common Law
practiced in Ambazonia is totally different from the Napoleonic Codes that serve as the
law in Cameroun.
Still in another letter signed by one of the leaders in detention, a list of 61 Anglophone
political detainees from Ambazonia, held at the Kondengui Central Prison, sincerely
appreciated the efforts being made to liberate them. The leader noted that they were
being starved to death, and lamented about the plight of their children who were now out
of school. Specific reference was made of the children of Ngek Simon from Oku, whose
children were reported to be street beggars. The leader of the group noted that these
children have now become
Orphans in their own country without shelter. As you know, Yaga Grace, the mother (of
the children, I suppose), Ngek Simon the father and the eldest son Ngek Adalbert are all
here under detention in Kondengui and Mfou prisons…though we are dying, we believe
that one or some will survive this persecution to relate the history.39
It is important to note that a list of detainees drawn up on September 3, 1998, contained
the names and place of birth, the date of death and place of burial of seven detainees who
were victims of the Cameroun government's cruelty. The overall human rights situation
in Cameroun at the time of depositing the Application against Nigeria was so bad that in
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writing about it, West Africa magazine40 (in commenting about the report of the United
States Department of State concerning its world wide survey of human rights for 1993)
captioned the story a "damning report." The report had criticized the Cameroun
government for "abusive practices that often target political dissidents and community
leaders opposed to President Paul Biya's regime." These abuses included routine
beatings, torture and illegal detention.
However, recent reports from Cameroun indicate that thirteen of the freed detainees
from the Kondegui and Mfou Central Prisons have disclosed that they were subjected to
all forms of inhumane treatment. According to Isaha'a Boh's Cameroon bulletin,41 the
detainees reported that they were forced to rape women in front of the Gendarmes and
equally carry out homosexuality—a thing, which as they lamented they "have never
known or thought of doing." Amnesty International, USA, has contacted officials of the
Cameroun Embassy in Washington D.C. to get their response to these stories but the
officials declined to comment, but demanded instead whether Amnesty International
believed them, Isaha’a Boh reported. If this picture of Cameroun today is alarming, then
one should wonder what would be said of human rights abuses in Nigeria, where both
land mass and population are more than that of Cameroun.
The main trouble with Nigeria has been that of continuous and overbearing military
dictatorships. More than any other country on earth, Nigeria seems to have recorded
more military coups and counter coup attempts in which thousands died. The effect on
the national polity has been recourse to other domains for a search for a cure to the power
crises, which is poisonously punctuated by religious differences and a dangerous North--
South dichotomy. For example, Christians see the Military Coups as dictated by
religious inclinations and dominance from Muslims, and yet, another Grande Nord
strategy. Thus, religious riots—even in University campuses across the nation continue
to plague the national consciousness, resulting to thousands of deaths also. To the best of
my recollection, only the Shehu Shagari regime was the only civilian President that lasted
for a while, with the exception of the regime that lead Nigeria to independence up till
1966, though he too was a Muslim, not to talk of the fact that he was from the North.
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Also, all the Military leaders, perhaps with the exception of Johnson Ayuiyi-Ironsi, have
been Muslims—Murtala Mohamed, Yakubu Gowon, Olusengun Obassanjo, Mohammed
Buhari, Ibrahim B. Babangida, and Sani Abacha. With the exception of the Shehu
Shagari regime, all the military regimes recorded gross human rights abuses.
It is easy to recall also the death of Dele Giwa, a newspaper editor who wrote
elaborately on peace between Nigeria and Cameroun. Dele was killed by a letter bomb on
21 October 1986, and his death was seen and reported as a political killing. We would
recall also the persecution of former Governor of Kaduna State, Balarabe Musa and his
aid, Professor Balla Usman of the Department History of Ahmadou Bello University
(ABU), Zaria, in the early eighties, and of recent, the death of Mushood Abiola in
detention for their struggles to democratize Nigeria. It would equally not be of service to
the cause of the people who struggle that Nigeria should be law-abiding, if one should
forget the torturous years that the Lagos-based Lawyer Gani Fawehinmi went through,
especially those many months he spent in the Maiduguri jail, Bornu State, for threatening
to put President Babangida and his wife, Mariam Babangida on the stand for corruption,
drug trafficking and human rights abuses.
So too would it equally be a disservice to all Africans if one were to forget the
expulsion of Sociology Professor, Patrick Wilmot, of ABU, Zaria, in 1988, and the
charges trumped-up on him for being a US-Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spy.
Wilmot was deeply concerned about the political future of Nigeria and predicted too
often, many things about Nigeria that came true. For instance, Wilmot was critical of the
Babangida regime and the promises he made for returning Nigeria to civil rule. Wilmot
had dismissed these promises as quibbles, stating that Babangida had no real intention of
returning Nigeria to Civil Rule. He stated that his bet was that Babangida was making
plans for another military leader to take over power from him.
For his political maneuvers and deceitfulness, Babangida was known all over Nigeria
and beyond by the phrase: “I.B.B. na (is) Maradonna!” He, like Biya in Cameroun
never kept to a single promise, and dribbled the masses just as Maradona does when he
goes through the soccer field, meandering with no real challenger to stop him, or as if
there are no players on it.
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Even though the long run has proven Babangida wrong, in his times, Patrick Wilmot
earned a 48-hour marching order (to leave Nigeria) for, as Americans would say,
"running his mouth." Today we know that Wilmot's prediction all came to pass, and that
the ex-president owes him an apology, as he does to all Nigerians.42 Perhaps the most
stinking record of human rights abuses was the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight
others, in November 1995, for protesting the misuse of the revenues and natural resources
from the Delta region of Nigeria—their area of origin, and the resultant degradation
caused to the environment of that area. Amnesty International Annual Report on Nigeria
for 1998, indicated that at least 20 other Ogoni people are still in detention, and without
trial on identical murder charges. These human rights abuses do not ignore the many
thousands who have been detained for participating in pro-democracy demonstrations, or
those who lost their lives in the process. The brutal killing of the wife of Abiola with
machine gun fire, in broad day light on the streets of Lagos a year ago is a case in point.
These glimpses are intended to show that the leaders of both Cameroun and Nigeria
were, prior to the deposition of the case over the Bakassi peninsular with the ICJ, facing
serious internal frictions and thus a dispute with a neighboring state that could likely
result to war, served them well in diverting the attention of their masses to this external
crisis. As Africa Confidential noted:
The trial of strength is dangerous, not just because Biya and Abacha believe Bakassi
worth fighting for but because both see the dispute as a way to shore up falling domestic
support. Their grip on power is threatened by a rise in ethnic nationalism, economic
collapse and restive soldiers; while a full-fledged border war would be damaging, even
catastrophic, because of the instability it could spark, this prospect may not prevent them
from blundering into battle. Given the diplomatic failures that have marked the dispute,
the most probable brake on further escalation appears to be the sense of failure of the
Cameroonian and Nigerian governments to convince the majority of their people that the
peninsula is worth fighting for.43
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Africa Confidential went further to indicate that almost as important as the Bakassi
dispute, are the disputes within the two countries in that both nations face serious
challenges to their integrity as nation states. Specifically, the paper notes:
Several Nigerian ethnic groups are demanding a break-up of the Federation while
Cameroon's substantially Anglophone minority in the south argues as part of its agenda
for self-determination that Bakassi's future has to be negotiated from Bamenda (Buea, it
meant) (the capital of Ambazonia) and not from Yaounde (the capital of Cameroun).44
The article then elaborated on the role being played by the French, accusing them for
wrong footing, by its policy of backing Biya, Cameroun's president.
The most recent case of ethnic showdown in Nigeria was reported by the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) at 6.00 a.m. Monday July 19, 1999. The news reported
a clash between the Yoruba and the Haussa in the town of Shigamo, about 50km from
Lagos in which ten people were killed. The fighting, BBC reported occurred because
during a Yoruba festival that requires people to stay off the streets, a Haussa woman did
not respect the order and was killed. This then sparked a fight between the Yoruba and
the Haussa. On November 18 1999, at precisely 6:20 am ET (USA), BBC reported yet
another ethnic clash--this time in the Esuku ethnic group. The tribes were fighting over
pipelines leftover by petroleum industries. These pipelines are useful to the natives for
the channeling of water. According to the BBC report, 40 civilians and 4 police officers
were killed in the clashes. The report was suggestive of the fact that the Esuku ethnic
group is one of the poorest in Nigeria in terms of development, but is in the richest
region, with oil. The clashes, BBC noted has once again put government policy on the
line. Thus clash of traditions is not restricted to the Yoruba and Hausas of Nigeria; it
threatens every region of both Nigeria and the Cameroons. Worst still is the feud
between the Anglophone and the Francophone, which is at the nerve center of Cameroun
government malpractice of human rights abuses predominantly aimed at the Anglophones
(Ambazonians), election rigging and her contradictory, if not hypocritical posturing claim
of sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula.
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Another alternative explanation of the Bakassi peninsula dispute comes from N. N.
Susungi in his article titled "Cameroon-Nigeria: The Bakassi Peninsula Conflict," (most
notably part II of it titled "Foncha, Muna and the Foumban Conference of 1961 about
Southern Cameroons--Foncha and Muna did not betray Southern Cameroons,"). Susungi
laments about the fan fare that surrounded the handing over of Hong Kong to China on
July 1, 1997. In comparing the situation to the hand over of Southern Cameroons to
Cameroun, he charge that Southern Cameroons leaders then did not have the
constitutional mandate to negotiate. He notes, "even though Hong Kong is full of some
of the brightest Chinese…Britain could not have allowed Hong Kong itself to conduct
such negotiations on its own behalf with the Beijing authorities. But that is exactly what
Britain did in the Southern Cameroons in July 1961."45
Quite to the contrary, the declassified file of London show that London had negotiated
secret deals with Yaounde, such that Commissioner J. O. Field stayed in Buea on July
1961 instead of being in Foumban where the so-called negotiations were supposed to be
taking place. On this count it is clear that Britain betrayed Southern Cameroons, by
secretly agreeing with Ahidjo that the British would create a vacuum of the territory,
which President Ahidjo would then fill with his own troops. This explains why to many
people who grew up in Southern Cameroons; life has always been as if they live in a
perpetual state of emergency—one that continues to push them into seeking political
asylum in foreign countries. The soldiers ever since Ahidjo illegally acquired sovereignty
over Southern Cameroons had never ceased to be on a state of alert. Britain did not only
betray Southern Cameroons but by its actions also abused the mandate entrusted on her
by the international community.
Perhaps the most pressing evidence from the Cameroun side for the argument that the
government would prefer an external conflict to the internal one (so as to divert the
attention of the masses from its ills) comes from the Beti and Bulu tribes that were seen
as benefiting most from Biya being in office. The Biya regime seems to have suffered
some opposition from his own tribesmen, notable from former Governor and Minister
Ayissi Mvodo and the former Secretary General at the Presidency Titus Edzoa. Mvodo
had switched camp from the Government ruling Cameroun Peoples Democratic
http://www.postwatchmagazine.com/ 24
Movement and was being rumored to join hands with the Anglophone—led Social
Democratic Front of John Fru Ndi, to be the National Opposition candidate. Besides
Mvodo, Titus Edzoa, the Secretary General at the presidency, was about to announce to
the public some of Mr. Biya's terrible deeds so as to oust him from power. Biya
countered with a few surprising and dazzling moves and like most other political
opponents, Mvodo died in mysterious circumstances just a few days after his
announcement that he was going to join the Cameroun opposition.
Titus Edzoa got a more humiliating treatment. He was bundled to the deplorable
Kondengui prison on charges that he embezzled from roads-work projects. The truth of
the matter is that if there were any two people in Cameroun that could bring down Biya
with just a few words, it was Mvodo and Edzoa. As The Herald46 noted, Beti were
mobilizing to fight Biya following discontent over the death of Ayissi Mvodo and the
arrests of Edzoa and others such as Remy Ze Meka, the former Secretary General at the
Prime Minister's Office.
This clampdown on former Secretary-Generals speaks for itself and in support of the
fact that Biya is more concerned with staying in power than caring for Cameroun's
national interests. Besides, why would top government officials including the President
bring charges of corruption and embezzlement on people only when they threaten to
reveal these same practices? What has Mr. Biya done to the former Minister of Finance
Etienne Ntsama, who in the late eighties stole sums of money close to half of Cameroun's
national budget and stored it in his ceiling? The truth is that as long as one does wrong to
the nation and does not threaten to act against the President, such people, like Ntsama,
would always remain in high offices and never to be investigated or sacked.
The extension of the Killing arm of Government opponents used to be a typically
Anglophone tragedy, but because Francophones were showing signs that the Anglophone
led opposition concerning the way government is run in Cameroun was being bought by
many a majority of Francophones, bad leadership has become a national emergency and
the killing of political opponents, a national tragedy. But the glaring truth is that
Cameroun has been a state on emergency ever since that UN-led mistake of fusing a
democratic Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons) with a Cameroun, which at that time was
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at war with itself. Though some critics of such a theory could argue that the filing of the
case against Nigeria was done in 1994, we should recall that by 1994 Cameroun had
witnessed strong and very organized opposition from the political parties that were born
between 1990-1993. A leader caught in such power frenzy, will surely and most likely
resort to external war with a neighbor to divert national attention.
The relevance of these findings to the Bakassi border dispute is clear in that not only
does Nigeria charge Cameroon soldiers for being the perpetrators of acts of aggression,
but also, Ambazonian leaders at home and abroad hold this same belief. Yaounde would
definitely go to war with Nigeria not because it cares about the territory and the people
(Ambazonians) who truly own the land, but because of resources they would acquire
from there. Ever since the faked unification, the concern of the Yaounde governments
has been centered only on extracting the riches of Ambazonia, free of charge, and does
nothing in return to the citizens of this ill-fated territory. This position can be verified by
simply examining the revenue of the Cameroun petroleum industry and the fact that
government does not account for it ever since 1977 when production started, because the
resources are from a territory that it knows it illegally acquired. The Cameroun
government cannot be proud enough to say how much of these petroleum funds have
been invested or used to improve living conditions in Ambazonia. To the best of my
knowledge, not a dime has been used in the territory of Ambazonia.
Coupled with these gross violations of international law at the time of the plebiscite, is
the fact that since then, Ambazonia has been isolated in terms of communication.
Besides poor infrastructure the territory is almost impossible to reach by telephone--all
other (French-speaking) provinces of Cameroun are accessible since most of them have
been equipped with modern digital systems. Thus the Bakassi peninsula dispute in this
regard--the alternative explanation, could be seen as a dispute over the wider territory of
Ambazonia and not just the islands of the Bakassi peninsula.
CONCLUSION:
These alternative explanations of the claims of disputants over Bakassi are in
themselves, evidence that should be used by the Judges of the ICJ to determine who truly
should exercise sovereignty over the peninsula. While the restatement of the problem
http://www.postwatchmagazine.com/ 26
shows some aspects of the chronological development of the dispute to its present level,
the actual drawing of the border and contemporary claims in historical context all help us
to understand the importance of one instrument—the Anglo-German Treaty of March 11,
1913. Any suggestion that because Britain and France hatched a plan to take over
German Kamerun, which of course, is one of the least, mentioned causes of World War I
meant the Treaty ceased to be enforceable is not reasonable.
We have shown that subsequent treatment of the Kamerun territory on the Nigerian side
continued to respect that agreement, besides, the bitter truth that the only boundary
instrument, such as pillars along that close-to-2000km long border are those planted into
the ground by the Germans. The 1913 Treaty is a legally binding document
constitutionally and by the weight of its evidence on the ground--the boundary pillars—
are a very reliable, and perhaps the only reliable premise from which to make judgment
as to who owns Bakassi. A close look at the cases of the disputing parties will give more
credence to this Treaty and the role it will play in determining who should have
sovereignty of the Bakassi peninsula.