Babangida: His Life And Times (Part 3 -
The Return Of The Military
By
Max Siollun
Continued from:
Part 2: http://www.gamji.com/article6000/NEWS7982.htm
Having handed over power to a democratic
government led by President Shehu Shagari in 1979, Babangida and his
colleagues saw themselves as national governmental custodians akin to an
emergency rescue team that could be called out to depose the government
anytime the public got fed up of its policies. In control of the military
and with wealthy civilian friends to bankroll them, Babangida and his
colleagues had an excellent chance of deposing President Shagari but
simply waited for the right time. Babangida later admitted that:
“We in the military waited for an
opportunity. There was the media frenzy about how bad the election was,
massively rigged, corruption, the economy gone completely bad, threat of
secession by people who felt aggrieved. There was frustration within
society and it was not unusual to hear statements like, the worst military
dictatorship is better than this democratic government. Nigerians always
welcome military intervention because we have not yet developed mentally
the values and virtues of democracy.”
Babangida’s good friend MKO Abiola might not
have been the only civilian collaborator. Other media outlets, opposition
politicians and the public joined in with the lacerating criticism of
Shagari’s regime. The former Emir of Gwandu Mustapha Jokolo (then an army
officer and one of the coup plotters) also claimed that former Chief of
Army Staff Lt-Gen T.Y. Danjuma was briefed of the plot to overthrow
Shagari, and lent his support by using his prestige to criticise Shagari’s
government in the media. The critics were wittingly or unwittingly
inciting a military comeback by Babangida and his colleagues. Babangida
revealed that:
“We couldn’t have done it without
collaborators in the civil society – collaborators in the media,
collaborators among people who have the means. Because the means were not
easily available but we received some from people who were convinced it
was the right thing to do….The elite who participate want recognition,
maybe patronage as time goes by” (Karl Maier –
Midnight in Nigeria)
However the plot was leaked to the
government through pillow talk between an army officer within the plot and
his wife who was a sister-in-law to the wife of Plateau State Governor
Solomon Lar. Lar became aware of the plot to depose the government via
his wife and he passed on the news to President Shagari. According to
President Shagari, after having dinner on the night of December 31, 1983,
Shagari was approached by Captain Augustine A. Anyogo of the Brigade of
Guards. The Brigade of Guards is the army unit detailed to guard and
protect the Nigerian Head of State. In the presence of Shagari’s ADC
Major Ali Geidam and a member of the National Security Organisation Ali
Shittu, Anyogo informed Shagari that he had some urgent security
information for him. Anyogo told Shagari that a couple of hours earlier,
he was approached by Colonel Tunde Ogbeha and informed of a “military
operation” scheduled for midnight at the State House, Abuja. Ogbeha told
Anyogo to arrest President Shagari’s at midnight and detain him pending
the arrival of senior officers from Kaduna. In response to the strange
order, Anyogo replied that he would take orders only from his own
commanding officer, and not from Colonel Ogbeha (whose base was in
Lagos). Shortly afterward, Anyogo briefed his commanding officer
Lt-Colonel Eboma. Eboma arranged for troops to be put on alert and to
take defensive positions on approach roads to State House, and reinforced
the guards at State House itself.
Colonel Bello Kaliel (the commander of the
Brigade of Guards in Lagos) was also contacted but unfortunately his
deputy was one of the conspirators. Kaliel was arrested and detained.
Back in Abuja, President Shagari was woken up by his security men and
informed that troops led by Brigadier Ibrahim Bako were headed to the
State House to arrest him. Shagari was evacuated from State House in
order to get him out of harm’s way during an anticipated gun battle
between his guards and Bako’s troops. Around 2:30 a.m. on New Year's Day
1984, armed troops moved to strategic locations, set up roadblocks and
took over the radio and television stations in Lagos. Communication lines
were cut and airports, border crossings and ports were closed. Many of
the soldiers used for the operation were Babangida’s former students from
his days as an instructor at the Nigerian Defence Academy. At 7:00 a.m.
normal programming was interrupted by martial music interspersed with the
following broadcast by a hitherto unknown army officer:
“I and my colleagues in the armed
forces have in the discharge of our national role as promoters and
protectors of our national interest decided to effect a change in the
leadership of the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and form a
Federal Military Government. This task has just been completed….
Accordingly, Alhaji Shehu Usman Shagari ceases forthwith to be the
President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria.”
It was the monotone voice of Brigadier Sani
Abacha, the commander of the 9th mechanised brigade in Ikeja.
On the last day of 1983, the military overthrew Shagari’s regime in order
to “save this nation from imminent collapse”. President Shehu
Shagari was overthrown only three months after being re-elected for his
second and final term of office in an election that was marred by
accusations of electoral malpractice. Scarred by the memory of the mass
bloodshed that followed the bloody military coups of 1966, the coup
plotters wisely did not harm any senior government figures. The only
casualty of the coup was Brigadier Ibrahim Bako who was killed in still
unconfirmed circumstances while trying to arrest President Shagari in
Abuja. How did Bako die? Several different accounts have been given.
The author has distilled the three accounts from the most authoritative
sources:
1) General Babangida’s Account.
In an interview with pointblanknews earlier this year, Babangida gave the
following account of Bako’s death:
Question:
“…What really happened to General Bako?”
Babangida: “..….when they went to Abuja
for that operation, ….this thing happened in the night… you see, from the
experiences we had from the civil war, we found out that soldiers
sometimes panic and when they panic, there are dire consequences. So, it
was in the night and there was what you could call accidental discharge
and the first reaction of the soldiers was that they were being attacked
and in situations like that, you could shoot anyway. It happened to us I
remember, during the civil war. You get shot at in the front and the sound
reverberates behind so the soldiers at the back believes that the person
shooting is right there then they forgot that some 500 meters away are
what we refer to as own troops, your own forces. Because of no adequate
training, a soldier would just cork his riffle and start shooting only to
discover that he is shooting his own people. During the civil war, we
sustained lots of casualties as a result of this situation. So, my
suspicion is that a similar situation must have played out during that
operation in Abuja and a bullet hit the late Ibrahim (Bako).”
Question:
“So, claims that General Tunde Ogbeha may have pulled the
trigger on Bako are not correct after all?”
Babangida:
“I would not like to say he did it, no. It was the situation they found
themselves; it was dark and everybody was shooting anyhow.”
2) Former President Shagari’s Account.
In his memoirs “Beckoned to Serve”, Shagari said that Captain Anyogo (a
company commander of the Brigade of Guards) narrated to him, the story of
how Bako was killed. According to Shagari, Anyongo told him:
“I was the company commander of the
guard battalion of Abuja during the change of government in December,
1983. Neither I nor members of my guard were informed of the impending
change of government, and in the process of finding out what group
soldiers were trying to change the government, Brigadier Ibrahim Bako and
my driver, Private Sule were shot and killed, when I entered into the
ambush mounted by Recce troops brought by the officers from Kaduna. This
happened about 11 kilometres away from the State House where ex-President
Alhaji Shehu Shagari was staying. The officers, Brigadier Ibrahim Bako
and Lt-Colonel Tunde Ogbeha were both in civilian dresses during the
operation and they did not identify themselves to me as senior officers.
At this time there were rumours that some junior officers were planning to
take over government and we were careful this was happening in our area of
jurisdiction. The two officers were disarmed and put in front of my
vehicle and we were on our way to the State House of Abuja under the
orders of my commanding officer Lt-Colonel Eboma. When we entered into
the ambush it was Lt-Colonel Tunde Ogbeha who jumped in front of my
vehicle when somebody shouted the order, ‘fire him’. In the resultant
ambush firing, Brigadier Ibrahim Bako and my driver Sule died.”
(Shagari – Beckoned to Serve)
3) Vice-Admiral Akin Aduwo’s Account.
Vice-Admiral Aduwo was President Shagari’s Chief of Naval Staff. In an
interview published in the Saturday, January 13, 2007 edition of the Sun,
Aduwo said that:
“They sent Brigadier Ibrahim Bako to
arrest him ( Shagari) at the then uncompleted presidential lodge – Akinola
Aguda House. …..Bako got to the gate, stopped his Landrover and even
disarmed himself, left his pistol. He said, ‘this man is a friend to my
father’, and that he would go to him alone. He went to Shagari and told
him there had been a change of government. And that he would guarantee his
safety. No force but with all due respect and courtesy. Shagari said to
him, ‘all right, please let me say my prayers’. And Bako said, ‘okay sir,
I will be waiting outside’. As he was walking out of that place, maybe the
ADC or security you have to pass before entering the president’s living
room. As Bako was coming out, there was a gun shot from the security room,
and it finished him.”
What these three differing accounts
demonstrate is that no one really knows, or is willing to admit, how Bako
died. Bako was buried in Kaduna on 3rd January 1984. Maj-Gen
Muhammadu Buhari became the new Head of State. Babangida later denied
rumours that Bako would have become Head of State had he not been killed.
He also revealed that he was approached to become the new Head of State
but declined as “Buhari was our senior, so I did
not want anybody to jump him.”
AN “OFFSHOOT” FROM OBASANJO
Alleged links between General Olusegun
Obasanjo and the new military regime were tacitly acknowledged in public
when the new regime emphasised that it was an “offshoot” of the
Murtala-Obasanjo regime that governed between 1976-1979. This was
entirely accurate because many of the new regime’s senior figures such as
Buhari, Babangida, Ukiwe, Kpera, and Garba Duba all served under the
1976-1979 regime. Babangida was appointed Chief of Army Staff to succeed
Lt-General Mohammed Wushishi. His old class mate Maj-Gen Mamman Vatsa was
appointed Minister of the Federal Capital Territory – outside the army
chain of command, in a move that prevented either of the former
coursemates from serving under other each other.
Babangida and Brigadier Babatunde Idiagbon
informed Wushishi and the other service chiefs Lt-Gen Gibson Jalo (Chief
of Defence Staff), Air Vice Marshal Abdullahi Dominic Bello (Chief of Air
Staff), and Vice-Admiral Akin Aduwo (Chief of Naval Staff), that their
services were no longer required and that they would be detained at Bonny
Camp in Lagos under “protective custody”. All the former service chiefs
were compulsorily retired but they remained so distrustful of Babangida
and the members of the new regime that while in detention, they held daily
Islamic and Christian prayer sessions and refused to be separated from
each other. President Shagari emerged from hiding and joined the other
military and civilian detainees after being given assurances that he would
not be harmed.
TROUBLE IN PARADISE - THE BABANGIDA
FACTOR
The new regime led by Buhari was an austere
regime whose major policy platform was a massive crackdown on corruption.
As the anti-corruption drive by Buhari widened, the trail of
investigations led back to the Ministry of Defence. There were allegations
that senior army officers were involved in drug dealing and rumours of
some suspicious financial dealings at the Ministry. Some accusatory
fingers were pointed at Babangida. Additionally several sources have
stated that these investigations led to a decision to retire Babangida’s
close ally Colonel Aliyu Mohammed. Babangida also claimed that the NSO
was monitoring the activities of SMC members, and had even bugged his own
telephone lines. Babangida said he later retrieved most of the tapes of
the NSO's wiretaps on his phones. Why was he so keen to recover the
tapes?
Buhari compounded his problems by not
rewarding the key junior and mid-ranking officers who staged the coup that
brought him to power with lucrative political postings. This created
discontent among officers who were essentially coup specialists. Other
officers in the government and junior officers took their complaints to
Babangida. A cleavage opened up in the SMC with Buhari, Idiagbon,
Mohammed Magoro (Internal Affairs Minister) and Alhaji Lawal Rafindadi
(Director of the National Security Organisation) on one side and Babangida
heading the opposition. Babangida had to do something drastic to save his
neck. He had to overthrow Buhari to ensure his survival.
According to Babangida, the planning to
overthrow Buhari began in January 1985 - just one year after Buhari came
to office. The period of time between April and July 1985 was the most
critical phase in the planning. Babangida says it was a "collective
decision" to overthrow Buhari. There was a subtle plot by Babangida
loyalists to discredit Buhari’s regime. They would sanction moves which
were publicly unpopular and which made Buhari’s regime appear harsh and
unsympathetic. These included the arrest and detention of government
opponents and journalists, the execution of drug dealers, a raid on the
home of Chief Obafemi Awolowo and the seizure of his passport, and the
stifling of political debate on when the country would be returned to
civilian rule. Buhari took the blame for these decisions but later
revealed that they were sanctioned by the same men that overthrew him. It
was all part of a plot to make the regime unpopular enough to justify
public support for a military coup and Buhari’s replacement by Babangida.
Babangida later admitted as much:
“There was a lot going in our favour. So
we seized the moment …..You see we are very smart people. We don’t
intervene when we know the climate is not good for it or the public will
not welcome it. We wait until there is a frustration in the society. In
all the coups, you find there has always been one frustration or the
other. Any time there is frustration we step in. And then there is
demonstration welcoming the redeemers.
(Karl Maier – Midnight in Nigeria)
While Buhari was stern, serious and
resolute, Babangida was deft, tactical and extremely devious. He had
systematically cultivated a loyal following of sycophantic mid-ranking
officers over the years by making grandiose gestures and buying lavish
presents for officers junior to him. These officers now owed allegiance
to him rather than to their nation, institution, or to the Head of State
Buhari. Babangida had managed to create a mini-personality cult within
the military. A military intelligence officer Chris “MC” Alli later
observed that:
"Major General Ibrahim Babangida
sat atop the strategic office of Chief of Army Staff. This conspiratorial
group and their cohorts properly circumscribed General Buhari and Major
General Idiagbon. Most transitional coups in Nigeria have revolved around
the following; late, Brigadier General Ibrahim Bako, a brilliant Armoured
Corps officer who died in unexplained circumstances in the 1983 coup
d'etat that sent President Shehu Shagari packing. others were, General
Murtala Mohammed, Major General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, an accomplished
strategist of vast resources and the hero of the Onitsha campaign, General
Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida and General Sani Abacha. These were the
carpetbaggers, the first tier of coup merchants. The second was forming
around the officers of Nigeria Defence Academy Course Three and by 1985
they were mostly lieutenant colonels. A new crop of officers were further
tacitly being groomed into this brand of schemers, the third tier which
formed around General Babangida and had such young officers such as Lawan
Gwadabe, Ibrahim Dasuki* (sic), John (Yohana) Madaki, to name a few. So,
there were first and second lines with the third in a state of gestation,
all aimed at ensuring the sustenance of the status quo and power equation
in the nation. Each would protect the previous from its horrid shadows
while in power. They were all northern in their political orientations and
composition". (Maj-Gen Chris Alli, The Federal
Republic of Nigerian Army: The Siege of a Nation)
*This was an error by Alli. He obviously
meant Sambo Dasuki – the son of the former Sultan of Sokoto Ibrahim Dasuki.
The second coup plotter tier described by
Alli were the same men who brought Buhari to power. However with his
superior charm, Babangida could easily convince these men to switch
loyalty and abandon Buhari. Although Buhari was his close friend, for
Babangida, this was pure business. Babangida later claimed that: “To
be able to stage a coup you have to be close to somebody. I was a very
good friend of Buhari, there’s no doubt about it.”
However there was a sticking point. The GOC
of the 2nd division in Ibadan, Maj-Gen Sani Abacha was a
mysterious figure. If Babangida could not obtain his support for the
coup, it would fail and Babangida and his friends would end up in front of
a firing squad. Babangida went to Abacha to personally plead for his
support in deposing Buhari. Only Babangida could talk him round.
According to Babangida
“Nobody could get him [Abacha] to be
involved except me because of our relationship. If it were any other
person, he would have gone to the side of Buhari. But when I sat him
down, he said ‘You are my chief, anything you want I will do.’ So the
personal relationship also helped in trying to recruit people into this
unholy alliance.”
Next Part:
“He had been building a political empire for years inside the barracks.
Babangida created an army in his own image with both his own personal
charm and with spontaneous acts of kindness to colleagues and
subordinates. He is known to have an exceptional memory for names and
faces and is able to recollect the first names of colleagues,
subordinates, opponents and even their family members.”
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