NewsRescue- As the Nigerian geopolitical remains riled up, post the provocative publication of ‘There Was a Country’, by one of Nigeria’s most popular writers, Chinua Achebe. A revisiting of Nigeria’s history becomes pertinent. We decided to provide an address made by Dr. Nowamagbe Omoigui in 1998, which described a rather not so popular aspect of the Biafra secession war.
Related: NewsRescue- Documents contradict Achebe book ‘There Was a Country’ on facts of Biafra Genocide
NewsRescue contacted Dr Omoigui, a high repute Cardiologist in the United States, in reference to this article, and as he explained, there is so much more detail which he left out in order to summarize it into this speech, but he will be glad to provide more information and evidence as needed to enlighten and inform Nigerians on their historical past. We updated his email in the article, so the author may be contacted.
Apparently from this and other evidence, the Biafra program was not a mere secession, but contained aggressive acts of war directed at non Igbo and non Biafra geopolitical zones, which the zealous young Ojukwu planned to annex and dominate over. His ambition and sight extended westward to Lagos, the Yoruba predominant western boundary of Nigeria. Indeed some say that no part of Nigeria was safe from the dreams and quest of this perhaps Narcissistic commander.
Lt Col Ojukwu
In addition to the scourge and humiliation of the occupation itself, fleeing Biafran soldiers carried out all kinds of unspeakable acts of brutality against the local population (17, 18). At the Urhonigbe Rubber Plantation, for example, hundreds of Midwesterners were summarily shot by regular and militia units which had already blazed a ‘scorched-earth’ trail of terror through Benin-West division (14).The above is a excerpt from the article published on dawodu, below. The entire article is by all means a must read for those interested in Nigeria’s history and its relation to the present and future:
The Midwest Invasion of 1967: Lessons for Today’s Geopolitics
Dr. Nowamagbe A. Omoigui
Text of a keynote speech delivered at the Nigerian
Independence Day Celebration sponsored by the Nigerian Women Association
in Columbia, South Carolina on October 3, 1998 at the Holiday Inn
Express, 773 St. Andrews Road, Columbia, SC 29210.
Nowamagbe A. Omoigui, MD, MPH, FACC
*Updated Email: Nowa_o@yahoo.com
INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
Thank you very much for inviting me to deliver the
keynote address to the Nigerian community in South Carolina this year.
As you all are aware, our country is 38 years old, having attained
political independence from Britain on October 1st 1960.
Our history goes back much further. Having secured
the Atlantic coastal areas, in the latter part of the nineteenth century
(1, 2), two significant events at the turn of this century marked the
interior drive by colonialists to gain political and economic control
over what later became the central and eastern states of Southern
Nigeria. They were the Benin expedition of 1897 and the Aro expedition
of 1901-2. Much earlier, Consul Johnston of the Niger Coast protectorate
removed King Jaja of Opobo in 1887. Chief Nana of Itsekiri was deported
in September 1894. In the context of events created by the 1892 treaty
with vice-consul Gallwey, the Benin empire fell in the wake of the
so-called “punitive” expedition by Sir Ralph Moor’s government on
February 18, 1897. Oba Ovonramwen was subsequently deported to Calabar
(3).
The British government later transformed the Niger
Coast Protectorate into the “Protectorate of Southern Nigeria”,
encompassing multiple ethnic territories (except Lagos) some of which
used to be administered under the Royal Niger Company. In 1906, the
colony of Lagos was merged with the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.
On January 1st 1914, Sir Frederick Lugard
announced the amalgamation of two British colonial protectorates,
northern and southern Nigeria. In his words, the union would henceforth
be “….conforming to one policy and mutually cooperating for the moral
and material advancement of Nigeria as a whole…”. (4) Based on other
accounts, however, it appears that the reason why the British
amalgamated Northern and Southern Nigeria had nothing to do with the
moral and material advancement of Nigeria as a whole. His Majesty’s
Government sought to consolidate contiguous colonial possessions and
reroute the great rail-lines, thus gaining direct access to Atlantic
ports. Southern Nigeria’s riches (particularly timber) was a means to
subsidize the cost of administering northern Nigeria so as to free up
scarce resources in other colonies to prosecute the First World War.
Perhaps emblematic of our inability to find a stable
structure (5, 6), Nigeria has had eight constitutions in the 70-year
period between 1922 and 1992: 1922, 1946, 1951, 1954, 1960, 1963, 1979,
and 1989. At the present time, we are in the throes of yet another
military-civil transition program that will (hopefully) lead to the
emergence of the third republic on May 29, 1999. The draft of our ninth
constitution was recently released for public comment (7). There are
those who believe we are in for yet another replay of our tortured past.
Indeed, much has happened in the last eight years,
the details of which you are all aware. On April 22, 1990, a young
middle-belt Armored Corps officer by name of Major Gideon Orkar
(supported by a clique of southern minority officers) went on Lagos
radio and announced the expulsion of all states in the far north fringe
of Nigeria from the country. His putsch eventually failed. In 1993,
Nigeria’s military leader, General Ibrahim Babangida, (himself a
northerner, with a personal agenda of his own) was urged by a clique of
northern officers in the Army (with the acquiescence of some southern
civilian elite) to prevent the apparent winner of a national election
from taking office. According to Babangida’s son, these officers
reportedly cited the economic control of the country by southerners as a
justification for politico-military control by the “disadvantaged”
north. The presumed winner of the election, Moshood Abiola, who died
recently in detention, was a Yoruba from the southern part of the
country. Since then, separatist instincts (which have never been too far
from the surface) have been given a new lease of life. With nearly all
ethnic groups in the country suffering from the disease of want and
feeling “marginalized” from opportunity by at least one other ethnic or
religious group, calls have increased for measures to attain redress.
They include a “sovereign national conference” to decide the future of
the country, confederation, a return to the 1963 regional constitution,
establishment of a political “Truth Commission” and even outright
dissolution of the federal republic. Most recently, the establishment of
“regional armies” has been advocated to redress what is perceived as
the domination of the military by “the north” (7).
These developments are neither trivial nor new. In
early September, an unnamed diplomat was alleged to have imported 9000
9mm parabellum pistols and 500 submachine guns across the Beninois
border (7). Rumors of similar activities in other parts of the country
(including the stockpiling of weapons in warehouses abroad) persist.
Such importation may be motivated by the desire to sell weapons in
Nigeria’s thriving “Armed Robbery” market. A more sinister possibility,
however, is the contingency storage of weapons (by private interests)
for another civil war.
My roots are from the Edo nation of the old
Midwestern region (now Edo and Delta states) of Nigeria. My ancestors
established the ancient Benin Empire, which, after 400 years of contacts
with Europeans, lost its independence in 1897. Our country, Nigeria,
has failed to live its promise and sometimes behaves as if it is living
between wars. Indeed, no less a personality than Lt. General Theophilus
Danjuma, former Army Chief made a similar observation in 1979.
Today, I have chosen to reflect on a particularly
sensitive period of our history. The two-month period of the Nigerian
civil war from August 9 to October 8th 1967 represent the entry and exit
dates of Biafran forces from the Midwest. As we ponder the suggestion
to set up “regional armies”, there are lessons from that campaign that
need emphasis if we are to learn from history and avoid repeating its
mistakes.
PRELUDE
The coups d’etat of January 15, and July 29, 1966 had
profound consequences which went far beyond the expectations of its
planners. The specific details of those coups are well known and will
not be recounted here (8, 9, 10, 11, 12).
From the perspective of the Midwest, Ibo-speaking
officers and men from the Ika, Asaba and Aboh divisions of the state
joined the massive exodus of easterners from other parts of the country
(13). This was in response to the May 29 and July 29 killings and the
subsequent call by the Military Governor of the Eastern region, (Lt.
Col. C. O. Ojukwu) for all Ibos to return ‘home’ in the wake of further
acts of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in September 1966. [Subsequently, Ojukwu
expelled all non-Ibo Midwesterners from the eastern region, including
students.]
Because of the complete breakdown of military
discipline and trust occasioned by the widespread killings of Ibos, it
became apparent that troops had to return to their regions of origin.
For this reason, a regional army structure was approved corresponding to
the four regions of the country at that time (6, 12, 13). The 1st, 2nd , 3rd and 4th
area commands were based in the Northern, Western, Eastern and
Midwestern regions, respectively. Since the northern region essentially
controlled the federal government, northern troops remained in Lagos.
This raised two issues:
- Whether a mixed regional force ought to control Lagos, as federal capital.
- Whether northern troops should remain in the West to protect the northern flank of northern troops in Lagos, who would be cut off from the north, should their colleagues in the West be recalled. On August 9, 1966 the Ad-Hoc Committee had indeed recommended that northern troops be repatriated from Lagos and the West, but Gowon demurred. This led the West to believe that it was “occupied” and became a sore point in West-North relations for quite some time.
In the tense period of political maneuvering leading
up to the civil war, the different area commands had different degrees
of motivation for and ability to procure arms and ammunition. The 1st
area command in Kaduna allegedly had the advantage of simply using
federal connections to do this. Excess weapons in Lagos were reportedly
moved up north, and certain prominent businessmen are said to have
helped to import arms. Northern troops returning from other regions took
their weapons along. The 3rd area command in the east made
its own arrangements, which (as we now know) were grossly inadequate by
the time a decision was made to secede (8). The 2nd area
command in Ibadan was in a difficult position because of the presence of
northern troops. Concerned about the lopsided ethnic structure of the 4th
area command, and the potential for abuse, the Governor, Lt. Col. Ejoor
prevented a private group led by Mr. Yon DaKolo and Lt. Col. Mike
Okwechime from importing weapons to Benin. Instead, he asked the federal
government to provide the Midwest region with weapons directly,
choosing not to do so secretly. Hence a small consignment of weapons was
sent to Benin to beef up the 20 odd Mark 4 rifles held by the 300
soldiers there at the time. Three keys to the armory were made. Midwest
Ibo officers (Lt. Cols. Conrad Nwawo and Sylvanus Nwajei) held two keys,
while Major Sam Ogbemudia (Bini-Edo) ostensibly held the third. Because
of this complex arrangement, with Lagos regulating the supply of arms
on the one hand, and the absence of any credible attempt to recruit new
soldiers locally on the other, the 4th area command was never in a position to independently defend the region or state in a sustained manner from any threat even if all the officers were loyal (13, 14).
At the September1966 Constitutional conference for
the political future of the country, the Midwest was the only region to
support the preservation of a federation with a strong center. This was
based at the time on enlightened self-interest, because the leadership
feared that the barely three year old oil, cocoa, rubber, timber and
port rich region would in all likelihood become a target of hostile
intent and domination by its larger, more cohesive, more organized and
more powerful neighbors. Midwestern Ibo officers who felt the
confederate and even secessionist arrangements proposed by other regions
was a better approach opposed this position, hammered out by the Urhobo
Governor, Lt. Col. Ejoor, Chief Anthony Enahoro (Ishan-Edo), and a
group of non-Ibo intellectuals from the University of Ibadan. Such
disagreements over policy reflected deep divisions within the political
milieu over which Ejoor presided (13).
From January 4-5, 1967 all military leaders of
Nigeria met in Aburi, Ghana to resolve Nigeria’s dilemma. Thereafter,
conflicting versions of what was and was not agreed became the stuff of a
propaganda war between Ojukwu and the federal government (12, 15). On
Jan 14-15, solicitors-general from all over the country met in Benin
City to discuss the legal implications of Aburi and review all decrees
passed by the Military since Jan 17, 1966. On Jan 17-18, they discussed a
draft decree on decentralization. This was followed on Jan 25 by a an
inconclusive meeting (again in Benin City) of senior Nigerian Officers
from all regions to discuss the reorganization of the army after the
events of 1966. On March 9-10, the Supreme Military Council met (yet
again in Benin City) to ratify the decentralization decree. Ojukwu did
not attend, citing security concerns. However, he showed up alone by
Helicopter in Benin City on March 12 at which time Ejoor briefed him on
the deliberations of the meeting he missed (13). He still was not
pleased. This decree (No. 8) was issued a few weeks later, practically
making Nigeria a confederacy (6).
On April 30, the National Peace Committee met in
Benin City to review efforts to resolve the crisis. In the weeks that
followed it was pretty clear that Ojukwu was heading toward secession.
On May 26, a crucial joint meeting of the chiefs and elders of the
Eastern Consultative Assembly was convened in Enugu (15). It mandated
Ojukwu to proclaim the eastern region as an independent republic of
Biafra. On May 27, therefore, Gowon pre-emptively declared a state of
emergency and announced the creation of twelve states out of the four
regions. The Midwest region became a state with no change in its size or
configuration, while the other regions were divided. One of the most
significant results of this exercise, was the splitting of the eastern
region into three parts, separating (and land locking) the inland Ibo
from the oil rich coastal minorities of the Calabar, Ogoja and Rivers
provinces (12).
On May 30, 1967, one year after the infamous
“Unification Riots” took place in the then Northern region, 34 year old
Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, mandated by the East Regional
Consultative Assembly, proclaimed the Republic of Biafra. Tracing a
diary of events in 1966, Ojukwu stated (among other things) that: “The
widespread nature of the massacre and its periodicity May 29, July 29,
and September 29 show first, that they were premeditated and planned,
and second that Eastern Nigerians are no longer wanted as equal partners
in the Federation of Nigeria.” (15)
Based in Lagos, the federal government under 33 year
old Major-General Yakubu Cinwa Gowon, did not accept the proclamation.
The “northern group of states”, having suppressed their own prior
instincts for secession, perceived it as an economic threat to its
survival and well being. The federal government believed that it had not
exhausted alternatives to complete disintegration, even though
communication with Ojukwu in particular had broken down. Almost
immediately, therefore, steps were taken to bring the situation under
control. By June 3, a total naval blockade of the bights of Benin and
Biafra (later renamed ‘Bonny’) had been ordered. Oil tankers and other
ships heading for Bonny and Calabar were intercepted and diverted.
Ojukwu was formally dismissed from the Nigerian Army on July 1st.
The ‘police action’ land phase of what is now referred to as the
Nigerian Civil War subsequently began in earnest at 0530 hrs on July 6,
1967. Troops concentrated at Vanderkya [in Benue State] under the
command of Major Martin Adamu opened a barrage of fire in support of an
assault on Garkem and Obudu in the Ogoja sector. A few hours’ later
troops under Major Sule Apollo opened up a second front from Ankpa and
Idah toward Enugu Ezike and Okutu in the Nsukka sector. (8)
It turns out that during the Commander-in-Chief’s
conference on June 7 in Lagos, Lt. Col. David Ejoor (Military Governor)
was told that “Midwestern State will be kept free from active operations
unless where necessary, but the border between the Eastern States and
the Midwest will be completely sealed off.” (10, 12) Therefore, on June
18, at a speech in Asaba, Ejoor reiterated a public commitment that the
Midwest would not be turned into a battlefield. Sensitive to his own
Midwest Ibo constituency, the prevailing wisdom at the time was that the
war was a confrontation between the ‘Northern’ and ‘Eastern’ regions in
the larger context of Nigerian unity. But within 7 weeks after Ejoor’s
speech, “Biafran” troops were in control of the Midwest and hurtling
across the West on their way to Lagos. That campaign and its
far-reaching implications, ladies and gentlemen, is the focus of my
speech tonight.
THE ASSAULT
At 3 a.m. on Wednesday, August 9, 1967, the fourth
anniversary of the democratic creation of the Midwestern region, a
motorized rifle brigade consisting of 3000 Biafran soldiers and
militiamen, under the command of Lt. Col. ["Brigadier"] Victor Banjo,
crossed the Niger Bridge at Onitsha into Asaba. The Biafran Invasion of
the Midwest had begun. Transported in over 100 trucks and civilian
vehicles, this was the nucleus of what eventually was planned to be
designated the “101st division”, also known as the
“Liberation Army of Nigeria” or the “Midwest Expeditionary Force”. Upon
arrival in the Midwest, they split up into three spearheads, destined to
peal off from one another at Agbor. Units fired indiscriminately into
the air as they arrived unchallenged at successive tactical objectives.
The seizure of the Midwest was essentially accomplished within 12 hours
(8, 9, 13, 14).
The 101st HQ group included Major
(‘Lt. Col.’) Emmanuel Ifeajuna as Chief of Staff and Captain (“Major”)
Joe Isichie as QuarterMaster General. Much later in the campaign, Lt.
(“Major”) Fola Oyewole (upon release from prison in Enugu, where he (and
Adeleke) had been detained for the January 15 coup) became Isichie’s
deputy (16).
The 12th Battalion, under Lt. Col. Festus Akagha, made a dash for Benin City, [the capital]. The 18th
battalion under Major Humphrey Chukwuka, headed for Warri, [in the
oilrich delta] with Sapele and Ughelli as secondary objectives. The 13th
battalion under Lt. Col. Mike Ivenso, swung northwards toward Auchi,
with Agenebode (across the Niger from Idah, in Benue State), and Okene
(in then Kwara state) as secondary objectives. A detachment was to head
for Jebba to destroy the Niger Bridge at that location (8, 9).
Unknown
to Banjo, a unit led by Lt. Col. Ochei (a Midwest Ibo officer),
specifically attacked the Government house in Benin, ostensibly ordered
by Ojukwu to capture the governor, Lt. Col. Ejoor dead or alive (13).
Fortuitously, Major Ogbemudia (then quarter-master-general) had changed
the guard detail at the Government House during the night (14).
Therefore, the soldiers on duty, not being part of the plot to hand-over
the state resisted. Ejoor escaped, separated from the rest of his
family. Other than some fighting in the Siluko area, this was the only
resistance the “Liberation Army” had to face in its initial phase of
operations.
The 12th battalion had originally operated
in the Ogoja sector before being re-deployed to take part in the
Midwest operation (8). It was supposed to have breakfast in Benin City,
then proceed speedily toward Ibadan and Lagos on two axes springing from
Ore and Okitipupa. The Ore group was to split into two groups, one
pushing to Ibadan through Ondo and Ife, while the other was to drive
through to Ijebu-Ode on to Lagos. Instead, the 12th battalion
stalled in Benin City, while Banjo and Ojukwu argued back and forth for
three days about whom to appoint Governor/ Administrator of the
Midwest. Ojukwu had apparently initially preferred Lt. Col. Nwawo as the
governor (9). But Banjo, eager to avoid creating a restive non-Ibo
population, independently and separately approached Lt. Col. David Ejoor
(through the Catholic mission), Major Sam Ogbemudia (through an agent)
and Lt. Col. Trimnell (a molato officer with ancestral links to Aboh
division), in that order (9, 13, 14). The first two declined. Ojukwu
turned down the latter, ultimately choosing Major Albert Nwazu Okonkwo, a
Midwest Ibo medical officer. After the first of several recalls to
Enugu, Banjo returned to Benin City on August 11/12, 1967 to resume the
fatally delayed westward thrust of the 12th battalion, which
had now been re-designated a brigade. The announcement of Major
Okonkwo’s appointment was eventually made on Thursday, August 17 from
Enugu.
The 18th battalion took Warri without
incident. Major Chukwuka released Major Adewale Ademoyega from Warri
prison before making his radio broadcast to the people of the Delta (9).
Discerning listeners knew that Chukwuka was one of the January 1966
coup plotters in Lagos who had killed Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, a son of
Warri, Federal Minister for Finance and arguably the Midwest’s most
influential politician at that time. Ademoyega had been transferred to
Warri from Uyo prison after a fistfight with Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna
over the ultimate failure of their coup in Lagos. After expropriating
all the Mark IV bolt-action rifles from the Warri Police Station, he
headed for Benin City where he assumed training and command (as “Lt.
Col.”) of a newly conscripted 700 man battalion, based at the Edokpolo
Grammar School. This battalion (called the 19th) was to advance in support of the 12th battalion as part of the new 12th
brigade. When on August 13, “Lt. Col.” Ademoyega relieved “Lt. Col.”
Ifeajuna as Chief of Staff of the “Liberation Army”, Lt. Col. Henry
Igboba (Midwest Ibo) took over the 19th battalion. Ifeajuna returned to Enugu as Liaison Officer for the Liberation Army (9).
The 13th battalion under Ivenso secured
itself at Auchi and Agenebode, then crossed the border into then Kwara
(West-Central) state (now Kogi) in the former northern region. By August
13th, they had captured Okene, Atanai and Iloshi,
arbitrarily killing some civilians in the process (17). Their role was
to protect the northern flank of the main force while cutting off supply
lines to federal troops at Nsukka (8, 15, 19).
The 4th Area Command at the time of the Invasion (13, 14)
At the time of the Biafran Invasion, there had been no “northern” troops in the Midwest. The Nigerian Army 4th
Area Command had two battalions organized in nine (9) companies. Two
companies were based in Benin, two in Agbor, two in Asaba, and one each
in Warri, Auchi and Ekiadolor. It was manned by Midwesterners, under the
command of Lt. Col. Conrad Nwawo [the same officer to whom Major
Patrick C.K. Nzeogwu (also Midwest Ibo) had surrendered in Jan 1966].
Because several non-Ibo officers remained in Lagos and Kaduna, all but
three officers on the ground (Lt. Col. David Ejoor, Majors Ogbemudia and
Eremobor) of the rank of Major and above were Midwestern Ibos. Probably
75% or more of the 42 officers were Ibo-speaking. Indeed, in addition
to possessing a sizable chunk of the rank and file, among the strategic
positions in the Command, Ibo-speaking officers held the following:
- Commander, 4th Area Command (Lt. Col. Nwawo)
- General Staff Officer 1 (Operations) (Lt. Col. Nwanjei)
- Staff Officer (Civil-Military Liaison), Governors Office
- Commander, Benin Garrison, including two companies (Lt. Col. Ruddy Trimnell)
- Battalion Commander (Lt. Col. Igboba)
- Battalion Commander (Lt. Col. Ochei)
- Commanding Officer, Depot. (Lt. Col. Keshi)
- Officer in charge, Engineers/ Communications (Lt. Col. Okwechime)
- Company Commander, Auchi area
- Company Commanders, Asaba area (including Major Alabi-Isama)
- Company Commanders, Agbor area
- Company Commander Warri area
- Company Commander, Ekiadolor Unit
Non-Ibos held the following positions:
- Quarter Master-General, 4th area command (Major Ogbemudia)
- Intelligence Officer (Major Eremobor)
Col. David Ejoor (Military Governor, Midwest), was
thus caught between numerous Midwestern Ibo officers (whom he could
neither trust nor control) and the federal government (whom they did not
trust). Not exactly a stranger to intrigue, Ejoor (as Commander 1st
battalion, Enugu), narrowly escaped death (from Majors Anuforo and
Ifeajuna) at the Ikoyi Hotel in Lagos, Jan 15,1966. He also slipped out
of an attempted kidnap (by Ojukwu) during the burial of Major General
Aguiyi-Ironsi at Umuahia on Jan 20, 1967. As noted above, he tried to
play a balancing act as a neutral, by declaring that the Midwestern
region ‘would not become a battlefield’. It was a no win situation.
The Gathering Storm.
As far back as April 6th, 1967 almost two
months before the proclamation of secession, special branch police
reports had alerted the federal government of certain activities that
were to take on significance later (10). Two officers from the eastern
region, (Lt. Col. Ude and Major Obioha) were in contact with some of
their counterparts in the Midwest to make arrangements for the possible
occupation of the Midwest by troops from the Eastern Area Command. The
pretext would be that the Midwest was not strong enough to defend itself
and that Midwest Ibos needed protection. This occupation was to be
coordinated with a simultaneous seizure of the Western region, which
(according to the report) was why some individuals (presumably Ojukwu,
Awolowo and Adebayo) were advocating that “northern” troops leave that
region.
Ude and Obioha apparently met with Lt. Cols. Igboba,
Nwawo, Okwechime and Nwajei, along with Major David Odiwo and a civilian
hotelier, Joseph Nwababa. Igboba and Nwajei reportedly reconnoitered
the Ilusi and Ubiaja areas of the region to determine their suitability
as a springboard for operations. This option would have meant bypassing
Benin while advancing through Owo to Ibadan. Using the African
Continental Bank (ACB), money was allegedly laundered through Nwababa to
Military and Police operatives.
[This detailed intelligence report provides
another glimpse into the degree of dishonesty in Banjo's relationship
with Ojukwu. When Ademoyega was released from Warri prison, Banjo told
him that it was he (Banjo) that suggested the Midwest and Lagos moves to
Ojukwu, who accepted because of his 'confidence' in him. Obviously,
Banjo was unaware that plans for the invasion had been fostered even
before Biafra was proclaimed.]
On July 11, a week after “police action” had
commenced, Ejoor declared that the state would promptly and resolutely
resist any incursion of its territory; unfortunately, signs that an
invasion was indeed coming were essentially ignored. The Asaba end of
the Niger Bridge was wide open. The federal blockade was not enforced by
troops of the 4th area command, none of whom were under the
operational control of Ejoor. Trade with the Onitsha market continued
unabated. The Asaba Textile Mills, which was dependent on the Afam power
station for electricity supply, had its power cut off on July 18th.
The crude oil pipeline from Warri to the Port Harcourt refinery was
also sabotaged (14). These acts heightened apprehension in the Midwest
and raised eyebrows in Lagos. In his book (10), Major General Joe Garba
(rtd) describes an irritant in the relationship between certain Midwest
officers in Lagos (for example, Captain George Innih) and their northern
counterparts during this period. It had to do with demands from the
former that the 4th Area Command be given “adequate weapons”
to defend the state, rather than rely on “northern” troops. However, in
the setting of suspicions about the pro-East tilt of the majority of
officers in the Midwest at that time, the federal government was,
understandably, not in a hurry to flood the Midwest with weapons which
might in all probability simply be handed over to Ojukwu.
A subsequent demonstration of Heavy Weapons at the Benin airport and public statements of assurance from the Commander of the 4th
area command (Col. Nwawo) only served to lull the civilian population
into a false sense of security. Behind the scenes, other events
demonstrated the widening gulf between Ibo and non-Ibo officers. For
example, on August 5, a company of soldiers led by Lt. (later Captain
& “Major”) Igbinosa arrived in Benin from Lagos with orders to
escort a consignment of boats (procured by Ejoor from the Delta) to the
Bonny sector in the East, where Lt. Col. Adekunle was operating.
Igbinosa was promptly turned back by Lt. Col. Nwawo and other Midwest
Ibo officers at the Area Command HQ (13). Curiously, in his “Journal of
Events” (15), Ojukwu interpreted this event as follows: “Nigerian troops
start amassing troops and stockpiling large quantities of arms in the
Midwest in preparation for an attack on Biafra.” The following day, on
August 6, an embarrassed Ejoor (whose neutrality was now in doubt)
confronted these same Midwest Ibo army colleagues with newspaper reports
about the formation of a “southern solidarity front” to include the
East, Midwest and West to the exclusion of the North (14). Not
surprisingly, they denied. Interestingly, Ojukwu issued a public warning
that day, to Ejoor reminding him of his pledges to keep the region
neutral. However, two days later, on the night of August 8, Biafran army
uniforms were secretly issued to selected Midwestern Ibos while weapons
were withdrawn ‘for routine check’ from non-Ibo soldiers in the 4th Area Command HQ. The Police wireless station at Asaba closed down (as usual) for the night. The stage was set (14).
Between 3 a.m. when they crossed the Niger Bridge and 7:00 a.m. when the Biafran 12th battalion and 101st divisional HQ group arrived in Benin City, feverish activities took place among key officers of the 4th
area command. Those in the know, manipulated and stonewalled their
colleagues while rumors spread like wildfire (14). As it were, a group
of Midwest Ibo officers had actually been slated to welcome Lt. Col.
Banjo at Ikpoba Hill that morning (13).
Major-General Yakubu Gowon was very concerned about
the dynamics of the Midwest before the invasion (12). Recognizing that
(by prior agreement) there were no “northern” troops in the Midwest, he
(Gowon) took the precaution of quietly creating a new brigade at Okene
(in modern day Kogi State). According to Garba (10), a company was also
positioned at Ore and may have been the group that put up some
resistance at Siluko. All of these soldiers later came under the command
of 28 year old Lt. Col . Murtala Ramat Mohammed. Although he was the
coup-leader, he ceded leadership to Gowon after the July 29, 1966
counter-coup and was practically a man in search of a mission for some
time after that. In a curious twist of fate, the Biafran invasion gave
the Kano-born, Hausa-speaking Mohammed an opportunity to return to his
ancestral home in Auchi in the Midwest region as a Liberator (17).
Initially, these Okene based troops were being massed
in preparation for a possible dash to Agbor through Auchi, in the
Midwestern region, to cut off any attempt by the Biafran Army to match
on Benin City and on to Lagos (12). According to Ejoor, the nucleus of
this unit was the 3rd battalion originally based in Ibadan,
which had been transferred to Okene. In Ejoor’s opinion (13), the
subsequent eastward movement of most of this battalion to provide
reinforcement for the Nsukka sector, opened up the flank for Ojukwu’s
invasion of the Midwest. Events validate Ejoor’s perspective, because
the 3rd battalion was not in place to stop Ivenso from entering Okene on August 13th.
Clearly monitoring the unstable situation in the
Midwest, and looking for a pretext based on real or imagined troop
movements, Ojukwu struck on August 9th, fast and with
near-total surprise. Near total, because the clouds of imminent invasion
were noticed by at least a few others. One Sergeant Major, for example,
desperately sought guidance from a few non-Ibo officers to pre-emptily
arrest all Midwest Ibo
officers. He was quite prepared to do this, he said, as long he had an
order to do so. No one was willing to bite the bullet, perhaps for fear
it might boomerang. Those were anxious days (17).
By pre-arrangement, the Midwestern Area Command put
up no resistance, essentially folding into the Biafran rearguard. Among
others, the Officers who were most deeply involved in all of this were
Lt. Cols. Mike Okwechime, Igboba, Nwajei, Ochei and Col. Conrad Nwawo.
[Nigerian Army Headquarters took the view that these "Nigerian" officers
were involved in a coup d'etat against the Midwestern region of
Nigeria; this attitude that affected the way those who survived were
treated after the war ended in Jan 1970. (12)]
The Military Governor, Col. David Ejoor, eventually
escaped to Lagos, after an unusual August 11/12 midnight meeting with
Lt. Col. Banjo at the Catholic Seminary in Benin City. During this
encounter, he apparently declined an offer to serve as Governor and
assist in efforts to remove both Gowon and Ojukwu from office and form a
new reconciliatory national government in the “Dominion of Southern
Nigeria”. Lt. Col. Nwajei, ‘Major’ Alale and an unnamed Biafran
‘officer’ (possibly Achuzia) apparently witnessed this interesting
meeting. Banjo not only apologized to Ejoor for the attack on Government
House, but also stated that Ojukwu had told him that Ejoor was fully
aware of the plan to seize the Midwest! (13)
On August 13, having decided that the situation was
too complicated, Ejoor slipped out of the capital, dressed in a
disguise, hitching a ride in a car until he got to the Sakpoba River.
From there he reportedly trekked to an Urhobo settlement where he
mounted a bicycle, which he says he rode for 80 miles to his mother’s
village at Ebor-Orogun. He remained in hiding until September 23, when
(with Benin and Warri safely back in federal hands), he emerged to
rendezvous with Lt. Col. Benjamin Adekunle at Warri, enroute to Lagos by
air. After stints as Director of Training and Planning at Supreme
Headquarters and Commandant, Nigerian Defence Academy, years later, as a
Major General, he eventually became the last person to hold the title
of ‘Chief of Staff, Army’. He was retired in July 1975, at which time
the title was changed to ‘Chief of Army Staff’ (13).
Banjo not only declared a free and independent
Midwest region, but also expressed lack of support for the concept of an
independent Biafra, infuriating Ojukwu in the process (9, 14, 19). On
August 11, Lt. Col. Nwawo appealed to all soldiers in the 4th
area command to “return to duty”. Conceivably, their role was to help
garrison the Midwest while the main group of Biafrans proceeded to
Lagos. At this point, Major Sam Ogbemudia, (who was subsequently
declared wanted and had a bounty placed on his head), explains in his
memoirs that he went underground to assist in organizing a resistance
movement (14). For those interested in parallels, this was akin to the
French or Polish Resistance against Nazi occupation in the forties.
Ogbemudia was trained in special warfare techniques at Fort Bragg in the
United States, and had also been Chief Instructor (support weapons
wing) at the Nigerian Military Training College in Kaduna. Under Major
Nzeogwu and Colonel Shodeinde, he taught classes in guerrilla warfare to
military trainees.
THE OCCUPATION (14)
With the announcement of Major Okonkwo’s appointment
as Military Administrator, Midwest, came the imposition of a dusk to
dawn curfew and other measures consistent with martial law. Only
individuals with passes could move freely at night. The administrative
machinery of the civil service was manipulated to empower those who
supported the invasion (or were trusted) rather than the traditional
seniority based hierarchy. Mr. Agbajor (an Itsekiri police officer who
had escaped from a northern hit squad at Makurdi in September 1966)
became Chief of Police. Mr. Esedebe (Midwest Ibo) functioned as Head of
Service.
Some military officers then persuaded a number of
traditional rulers in the Ibo-speaking areas of the state to sign
petitions calling for a merger with their “kith and kin” in the east.
Local Governments across the board were mandated to donate materials for
transportation to Enugu to assist in the War effort. Salt was rationed
because of its presumably more important use as a raw material for
explosives. Because of the cutoff of northern sources of cattle, meat
became scarce. Shortages of other essential commodities also developed.
As might be expected, not everyone was equally affected by the
shortages, creating yet another sore point (among many) for ethnic
resentment.
Outright molestation, harassment and killing
of non-Ibo civilians occurred on a daily basis. At night “suspected
saboteurs” were fished out of their homes and arrested. The Hausa
community in the Lagos street area of Benin and other parts of the state
were targeted for particularly savage treatment, in part a reprisal for
the pogroms of 1966, but also out of security concerns that they would
naturally harbor sympathies for the regime in Lagos. But non-Hausas were
just as badly treated. And as the hostility of the local population
became more intense, so did the degree of indiscrete brutality for
“internal security”. Non-Ibo alumni of St. Patrick’s College, Asaba and
Government College, Ughelli, found to their chagrin that old school ties
meant nothing in the new dispensation (17).
Radio broadcasts “educated” the public about the role
of ‘gallant’ Biafran troops who had only come to liberate them from the
“bondage of the feudal Hausa-Fulani oligarchy”. An economic cooperation
agreement was announced between the ‘independent’ states of Biafra and
the Midwest. The truth, though, was that Ojukwu retained authority to
approve all expenditures made by the Okonkwo regime and it was not until
September 13th that normal postal, telephone and telegraphic
services between Biafra and the Midwest were resumed (15).
Counter-propaganda was indeed launched by federal radio, which appealed
to the citizens of the state for loyalty and cooperation.
In this atmosphere, civil resistance and disobedience
germinated, predominantly among non-Ibos. But a few Midwest
Ibo-speaking soldiers and civilians did become leery about the invasion
and felt the ‘interference’ from “across the Niger” was getting out of
hand. On the other side of this opinion divide was the powerful,
so-called “Enugu clique”, eager to share in the destiny of the corporate
Ibo nation (14). Such ambiguous sensitivities and antipathies within
and between “western” and “eastern” Ibos have always existed. Long after
the civil war, for example, it even affected negotiations about the
creation of a proposed Anioma state (18).
The Resistance
According to an Army manual, “a resistance movement
is the organized element of a disaffected population, which resists a
government or occupying power with means varying from passive to
violently active. Resistance movements begin to form when
dissatisfaction occurs among strongly motivated individuals who cannot
further their cause by peaceful and legal means”. (20)
Not much has been written about the popular
resistance. In their memoirs, Ademoyega (9) and Ejoor (13) make passing
reference to it. Much of what we know comes from the written account of
Ogbemudia (14) corroborated by oral testimony. For some reason,
Alexander Madiebo (8) saw things differently from his position as
Commander of the Biafran Army in Enugu, even claiming in his narrative
that “Benin was taken early that morning without a single loss of life, amidst frantic jubilation by the entire local population.”
(Italics mine) One can only wonder about which population he was
referring, and the veracity of intelligence reports reaching the East
(19).
Many resistance groups may have operated in the
Midwest, but one in particular was organized and very effective. This
group was the one formed by Chief Michael A. Ojomo in Benin on August 18th.
According to Ogbemudia, “….In a short time, recruitment and training
started, and volunteers came in hundreds. Soon afterwards, an effective
system of hit and runs was in operation…..By 26th of August, we had assembled a reliable force of about 600 men and 180 women……” (14)
Supportive citizens, who were too old for action,
donated their single and double-barrel cartridge guns. Recruits
performed armed and armless combat, isolating and capturing Biafran
sentries. Night raiders spat salt into the eyes of soldiers, while
attractive girls distracted them with sex, obtained intelligence, and
even stole their weapons. In a manner reminiscent of the Vietcong in
Vietnam, corpses of freedom fighters were recovered at great peril for
burial, frustrating the Biafran units who had just engaged them in
firefights. In the Siluko area, 50 Biafran soldiers (about half of a
company) were drowned by a group of “Ijaw, Urhobo and Itsekiri swimmers”
who lost 16 men in the fight (14).
At the behest of the resistance, female cooks put all
kinds of things in the meals of the Biafran soldiers. Supported by
threatening letters written to harass the Biafran command, rumors spread
about the risk of poisoning by locals. It is speculated that even the
Administrator, Major Okonkwo, stayed away from food cooked by his
official cooks, particularly if they were non-Ibo.
But all did not go well indefinitely. Undercover
agents were infiltrated into the group and counter-insurgency raids on
villages became more frequent and ruthless. Nine of the girls were
killed, some in suspicious circumstances. Faced with threats of severe
reprisals, extreme caution among the local population became the
watchword.
However, by this time, they were encouraged by news
of the progress of the federal army. After reorienting the movement to
undertake psychological and deception missions in support of the theater
commander, Major Ogbemudia himself eventually disengaged from guerrilla
warfare activities to return to Army HQ in Lagos. From there, he joined
the hastily organized Second Infantry Division of the Nigerian Army
making its way to Benin City (14).
According to Ejoor (13), similar activities took
place in the Delta. Small groups of Biafran soldiers looking for local
Hausa communities in the riverine areas, were drowned by local Urhobo
swimmers in the treacherous currents of the Ethiope River.
[Oral folk tales claim that even native doctors
joined the resistance, using spells and 'juju' to cause unusual ailments
among Biafran troops such as massive testicles, clearly an impediment
to mobility!](17)
Endgame
Major Albert Nwazu Okonkwo’s title as Military
Administrator of the Midwest region was changed to ‘Governor’ of the
“autonomous, independent and sovereign republic of Benin” on Sept 19,
1967. This proved to be the shortest lived republic in history because
less than 24 hours later, at 6 p.m. on Sept 20, 1967 Benin City was
recaptured by troops of the second division, Nigerian Army (6, 21, 22).
At the head of these troops were Lt. Col. Sam Ogbemudia (in charge of
support weapons), Major Adeniran (CO, leading battalion) alongside Major
Ike Nwachukwu, under Lt. Col. Alani Akinrinade (CO, 6th brigade), under the overall command of Col. Murtala Mohammed (14). [Adeniran was no stranger to Benin, having served in the mutinous Ibadan based 4th
battalion. In the rumpus after July 29, 1966, a unit from that
battalion had raided the Benin prison and abducted some January 15 coup
detainees.]
The Benin operation was conducted in a giant pincer
movement with motorized infantry and infantry on foot. They were
supported by 81mm Mortar and 105mm medium artillery along with Ferret,
Fox and Saladin Scout Cars. The main assault group came down from the
north through Auchi and Ehor via Ikpoba Hill. This bottle-necked the
retreating Biafrans, eager to avoid being trapped against an onslaught
from the other group coming from the West through Ore, even as Col.
Adekunle’s feared 3rd division was simultaneously landing at Warri in the south (9, 14, 17).
The 2nd division advance toward Benin from
Ore in the west had been delayed by the destruction of the Oluwa bridge
by retreating elements of the Biafran 12th battalion. Thus,
the final assault on Benin was undertaken along three flanks that sprung
from Ehor, 56 kilometers north of the city. The right flank swung
around westwards through Uhiere to Oluku junction where the Owo-Benin
and Ore-Benin roads intersect. The central flank made a direct dash for
Benin along the main Auchi-Benin road. The left flank cut through
eastwards to Ugonoba (on the Benin-Agbor road) via Eguaholor. They were
programmed to then swing westwards to link up with the central flank at
Ikpoba Hill for the final push into Benin (14).
Anticipating the arrival of federal troops and the
possibility of street fighting, many civilians in the city had fled to
the villages (17). The 101st HQ had itself been withdrawn to Agbor two days before, on September 18th
just as Banjo was being recalled to Enugu ostensibly to assume the
position of Chief of Defence Staff (9). In reality, he and Ojukwu were
playing out the last phase of their many cat and mouse games. The
decision to move the Liberation Army HQ to Agbor, understandably made in
the light of a brutally honest assessment of the military situation,
became a major political controversy in Biafra (8, 15, 16, 19, 21).
Banjo (and Ademoyega) were later accused of “abandoning Benin”, yielding
40 miles of frontline to the enemy without a fight! On arrival in
Benin, federal troops found that the Treasury and Central Bank had been
looted of approximately $5.6 million allegedly by retreating Biafran
troops (14, 22). Other than mop-up operations in small pockets (such as
the fierce gun-battle at the Benin Prison) there was no major fighting
in Benin once federal troops arrived.
Elements of the Third Marine Division assisted the
Second Division in clearing the Delta region from a springboard
stretching from South point (Forcados), through Escravos to North point.
In an enveloping move designed to cutoff escape and reinforcement
routes from Benin to Sapele to Amukpe to Agbor to Asaba, Adekunle (in
coordination with Mohammed) took the two bridges along the Benin-Sapele
road over the Ethiope River. While this did not prevent escape of
stragglers through Sakpoba via Urhonigbe to Agbor, it isolated the
Biafran 18th battalion from its divisional headquarters in
Benin which had only just been hurriedly moved eastwards to Agbor.
Warri, Sapele and Ughelli fell easily.
Those Biafran troops who found themselves cut off,
simply abandoned their uniforms and weapons and merged imperceptibly
into the rural civilian population, waiting for a chance to escape
eastwards.
From a tactical perspective, based not only on
terrain, but also the lack of sophistication of the hurriedly trained
fighting troops, both sides relied heavily on basic infantry “fire and
movement” methods along main roads rather than jungle paths for their
advance. At other times, though, the 2nd division employed
“Hook” tactics in dense forest maneuvers (14). Indeed, the Biafran Chief
of Staff wandered into the cross hairs of one such ambush, barely
escaping alive (9). Artillery and Mortar support was liberal, using
“predicted shoot” techniques. As was the trademark of other Nigerian
divisions, fire-discipline was not a priority. Ammunition was expended
in great quantities (6).
Having sprung from Auchi, the attack along three axes
out of Ehor used by Mohammed to retake Benin in 1967 was reminiscent of
that taken by British Admiral Rawson in 1897. At that time, however,
the “punitive” force sprung from Forcados and sailed up the Benin River
to Ugharegin (Ogharegi), near Sapele. The assault on Benin was then
conducted from the south along three converging axes. The main assault
was via Ologbo creek (from Ologbo), with subsidiary assaults via the
Jamieson river (from Sakpoba), and Ughoton creek (from Gele Gele) (3).
WHY DID OJUKWU STRIKE?
Coming to a conclusion about why Ojukwu struck
depends in part on whether the Midwest was an end in itself, or merely a
geographic and political corridor through which the West and Lagos
could be conquered.
In Ojukwu’s words, “Our motive was not territorial
ambition or the desire of conquest. We went into the Midwest (later
declared the Republic of Benin) purely in an effort to seize the serpent
by the head; every other activity in that Republic was subordinated to
that single aim. We were going to Lagos to seize the villain Gowon, and
we took necessary military precautions.” (15) In a speech monitored over
Radio Biafra, Ojukwu also stated: “Now that we are on the offensive, we
shall not relent until every single enemy soldier on Biafran soil is
destroyed, more territories of Nigeria liberated, and the enemy
vanquished.”
There are undoubtedly some historians (10) who see
similarities between Ojukwu’s invasion of the Midwest and Hitler’s March
1938 march into Austria (the Anchsluss) following which he secured the
annexation of Sudetenland in September (23). I think we can infer
additional reasons, based on the operational and political details of
the campaign, seen in light of the Nigerian situation at that time.
Within the early weeks of the ground war, Nsukka,
Ogoja and Bonny were overrun by federal troops. Using boats expropriated
from Shell-BP and U.A.C, and supported by the Nigerian Navy, the
successful assault on Bonny (by Col. Benjamin Adekunle) gave the 3rd
Marine Commando Division control of the river channel leading to Port
Harcourt. This undermined Biafran control of the oilfields. Negotiations
with oil companies (essential for foreign exchange) obviously became
complicated. These moves were the earliest steps taken to create a
military vise around Biafra. On a macro level, therefore, the invasion
of oil-rich Midwest could be seen as a strategic attempt to break out of
the jaws of encirclement and relieve pressure (6, 8,12).
Second, there was a perception in the Biafran
leadership that, given the chance, the Midwest and West would unite with
the East to fight the North (12, 19). On May 1st, during a
trip to the East, Chief Obafemi Awolowo had stated that “If the Eastern
Region is allowed by acts of omission or commission to secede from or
opt out of Nigeria, then the Western region and Lagos must also stay out
of the Federation”. Senior Yoruba officers (Colonel Olutoye, Lt. Cols.
Obasanjo, Sotomi, Akinrinade and Major Ariyo) supported Awo’s demand
that “northern” troops leave their region (10). They wanted westerners
recruited immediately to create an all-Yoruba force, making the West
less vulnerable to the ‘Northern region’, which at that time was
believed to be actively recruiting soldiers in the North. (The West was
the only region that had troops on its soil that were not exclusively
from that region). Gowon eventually ordered “northern” troops in Ibadan
to withdraw to Ilorin, but rescinded this order on May 27 when he
declared a State of Emergency (12).
Thirdly, Ojukwu wanted to render Gowon’s ‘irritating’
May 27 creation of Rivers and SouthEastern (Cross-River) states moot by
seizing Lagos and sacking the federal government. At the very least,
this would force all parties to the negotiating table with a new set of
“facts on the ground”.
Lastly, Ojukwu felt he could take the Midwest at
minimum cost, for two reasons. In the first place, sympathetic officers
dominated the Midwest Area Command (13, 14). Major Patrick Chukwuma
Kaduna Nzeogwu (himself a Midwest Ibo) had died in furtive circumstances
reportedly leading a counter-attack against Sule Apollo’s boys on July
29 (11 days earlier) in the Nsukka sector (24). What more proof did his
kinsmen in the 4th Area Command need that they were soul
mates of the Biafran cause? And secondly, with the redeployment of
federal troops away from Okene, thus exposing the northern flank, the
timing looked perfect (13).
WHAT WENT WRONG?
The decision to invade the Midwest was a risky
military gamble that left approximately 7,000 Biafran troops (at that
time) stretched over 39,000 square miles (22).
Against this backdrop of logistic overstretch, there
was disagreement among key Biafran Commanders about the pace and
objectives of the invasion (8, 9, 19, 21). These disagreements became
the substrate for inquisitions into alleged sabotage, further
undermining Biafran command cohesion (19). Apparently, (according to
Odogwu) Banjo and Ojukwu had a gentleman’s agreement to split the spoils
of the invasion in a way that would leave Biafra intact as a nation
under Ojukwu while Banjo took over the rest of Nigeria. But in the first
three days of the assault, its element of surprise and advantage of
speed were completely lost as Banjo sat in Benin arguing with Ojukwu
over the appointment of a military governor, while trying to raise an
additional battalion from scratch. Meanwhile, Gowon initiated recall of
two battalions from Bonny to Escravos (25). Trains and trailers began
bringing additional troops from Kaduna. Units were withdrawn from Nsukka
sector. New recruits were hurriedly trained. From Lagos, every
roadworthy vehicle that could be commandeered was grabbed to move troops
and material to a “Maginot-Line” stretching from Okitipupa to Ore,
through Ondo to Owo and on to Okene. A previously positioned company of
men from the federal guard led by Lt. Sam Tomoye initially held the
ground at Ore until relieved by additional troops from Ibadan led by
Captain Geoffrey Ejiga (10). On August 18, Kano airport was suddenly
closed to civilian traffic as a massive air shipment of Russian MIGS
arrived along with personnel (15).
It cannot be overemphasized that one of the murkiest
areas of the history of the Midwest invasion relates to the political
activities of key Biafran commanders, once they reached Benin City.
There are reports of secret contacts with the British Deputy High
Commissioner in Benin (Mr. Bell) to arrange a cease-fire and peace talks
between Nigeria and Biafra (15, 19). Simultaneously, attempts were made
to recruit a number of non-Ibo officers in a grand scheme to undercut
both Ojukwu and Gowon (13, 14). Col. Victor Banjo apparently disobeyed
orders to proceed further West with haste (to Ibadan and Lagos) from
Ore. Not until August 20 (11 days after entering Benin) did the threat
of the advance to Lagos fully mature with the Biafran capture of Ore,
followed quickly by Okitipupa, Atotogbo, Irele, Ute and Sobe (10, 15).
In part because federal troops blew up the Shasha Bridge on mile 82 of
the Ore road, but mainly because of yet another failure to press the
advantage, the western operation ground to a halt. Subsequently, the
prospect of being outnumbered and cut off by better-armed and
numerically superior troops now said by reconnaissance to be mobilized
and based at Ondo, made Lt. Col. Akagha very reluctant to continue his
advance (9).
It is said that Banjo was in touch with Yoruba
leaders who were initially supportive. Police officers in Ibadan were
apparently told to expect Biafran troops and instructed not to resist
(17). Eventually though, as events unfolded, other Yoruba leaders
expressed serious concern about his entry into Ibadan (through Ife road)
with a horde of Biafran (Ibo) troops under his command. In his book “My
Command”, General Olusegun Obasanjo (who was at that time the rear
commander based in Ibadan), said of one of Banjo’s contacts: “The
man, who is also a renowned social critic, turned out promptly at the
appointed place and time. I invited him to my car and for almost two
hours we drove round Ibadan and discussed Banjo’s request for me to
grant him unhindered access to Ibadan and Lagos at any price. Both the
request and the price were turned down.” (25)
{One can only wonder why it took two hours of talks
with the ‘social critic’ to reach this conclusion. Obasanjo later became
a divisional commander and subsequently emerged as Nigeria’s Head of
State in 1976. After handing over to Shehu Shagari in 1979 he went into
farming and became a social critic himself. General Abubakar recently
released him from a three-year stint in one of General Abacha’s jails.
Wole Soyinka, on the other hand, served jail-time for his efforts (26).
Many years later he became a Nobel Laureate. He is currently in exile,
having been declared wanted by the late General Abacha. Abubakar (who
took over from General Abacha) has appealed to him to return home.}
Although conceivable that Ojukwu may have viewed
these interactions as having sensitized his “yoruba conscience”, the
reality was that Banjo knew that his “liberation army” was a marginal
outfit. It was unprepared to deal with any serious resistance in either
Lagos or Ibadan, both of which had since recovered from the initial
shock of his march into the Midwest. Only a negotiated entry (with
popular support) seemed reasonable at that point and some form of
reconciliation was still at the back of his mind. Indeed, at his trial
in Enugu, Banjo stated: “In my opinion, the minimum condition for the
continued successful prosecution of the war has ceased to exist…It is my
view that, while we held the control of the Midwest we had a good
political bargaining power within the context of Nigeria.” (19)
Banjo may also have been simultaneously concerned
about an ambush in the rear, given the hostility of the local
population. Indeed, his frantic attempts to arrest Ogbemudia and locate
Ejoor support this view. Meetings were held with the Oba of Benin as
unspeakable incidents became more frequent between the restive
population and the Biafran soldiers who had become viewed as an army of
occupation. Banjo even ordered troops to remove their Biafran badges to
reduce tension (9). When rumors began to circulate that the Oba of Benin
had himself been arrested and taken back to Biafra, the Oba had to
appear publicly to calm nerves (17). With arguments among his commanders
and so much on his mind, (including ongoing power struggles and policy
debates back in Biafra) Banjo hesitated at Ore, which later became the
scene of a very bloody battle on August 29. Some historians now regard
the last Ore battle as the turning point of the civil war (6). Federal
troops (using old colonial survey maps of the bush-paths and hills,
which were not available to the Biafrans) pummeled the Biafran spearhead
between Ohosu (Ofusu) and Ore (17).
In addition, there were serious command, control and
logistic problems and errors. The so-called “Liberation Army of Nigeria”
was a poorly armed, poorly led and barely trained ragtag outfit (9).
Although (theoretically) there were as many as 28 fully trained Midwest
Ibo officers available to assist Biafran officers in commanding the
force, very few of these officers actually offered themselves once the
Biafrans were in the Midwest. Once the federal counter-offensive began,
the turnover of officers increased substantially. Lt. Col. Ivenso asked
for a sick leave away from the northern front. “Lt. Col”. Henry Igboba
took over but soon simply lost the will to fight. He cited the federal
advantage in numbers, weapons, and ‘white mercenaries’, in addition to
his own frustration with Biafran troops. Relieved of command, he was
detained by Banjo in the Benin prison. [One account says he was later
beheaded by federal troops. Another says he was actually executed by
Banjo before federal troops arrived.] An ambivalent Major David Odiwo
replaced Igboba, only to cross over to the federal side a few days
later. Thus, ‘Lt. Col.’ Chukwuka was re-deployed from Warri to command
the Irrua front, supported by Captain Adeleke who showed up from Enugu.
An inexperienced ‘Major’ Nsudoh replaced Chukwuka in the southern front.
(Nsudoh later redeemed himself during the first battle of Onitsha)
In the western (Ore) front, Lt. Col. Akagha, Commander of the “combat ready” 12th
battalion incredulously “got lost” in dense forest reserves for two
weeks. He later showed up in Benin seeking a posting for rest and
recuperation back in Biafra, far from the debacle of the Midwest! Of the
soldiers in the 11th and 19th battalions, former
Major (“Lt. Col.”) Ademoyega wrote: “…at the slightest prompting, they
would desert the front, skip the battalion headquarters and make their
way straight to Benin, to sleep in one of the school dormitories or
terrorize civilians in town.” (9)
Moreover, the 101st Division had no support weapons whatsoever. The 11th battalion at Auchi had three (3) machine guns along with rifles. The 18th battalion in Warri had two (2) machine guns along with rifles. Only 14% of men in the 19th battalion in Benin had weapons. Even the vaunted 12th
battalion that had been slated to take Lagos had no mortars, until a
single 3 inch mortar was sent from Enugu at the end of the second week
of the invasion. [Shortly before Murtala Mohammed took Auchi, Ojukwu
[who was still entertaining grandiose delusions about a counter-attack
on Ilorin, made an additional 81mm mortar tube available to Ademoyega.
Ifeajuna sent 'Molotov cocktails' (petrol bombs) when Irrua became
threatened (9). It may well be these petrol bombs that caused a
"poisonous gas" scare among federal troops at Eyaen (14).]
The invasion of the Midwest represented one of the
first appearances in the War of Biafran-made Armored Cars (“Red Devil”)
converted in Port-Harcourt from a hybrid of caterpillar parts on a
pre-World War II era armored vehicle chassis. When Banjo ordered these
heavy armored units up to the front to provide armor support, they
proved too wide and heavy for the narrow bridge over the Ikpoba river in
Benin City. An attempt was then made to bring up the armor through
Sakpoba road, up from Urhonigbe. All of this caused an inordinate waste
of crucial time (17). (As a historical similitude, many of Hitler’s
tanks broke down when the Wehrmacht marched into Vienna (23)). For many years after the war, a relic of a Biafran Armored Car could still be seen near the old Ikpoba Bridge.
In a pattern of behavior that can only be described
as self-destructive, the “liberation” force went molesting, raping,
kidnapping, torturing, detaining and even killing local figures whose
support they badly needed (14, 17). For example, Mr. J. O Adeola
(Commissioner of Police), Mr. Olu Akpata (Permanent Secretary), Mr. Sam
Umweni (of Radio Nigeria, Benin) and Mr. J Imoukhuede (Head of the civil
service), were abducted from Benin and taken back to Biafra. They
remained in prison (without trial) until the end of the war (17). In his
memoirs, Ademoyega acknowledges: “The 18th battalion
stationed in that port (Warri) was a ragged, ill-equipped and
ill-controlled unit. Reports of their lawlessness in town had been
scandalous.” Such actions (among others) did not endear them to the
people they came to liberate from “the north”. Ademoyega summarized it
thus: “Biafran entry into the Midwest was seen by the people, especially
the non-Ibos of the State, as an act of foreign aggression.” (9)
The decision to occupy and then terrorize a proud and ancient cultural region should not have been made so lightly (18).
WHAT WERE THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE MIDWEST INVASION?
First, it antagonized non-Ibo ethnic groups in the
Midwest who became extremely hostile to Midwest Ibos (as well as some
non-Ibo NCNC supporters who may have been privy to the invasion). They
were regarded [at that time] as fifth columnists. This hostility lasted
for many years, possibly well beyond the end of the civil war, mitigated
only by responsible leadership exercised by the Military Governor (14).
Thus, previously lukewarm non-Ibo groups were galvanized against the
entire concept of Biafra, fearing Ibo domination, and rushed to get
recruited on the federal side, offering help and assistance (10, 12).
Second, Awolowo and other Yoruba leaders (e.g.
Colonel Robert Adeyinka Adebayo) became intensely suspicious of Ojukwu’s
agenda (27). Some of these leaders had actually visited the East as
part of peace delegations on Mar 27 and May 5. [He (Ojukwu) had not
coordinated this Midwest move with them. Obviously this was probably
what prompted Ojukwu to make Col. Banjo the Commander, but it did not
work out as planned, which is why Ojukwu had Banjo shot later on]. Up
until that time, although Awo had been released by Gowon (from his 1962
treasonable felony conviction), and was the deputy head of the Federal
Executive Council (effective June 12, 1967), the West was sitting on the
fence. They had lost politicians and officers in BOTH the Jan 1966 and
July 1966 coups (Samuel Akintola, Brigadier Ademulegun, Col. Shodeinde,
Major Adegoke, Col. Fajuyi etc). Some, like Major Adeniran, had barely
escaped being killed on Jan 15 1966 by Captain Nwobosi’s storm troopers
in Ibadan (17). (Conceivably, his ‘crime’ was that he hailed from
Ogbomosho – the same town as Akintola).
In terms of factions, the Lagos group (Ogunsanya and
others) were opposed to the “Oduduwa Republic” secessionist leanings of
radical intellectual inland Yorubas; bad blood between pro-Akintola and
pro-Awo groups remained; and the civilian and military wings of Yoruba
leadership were not particularly well coordinated. According to Major
General Oluleye (rtd), many Yoruba officers “refused” to return to the
West to create an all-Yoruba force (28). There were even Yoruba officers
in Biafra, caught on the wrong side because they had been detained in
Eastern prisons by the Ironsi regime. However, on August 12, 1967,
(three days after the Asaba crossing), Awolowo publicly appealed to
Yorubas to support the federal government against the Ibos (12). It was a
fateful decision, one (among others) that would haunt him many years
later during the 1979 and 1983 presidential elections.
As previously noted, advance elements of the Biafran
invasion force actually reached Ore, 140 miles from Lagos. It is no
coincidence that Obafemi Awolowo (Finance) and Anthony Enahoro
[Information], along with the super-permanent secretaries and other
civil servants, many of whom were southern minorities, became the main
civilian bulwarks of the War Cabinet – the back office. Indeed a Midwest
solidarity committee was formed in Lagos under the chairmanship of
Chief J. M. Udochi with Chief A. Y. Eke as the secretary.
Thirdly, on August 11, Gowon announced the end of
“Police Action” and declared ‘Total War’ against Biafra (6, 12). The
second division of the Nigerian Army was formally created (with the
symbol of a ‘Snarling Tiger’) under Col. Murtala Mohammed. They were
charged to check the secessionist advance at Ore, drive them out the
Midwest, and follow them in hot pursuit. The division was organized
initially into three brigades, the 6th, 7th and 8th, under Lt. Cols. Alani Akinrinade, Godwin Ally and Francis Aisida, respectively (10).
Lastly, the invasion had international ramifications
(6). British support for Gowon became unambiguous (8, 10). While this
was in part due to the loss of the moral high ground by the Biafran
leadership, practical “Cold War” concerns no doubt played a role. The
enthusiasm of the Soviet Union (and its allies) to provide weapons and
personnel to the federal government, was viewed as a potential
forerunner to political influence in a former British colony, the
largest black nation on earth and an emerging Oil power.
WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THE RECAPTURE OF BENIN CITY?
THE LOCAL SCENE
In addition to the scourge and humiliation of the
occupation itself, fleeing Biafran soldiers carried out all kinds of
unspeakable acts of brutality against the local population (17, 18). At
the Urhonigbe Rubber Plantation, for example, hundreds of Midwesterners
were summarily shot by regular and militia units which had already
blazed a ‘scorched-earth’ trail of terror through Benin-West division
(14).
Unfortunately, therefore, temptation to seek revenge
against Ibos was very strong shortly after federal troops arrived.
Further, mischievous elements used the situation to settle scores
against old enemies simply by reporting them to federal troops for
“harboring Ibos”. An uncle of mine, for example, was saved from
execution at Ugonoba by the quick intervention of Colonel Murtala
Mohammed himself (17). A few criminals even changed property deeds for
housing, domestic plots, and plots on Rubber plantations. The
presumption was that the Ibo owners would not return.
Many Midwestern Ibos who had behaved in a very
high-handed manner while the Okonkwo regime was in power, anticipated
vengeance and fled along with Biafrans before the arrival of federal
troops. But others who had nothing to do with the Biafran invasion
remained behind only to find themselves being identified for
“interrogation”. As usual in such situations, small businesses were
ransacked if they were known to belong to Ibo traders. Children of mixed
ethnic marriages had to be sheltered as their desperate mothers
frantically foreswore any relationship with Ibo men. Many changed their
names and fled to the villages (17).
Because it was known that some Biafran soldiers had
been cut-off from retreat, any suspicious looking physically fit
character in underwear or disheveled civilian clothes was pointed out to
federal troops for summary judgement. At roadblocks, grim-looking
soldiers would frequently ask passing vehicles whether they were
carrying any Ibos. As Umeorah put it, “Hundreds of Ibo bodies, many
stripped and shot full of holes, were scooped into dump trucks and
carted off to common graves or to the nearby Benin river, others were
left to rot in the blistering sun.” (22)
FEDERAL SIDE:
Colonel Murtala Mohammed became “larger than life”.
Some modern day authors even refer to him as “Monty of the Midwest”
after Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery of Britain. Time magazine hailed
him as the Commander of the ‘brutally efficient’ second division of the
Nigerian Army.
On September 21, Col. Mohammed appointed Lt. Col. S.
O. Ogbemudia temporary administrator of the Midwestern State (14). Gowon
later ratified this after overruling a determined counter-lobby in
Lagos, including not just Col. Ejoor (who wanted his old job back), but
also some Edo individuals within the federal civil service and army
(17). [Brigadier Ogbemudia was retired as Military Governor in July
1975, served as civilian Governor of Bendel from Oct-Dec1983 and Federal
Minister for Labor & Productivity under General Abacha in the
nineties]
With 3rd division firmly in Warri, and the 2nd
division closing in from the north and west, a hasty tactical
withdrawal by much of the virtually leaderless “Liberation Army” from
the Midwest became inevitable (9). Bridges were blown up at every
opportunity. To linkup with the 2nd division, the 3rd division advanced
in two flanks from Warri. One went through Abraka to Umutu. The other
went through Ughelli and Kwale. Finally, the second division entered
Asaba on October 8 having taken Umunede and Isele-Uku before pushing to
Ogwashi-Uku and Otutu (8, 21). As a footnote, one prominent officer
in the recapture of Warri was Capt (later ‘Major’) Shehu Musa YarAdua,
who eventually became Nigeria’s military Vice-President [Chief of Staff,
Supreme Headquarters] in February 1976. He fell ill at Abakaliki
prison, [one of General Abacha's gulags] last December and died in an
Enugu hospital as a retired Major General. He has since received
posthumous pardon for knowledge of the alleged Gwadabe coup, an offence
he never committed.
Upon arrival of the main spearhead of the Second division at Asaba, two momentous events occurred.
- The Asaba Massacre: Although not the only example of savagery on both sides during the war, Federal authorities have never acknowledged this terrible event. It was a blatant violation of Gowon’s “Military Code of Conduct”. Hundreds of able-bodied males were allegedly lined up and summarily executed, Nazi style, for “collaborating with the enemy” (17). At least one authority opines that the delay occasioned by this exercise resulted in a missed opportunity by Mohammed to take Onitsha from the disorganized and retreating Biafran forces without a fight. (8)
- Three subsequent disastrous attempts to cross the Niger into the Ibo heartland. Against instructions from Supreme Headquarters, Murtala Mohammed (taking a cue from General George Patton’s behavior during the allied invasion of Italy, and encouraged by his initial success in evicting the Biafran force from the Midwest) tried repeatedly to take Onitsha from Asaba all by himself (6). He lost thousands of men and millions of dollars of material in the process. The bridge had been blown up at one end. Organized by Conrad Nwawo, and stiffened by the resolve of officers like Achuzia and Nsudoh, desperate well dug-in defenders using Biafran made rockets, “Shore-Batteries” and “Ogbunigwe” repulsed badly planned beach landings. During the first assault, federal troops actually occupied Onitsha briefly before being distracted by loot taken from the market, which they had set on fire (8, 19, 21, 25). According to an oral source, Major Ejiga (who later retired as a Major General) lost his entire battalion and swam back (alone) to the Asaba side on a raft. [A young and promising officer, 'Major' Igbinosa lost his life during another assault.] As far as the Biafran garrison was concerned, this was not going to be a replay of the US First Army’s capture of “the bridge at Remagen” in March 1945 (23).
Eventually, Mohammed acceded to orders to swing
northwards, make an unopposed crossing at Idah, and take Onitsha via a
north-south coastal advance, with Col. Shuwa’s 1st division protecting his eastern flank. Even then, he suffered one more humiliating loss at Abagana on March 31st
1968, when fleet-footed Biafran troops [under 'Major' Uchendu] ambushed
a 96 vehicle- column, carrying some troops but mostly material,
practically destroying the logistic backbone of the entire division (8).
The whole Onitsha operation was clearly a nightmare. “Monty of the
Midwest” began to look more like General Georges, the commander of the
Vichy French forces at Sedan in 1940 (23).
Gowon replaced Mohammed with Colonel Ibrahim Haruna
who was later replaced on May 12, 1969 by Col. Gibson Jallo when all
divisional commanders were recalled (6). [These officers eventually
retired as Major-General Haruna and Lt. General Jallo in the late
seventies and early eighties, respectively]. Brigadier (later General)
Murtala Mohammed became Head of State in July 1975 when a cabal of civil
war frontline officers, aided by the Commander of the Federal Guard,
staged a successful palace coup against General Gowon (12). After 200
days of sometimes-impulsive rule he was killed on February 13, 1976 when
his unguarded official car was riddled with bullets in front of the
federal secretariat in Ikoyi. Minutes later, Lt. Col. Bukar S. Dimka
went on radio to announce his doomed putsch (7). [The International
Airport in Lagos is named in Mohammed's memory. This is the same airport
he commandeered in July1966 to fly "northern" families back to the
north at the onset of the counter-coup, in a move to secede from the
south - "Operation Araba"].
BIAFRAN SIDE:
In the wake of the “abandonment of Benin” and the
disastrous Midwest expedition, a furious (and embarrassed) Ojukwu
ordered the court-martial and subsequent execution (on September 25th)
of Lt. Col. (“Brigadier”) Banjo, Major (“Lt. Col.”) Emmanuel Ifeajuna,
‘Major’ Sam Agbamuche (Agbam) and ‘Major’ Phillip Alale. They were found
guilty of “treason”. Ojukwu’s rationalization was that they had planned
a September 19 coup against him (operation “Kinshasha Special”) and
sabotaged the entire Western operation (8, 15, 19). There are others who
feel that they (and others) were made scapegoats for the failures of
the leadership (17). The complexity of events on one hand and the very
high expectations of Ibo people on the other, which were looking elusive
as time wore on, placed a huge burden on the relatively young Ojukwu.
Ojukwu himself deserted Enugu, the first capital of Biafra, on October 2nd when the military situation became untenable (8, 19). It fell to troops under Lt. Col. T.Y. Danjuma of the 1st division on October 4th 1967. Ojukwu (along with his Army Commander) ultimately abandoned Biafra “in search of peace” on Jan 9th
1970 when its military predicament became irremediable (15, 22, 29,
30). He was eventually granted amnesty in May 1982 by President Shehu
Shagari and is now a politician and businessman.
POSTSCRIPT:
On Jan 15, 1970, seated among the delegation that
accompanied Lt. Col. (‘Major General’) Phillip Effiong to Dodan Barracks
for the Biafran surrender, was ‘Brigadier’ Conrad Nwawo, the last Area
Commander of the Midwest on August 9,1967 (12). After the surrender
ceremony, General Gowon ordered the name “Biafra” expunged from the
Nigerian dictionary and established a Board of Inquiry to evaluate the
operational role of specific officers in the coup of Jan 15, 1966 and
the Midwest invasion of 1967. Officers who were displaced by the July
29, 1966 disturbances and thus found themselves in the Midwest during
the invasion, but who did not play operational roles either in
the Jan 15 coup and/ or the “Liberation Army of Nigeria” were either
retired or reabsorbed. Those who did were detained until October 24th 1974, when they were released following an Independence Day amnesty (12). They included:
- Colonel Conrad D. Nwawo
- Lt. Col. S. B. Nwajei
- Major Albert Okonkwo
- Major A. Asoya
- Major Adewale Ademoyega
- Captain Ben Gbulie
- Captain E. M. Udeaja
- Captian G.N. Okonkwo
- Captain J. N. Isichie
- Lt. F.M. Okocha
- Lt. F.O. Amuchienwa
- Lt. B. A. O Oyewole
- Lt. N.S. Nwokocha
- Lt. G.B. Ikejiofor
- Lt. G.G. Onyefuru
- Lt. A.R.O Egbikor
- Lt. A.N. Azubuogu
- 2/Lt. C.G. Ngwuluka
- Lt. J.C. Ojukwu
- Lt. J.O. Ijeweze
Many of these individuals are still alive. All were
dismissed except Ojukwu and Ijeweze who were retired. Lt. Col. Ochei,
who had attacked the Government House in Benin on August 9, 1967 and
Captain Ganiyu Adeleke, who had taken part in both the January 15 coup
and the Midwest invasion before becoming an instructor in the Biafran
School of Infantry were released at a later date (9).
CAN ALL THIS HAPPEN AGAIN?
We are who we were and history tends to repeat
itself. Time will tell whether we learnt any lessons. However, deciding
what constitutes a lesson depends on the perspective. There were several
players in the Midwest experience, each of whom can take away his (or
her) own piece from the puzzle. What is clear is that regionalization of
the Nigerian Army (as was done in 1966) without safeguards, is an
invitation to war. And war is hell.
Liddell Hart once wrote: “If you allow anyone to
stoke up a boiler until the steam pressure rises beyond danger point,
the real responsibility for any resultant explosion will lie with you”.
When I read the history of the Nigerian crisis in light of current
events in Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Congo, among others, I tremble at
the realization that any human being can behave like an animal if
provoked enough. Our challenge, fellow countrymen and women is to
co-exist peacefully so that our country can move on to take its place
among the great nations of the world (31).
APPENDIX
SHORT AND LONG TERM EFFECTS OF THE INVASION
Putting “Humpty-Dumpty” back together again
In the wake of the invasion, real social, economic
and political problems intersected with psychological bitterness and a
sense of betrayal in the Midwest (14). Families had been disrupted, many
citizens bereaved and ethnic mistrust and suspicions aroused. Roads,
buildings and bridges were destroyed, all against a background of
insecurity of jobs, life and property. The war was still in progress and
soldiers milled all over the place sometimes commandeering houses “for
military purposes” (17, 18).
With tensions running high for retribution, a ‘Rebel
Atrocities Tribunal of Inquiry’ was established on October 26, 1967.
Justice Omo-Eboh chaired it. Although unpopular with certain officials,
this turned out to be a helpful tactical measure to reduce tension among
those who felt wronged while preventing jungle justice from getting out
of hand. The tribunal met from December 4, 1967 until September 28,
1968, by which time public temperament had softened considerably. In a
move that was designed to avoid recriminations, a decision was then made
by the government not to publish the report of the tribunal (14).
Simultaneously, a committee of senior bureaucrats
worked on measures to reintegrate Midwestern Ibos into State life,
assist the economic recovery of those who had lost property, and attain
reconciliation. The scale was enormous. In Benin City alone, 213 houses
had been abandoned by fleeing Ibos. Many were looted of their contents.
The government, before wars end repaired many damaged and abandoned
houses; rent collected from tenants in rental property was kept in trust
for the Ibo landlords in a Bank in Warri (14). Similar acts of
forthrightness and honesty occurred in other parts of the state (17,
18). It is fair to say that the problem of “abandoned property”
experienced in Port Harcourt by Ibos was not a major issue in the
Midwest.
Midwestern Ibo civil servants who had been displaced
by the crisis of 1966 and returned to the state from other parts of the
nation were absorbed into the civil service. Loans were given to
self-employed individuals to enable them build back their businesses.
Civil servants (and others) donated a percentage of their income to a
State Rehabilitation Fund. These activities were in line with General
Gowon’s policy of Reconciliation, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction
after the war (14).
From 1968 to 1975, the state enjoyed massive physical
growth and development on multiple fronts, thanks to the inclusive and
visionary leadership of that era.
Many years after the war, in what certainly
qualifies as a triumph of the human spirit, one of the very young
non-Ibos who had been abducted and conscripted into the Biafran Army in
1967 suddenly showed up in his family home in Benin. It had been assumed
that he had died during the conflict. But he had actually fled with his
unit in its hasty flight back to Biafra, only to be identified as an
Edo by an Ibo man who had fond memories of his stay in Benin City before
the crisis. Concerned about the child’s safety, this kind Ibo man took
him into his protection, helping him go AWOL from his army unit. In the
social chaos after the Biafran surrender, the young lad stayed behind in
the East, doing odd jobs, until sighted years later by another Edo man
to whom he revealed his heritage. That is how he began his journey back
home to a grateful mother. The individual in question is now a
physician. (17)
Effect On Army Recruitment
The experience of the Midwest Invasion affected Army
recruitment. Before the war, the army was viewed as an unattractive
career meant for dropouts. In his book, Major General Joe Garba (rtd)
paid tribute to “the Northern soldier” as the principal reason why
Biafra lost the war. While one must give credit to northern minority
groups, along with citizens of Chad and Niger republic, it is not widely
appreciated that during the War a huge number of non-Ibo Midwesterners
joined the Army (17, 32). This phenomenon led to a disproportionate
representation of Bendel (Midwest) State during the seventies and early
eighties. [One middle-belt Army Officer told me in 1983 that the
barracks were 'crawling' with Bendelites. I have no way of confirming or
refuting this comment. There have been waves of military retirements
since then, the impact of, which is unclear].
After the war, the experience led to civilian clamor
for a new policy to admit an equitable number (to the extent possible)
of officers from each state of the federation. This was modified later
on to reflect each local government of each state particularly for those
states (like Bendel) with multiple ethnic groups. When in 1979, with
demobilization well on its way to completion, recruitment of other ranks
and men began in earnest again, a similar policy was applied at that
level, with a stipulation for minimum education. That intake group was
called 79NA (7, 17, 18).
But even this approach has its controversies. If
local governments are created unfairly, without due regard for
population, injustice can be perpetrated, setting the stage for
conflicts in the future. In the Edo South Senatorial zone of Edo State,
for example, 56% of the population of the state has been allocated one
third of the local governments and a similar proportion of seats in the
federal legislature! Within the Etsako Central local government, 5 of 8
wards were allocated (along with the headquarters) to the minority
Anwianwu clan, marginalizing the majority Ekperi clan (17, 18).
This polemic is an echo from the past that makes the
number and distribution of states, local governments and wards in the
country a sensitive political issue not only as it affects revenue
allocation and distribution of amenities, but also the military balance.
In a bizarre way, it is as if the contending political forces in
Nigeria’s polity desire “mutually assured destruction” as the basis for
respect at the bargaining table.
At a national level, some people feel that all went
well with an equal number of “southern” and “northern” states (under
Gowon) until the Obasanjo/ Mohammed regime approved an imbalance with
more states in the north than the south, an imbalance which Generals
Babangida and General Abacha sustained. One mechanism through which Ibo
leaders perceive that they have been ‘marginalized’ in Army recruitments
since the civil war has to do with the relatively small number of
states allocated exclusively to that ethnic group (considering its
population) as compared with, for example, the Yorubas or Southern
minorities (7). Hence the calls for a shift to a zonal or regional
system.
But it has become apparent that merely regulating
entry quotas is not enough. The ethnic and regional distribution across
the ‘teeth’ and ‘service’ arms is crucial. The rise of officers and men
through the service also needs to be monitored to prevent
disproportionate attrition through selective dismissals and retirements.
Selective attrition can result in lopsided ethnic and regional control
of key organs of state.
A Federal Character Commission now exists to monitor these issues. Unfortunately, it has no enforcement powers.
Subsequent Evolution of Military (and related) Facilities in the Midwest
Preamble:
In the period since the war of unification, the
number of states in the country has grown from 12 to 36. Not counting
the coup by an incumbent (Babangida) against an incoming administration
(Abiola), there have been four successful and two unsuccessful coups.
There have been three publicly alleged ‘coups in planning’. [All of
these convulsions have resulted in deaths, jail sentences, dismissals
and retirements.] By military decree, the federal capital has been moved
from Lagos, on the Atlantic coast, to Abuja, technically in the
geographic center, which happens to fall within the old “northern”
region. Midwestern Region, which evolved into Midwestern State, was
subsequently renamed Bendel State. On August 27, 1991, after 28 years,
Bendel (the only political subdivision ever to be created democratically
in Nigerian history) was divided into Edo and Delta states.
The Midwest:
(capital of Midwestern Region, Midwestern, Bendel and now Edo State)
became the headquarters of the Second Division (which was created
specifically to liberate the Midwest) until it was transferred to Ibadan
in the early seventies. According to sources, the real reason the HQ
was transferred was that the West put political pressure on the federal
government to get a Divisional HQ. The ostensible reason it was
transferred (and cover story) was a probe into the activities of the
Ogboni Secret Society in Benin City and Bendel in general. Army Brass
claimed the army was being corrupted, even though Ibadan and Lagos are
both key centers of Ogboni activity! A Brigade HQ was, however, left in
Benin until the late eighties/ early nineties when it was disbanded, as
part of another “re-organization”. [A supply and transport company,
along with the infantry battalion at Okitipupa, under that brigade were also disbanded.]
The huge 4 Mechanised Infantry Brigade HQ compound in
GRA (which used to be the Divisional HQ) was turned over to the state
government. In addition to an Army Reserve and Recruitment Center, an
infantry battalion (69th) was left behind, located just outside the city
on Ekenhuan road. This was later replaced by the 322 Field Artillery
regiment. The large makeshift Ikpoba Army barracks (at the junction of
the Benin-Asaba and Benin-Auchi roads) no longer exists.
The reason why there is a large Military Hospital in
Benin (on Airport road) was because Benin became an important rear
location for strategic medical evacuation during the War. That hospital
(so far) remains there today although it is no longer a ‘reference’
hospital, having been downgraded to be commanded by a Lt. Col. The HQ
(and School) of the Army’s Corp of Supply and Transport is at Ugbowo.
The civil wartime airforce forward operational base
(FOB) in Benin was transformed into the headquarters of the Tactical Air
Command, Nigerian AirForce during the reorganization after 1975 (6). It
remained so until Air Vice-Marshall Ibrahim Alfa became Chief of Air
Staff in 1984 and (without any credible reason) moved it to Makurdi (7,
17, 18). What remains now in what is known as the “81 Air Center” are a
few propeller aircraft sitting in the rain near the old terminal, a far
cry from the L29 Delphin and Mig17 fighter jets that used to streak its
skies (18). It is unclear what has happened to the Maritime surveillance
and Anti-submarine warfare capability that was at one time spoken
about.
Somewhere near Agenebode
a huge barrack facility (cantonment) was built in the late seventies.
It was later turned over for Police and paramilitary use in the late
eighties/ early nineties. The 12 Field Engineer Regiment at Agenebode
was either disbanded or moved. The Nigerian Army Electrical and
Mechanical Engineer Corps (NAEME) Training branch (School) is still at Auchi.
An Army Reserve and Recruitment Center is located at Asaba which is now the capital of Delta State.
Warri
is garrisoned by the 20 Amphibious Infantry battalion which is
administratively under the Brigade HQ in Port Harcourt. Warri also has
an oil refinery and is the location of the Delta Steel Plant, Aladja,
both of which are in disrepair. It has a modern Port, not far from a
site from where I hid, (at the age of ten) trembling under the Minikon
air-attacks of the mercenary Count Von Rosen against a background of
Bofors antiaircraft gunfire. The stone frigate, NNS Umualokun is based
at the Naval Base there. A Trans-delta expressway now links Warri to
Port Harcourt.
The Niger Bridge was repaired after the war, as was the famous Onitsha
market, which was gutted with fire. A river-port is now located at
Onitsha. Shehu Shagari, the President who eventually pardoned Ojukwu
(and Gowon), built it. Little (if any) evidence remains of the blood
that was tragically shed there. Shagari also built a Port in Sapele
in the eighties, which was for some time (and probably still is) a
Nigerian Naval Base, not far from the Thermal Gas Power plant (18).
Monuments
Certain historic roads in major midwestern cities
were initially renamed after key Civil War Commanders (Mohammed, Gowon,
Ogbemudia and others). These roads reverted to their old names in a
temporary fit of righteousness when the Murtala/ Obasanjo regime came to
power in 1975. But other roads and public places were renamed later in
their honor. After General Mohammed’s death in 1976, for example, “Ramat
Park” was dedicated on Ikpoba Hill. Unfortunately, with officials and
citizens alike oblivious of its historical significance, it has largely
been overgrown with weeds over the years.
On December 18, 1980, the elected Bendel State House
of Assembly overwhelmingly passed a ‘Vote of Implicit Confidence’ in
Brigadier Samuel Ogbemudia (rtd) as the Military Governor of Bendel
State from 1967 to 1975.
A statue called the “Soldier of Peace” now stands
adjacent to the Museum at Ring Road Park in Benin City. With a gun
cocked ready, it is dedicated to those who lost their lives liberating
the Midwest.
Acknowledgements
Although a victim of several air-raids, all of which I
remember vividly, and a witness to troop movements and littered
corpses, I was too young to directly participate in the Nigerian crisis.
I must, therefore, thank all the actors in and witnesses to the crises
of 1966-70 for putting their invaluable experiences on paper and being
willing to discuss their perspectives. Even though perceptions of events
differ, their efforts have made it possible to reconstruct history for
future generations. I can understand why some are unwilling to discuss
these matters because of the pain and fear that stereotypes and
inaccuracies may be handed down to unsuspecting future generations.
However, we really cannot move forward without coming to terms with our
past. One hopes that the 30 year lag since those events has helped to
heal some of the wounds.
Those who ignore history are condemned to repeat it.
As much as possible I have tried to verify much of what I have said
today. In fact, this presentation is part of a book I am writing on the
subject. I appeal to others who have personal stories to share them, so
that we can all learn from their experiences. May the souls of the
departed rest in peace.
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